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ABSTRACT 
 
Are competitive elections “good” for democracy?  Competitive elections are said to 
symbolize the health of democracy, and their absence thus challenges the viability of the political 
system.  But, there are actually competing expectations about the consequences of competition 
on representation.  Close elections may increase reelection-oriented legislators’ responsiveness 
to the interests of their constituents.  However, time, effort, and resources spent campaigning in 
the district means time taken away from governing in Washington DC.  Further, the increased 
focus on legislators’ reelection constituencies may drive them to be less likely to pursue the 
interests of the district as a whole, particularly in primary elections where the reelection 
constituency is the party base.  
I investigate how primary competition affects legislators’ volume of activity, the issue 
content of this activity, and their levels of party loyalty.  Using primary election data from the 
1998-2008 election cycles and legislative behavior data from the 105
th 
- 110
th
 Congresses, my 
analyses compare the legislative behavior of MCs with and without primary opponents, the 
behavior of legislators before and during the primary election, and MCs’ behavior across 
Congresses. In turn, this provides insight into how primary competition affects legislative 
behavior, and, equally important, whether it promotes representation and responsiveness. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Are competitive elections “good” for democracy?  Is the ideal political system one where 
close elections are widespread and prominent?  Normative theorists and empirical researchers 
have answered these questions with a resounding “yes.”  Competitive elections serve as a 
benchmark for defining democracy, with even the most minimal classifications identifying them 
as a necessary condition (see, for example, Dahl 1971; Huntington 1991; Schumpeter 1942).  In 
short, competitive elections symbolize the health of democracy, and their absence challenges the 
viability of the political system. 
But reality rarely meets these expectations.  In the 2008 congressional election, for 
example, nearly every House member running for reelection had an opponent in the general 
election (361 out of 390 incumbents), but only 29 percent were involved in heated battles, and 
even fewer received competition in the primary election.  In fact, 21 percent of incumbents had 
opposition in the primary, with just 5 percent facing a high quality challenger with previous 
elected office experience.
1
  And this lack of competitiveness in congressional primaries is not 
new.  Ten years earlier, in the 1998 election, 19 percent of incumbents had challengers in their 
primaries, and only 3 percent had a high quality challenger.  As congressional reelection rates 
have remained at very high levels over time, both political observers and political scientists alike 
have been concerned about this lack of competitive elections. 
Although we often posit that competition is “good” for the political system, this is a 
normative conjecture that has not been rigorously tested.  The effects of competition merit 
investigation because there are actually competing expectations about the consequences of 
competition on representation.  On the one hand, competition may increase reelection-oriented 
                                                 
1
 As defined by Jacobson (1989), a high quality challenger is one who has held elected office. 
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legislators’ responsiveness to the interests of their constituents (Schumpeter 1942). Competition 
creates incentives for members of Congress (MCs) to attend to the wishes of their districts in 
order to stay in office.  On the other, time, effort, and resources spent campaigning in the district 
means time taken away from governing in Washington, DC, as legislators with challengers must 
leave their duties on Capitol Hill in order to return to the district to campaign. Compared to their 
colleagues who do not have challengers, they may be less present in Washington, DC, and, 
hence, less active representing their districts’ policy interests in Congress.   
Further, the increased focus on legislators’ reelection constituencies—those in their 
districts they must have the support of to get reelected—may drive incumbents to be less likely 
to pursue the interests of the district as a whole. This should be particularly true in primary 
elections, as the reelection constituency is the party base, a small group of more ideologically 
extreme voters (Aldrich 1995; Brady, Han, and Pope 2007; Mayhew 1974; McCloskey et al. 
1960; Norrander 1989; Ranney 1972).  Competition in primaries might induce legislators to 
focus more on the interests of the primary constituency rather than that of the larger district.  And 
although primary competition might lead to better representation in ideologically uniform 
districts where the party base closely resembles the larger electorate, it may have the opposite 
effect in ideologically diverse districts where the party base is only a small subset of the larger 
district constituency.  This raises questions about whether we should consider competition 
inherently desirable in elections. 
 My dissertation focuses on this puzzle.  Using primary election data from the 1998-2008 
election cycles and legislative behavior data from the 105
th
-110
th
 Congresses, I investigate how 
the presence and quality of primary challenges affects incumbents’ behavior as policy-makers.  
In particular, I assess how primaries affect the volume of their activity, the issue content of this 
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activity, and their levels of partisan loyalty.  My analyses compare the legislative behavior of 
incumbents with and without primary opponents, the change in behavior of legislators before and 
during the primary election, and incumbents’ behavior across Congresses.  The results point to 
different effects of primaries depending on the timing of legislators’ primaries, specifically the 
proximity of the primary election date to the general election.  This provides insight into how 
primary competition affects legislative behavior, and, equally important, whether it promotes 
representation and responsiveness.  
This project offers a number of contributions.  From a normative standpoint, I empirically 
test the claim that competition is intrinsically good for the political system.  It is often assumed 
that competition is the democratic ideal, but we do not fully understand whether this holds in 
practice.  If competition induces legislative responsiveness, then in congressional primaries this 
means MCs will become more responsive to the party base.  Thus, we should pause to consider 
how competition at all stages in the election process affects legislators’ representation of their 
districts.  Further, MCs’ primaries occur at different times in the year and this might impact the 
extent to which they respond to the election contexts.  If MCs with earlier primaries react 
differently to primary challengers in their legislative behavior than MCs with later primaries (i.e., 
those closer to the general election), then this suggests that the timing of primaries also impacts 
representation of the primary electorate and that of the larger district in Congress.  Adding to 
this, as the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans continues to grow and 
Congress becomes even more polarized, it might be that primaries contribute to this growing 
divide.  I add to this debate by examining whether competitive primaries encourage legislators to 
respond to the interests of the party base.  If primaries lead MCs to become more partisan, then 
this has implications about the effect of primaries on polarization. 
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My findings also contribute more generally to the field of legislative behavior.  Although 
reelection has long been viewed as one of the central goals of MCs, only recently have we begun 
to fully understand how the experiences candidates have in campaigns shape their behavior in 
Congress.  We expect that the reelection imperative should drive legislators to represent and 
respond to their constituents, but we have not fully explored how this connects to what MCs 
actually do in office.  This is important because not only does this relate to representation, but 
also has implications for policy outcomes.  Among many things, legislators introduce and 
cosponsor legislation, shape legislation in committee mark-up, and vote on bills and resolutions.  
If what they do is influenced by their desire for reelection, then subsequent policy outcomes will 
also be a function of the reelection imperative.  Further, we know relatively little about how the 
dynamics of primaries operate in congressional elections, and about the connection between 
primaries and legislative behavior.  Nearly all the studies that examine the election-legislative 
behavior linkage focus almost exclusively on general elections, not primaries (but see Burden 
2001).  Because elections in the United States are a two-stage process whereby candidates must 
first win their party nomination to then proceed onto the general election, it is important to 
consider how the first hurdle, the primary, affects legislative behavior.   
Competition as a Democratic Ideal 
 It is often argued that competitive elections are a necessary component of representative 
government.  Competition presents options to voters, and voters use elections as the way to hold 
their elected representatives accountable (Dahl 1956).  If voters are satisfied with their 
incumbent representatives, they vote to keep them in.  However, if they are dissatisfied, then 
they can replace incumbents with other candidates.  Knowing that voters hold them accountable, 
MCs behave in such a way as to boost their electoral prospects.  Indeed, many argue that it is 
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competition that leads legislators to represent and respond to the interests of their constituents 
(see, for example, Fiorina 1973; Froman 1963; Griffin 2006; MacRae 1952; Schumpeter 1942). 
Thus, competition and accountability are keystones of democracy.  Fenno (1978) notes: 
 “…the theory of electoral accountability holds that so long as representatives want  
to retain their office, the knowledge that they will later be held accountable at  
the polls will tend to make their representative behavior more responsive to their 
constituents.” (233) 
 
But decades of political behavior research suggests that voters are neither politically 
knowledgeable nor highly attuned to the activities of their elected representatives.  For example, 
in the seminal Michigan study of voting behavior, Campbell and his coauthors (1960) found that 
citizens were largely in the dark about the political world.  Only about one-third of respondents 
in their survey demonstrated a high level of familiarity with problems facing the country during 
that time.  Study after study suggests that voters are not very informed about politics (see, for 
example, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).  A recent survey revealed that only forty-three percent 
of citizens know that John Boehner is the Speaker of the House and just thirty-eight percent can 
correctly identify the Republican Party as the majority party in Congress (Pew 2011).  This has 
led some to argue that voters are “irrational” and “unsophisticated” (Campbell 1960; Bartels 
2008). 
So, how might voters who are otherwise unaware and unknowledgeable be able to hold 
their elected representatives accountable?  Even if voters are not informed about the activities (or 
perhaps inactivity) of their elective officials, competitive elections produce challengers who are 
more than willing to level charges about the failings of incumbents (Arnold 1990; Sulkin 2005).  
MCs are aware of these potential performance critiques and anticipate how their legislative 
activities might be used against them in subsequent elections (Kingdon 1968).  In addition, 
failing to act on behalf of the district might also lead to a strong challenger in the next election.  
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Not only do voters punish legislators on the basis of, for example, their roll call voting patterns, 
but challengers can emerge as a consequence of these actions (Arnold 1990; Fiorina 1974).  
Given this, the uncertainty surrounding election outcomes encourages incumbents to represent 
and respond to the interests of their districts.  
Such responsiveness manifests itself in legislators’ activities in their districts and in their 
legislative activity in Congress.  Legislators understand that although their elected duties are in 
Washington, DC, they get reelected back at home (Fenno 1978).  MCs spend a good deal of time 
in their districts.  When faced with a challenge, legislators are prompted to head back to their 
districts and spend even more time there while they are campaigning.  In doing so, they seek to 
gain electoral support from those in their districts.  This is normatively good because constituents 
want their elected representatives present in the district, not spending all their time in 
Washington, DC (Fenno 1978).  This direct contact builds trust, confidence, and most 
importantly for incumbents, electoral support (Fenno 1978).  By sending MCs back to their 
districts, competition enhances representation.
2
 
                                                 
2
 Before and even after Fenno’s (1978) study, the literature focuses almost exclusively on the 
district-MC representation connection as what legislators do in office, not what they do in their 
districts.  Indeed, the idea that legislators are connected to their districts when they travel more 
frequently back home has not been empirically tested.  However, this connection is important 
and has a role in elections.  For example, Senator Lugar (R-IN) was attacked in the most recent 
2012 primary election on the idea that he did not physically live in Indiana, and that he did not 
travel back to the state.  Thus, it was argued, he was out of touch with the constituents in the 
state.  He subsequently lost the primary. 
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 At the same time, competition should also persuade incumbents to become more 
responsive to their districts in their legislative activity.  In short, competition should prompt MCs 
to do what their constituents want in Congress.  From the way they vote to the issues on which 
they introduce and cosponsor legislation, competition should lead MCs to become more aligned 
with their districts, better representing their interests in Congress.
3
  
 Although we expect that competition should induce responsiveness and make for better 
representation, evidence supporting this notion has largely been mixed.  Indeed, a large body of 
research suggests that what might be the normative ideal does not play out in practice.  In the 
1950s and 1960s, for example, scholars first posited the “marginality hypothesis”—that, 
compared to their electorally secure colleagues, vulnerable legislators (those from marginal 
districts) will be more responsive to their constituents (Froman 1963; Huntington 1950; MacRae 
1952; Miller and Stokes 1963; Patterson 1961; Shannon 1968).  The marginality hypothesis was 
first applied to legislators’ party loyalty in Congress.  The expectation was that MCs from 
marginal districts would be less loyal to the party in their roll call votes and more responsive to 
the district.  The argument was that the interests of the party leadership do not represent the 
interests of the district, and eschewing the party appeals to the broader electorate.  Thus, 
vulnerable legislators should toe the party line less in order to vote in accordance with the 
preferences of their districts. 
 Huntington (1950) was the first to empirically assess this claim and found that, contrary 
to expectation, vulnerable MCs are the most loyal of all legislators.  This prompted a number of 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, early studies on the connection between electoral insecurity and legislative 
responsiveness (Froman 1963; Huntington 1950; MacRae 1952; Miller and Stokes 1963; 
Patterson 1961; Shannon 1960). 
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other studies to examine how competition affects party loyalty.  Although some research 
indicates that vulnerable MCs are less loyal to their parties (MacRae 1952; Patterson 1961), 
other studies suggest only a weak relationship (Froman 1963; Shannon 1968), and other research 
finds no link between competition and party loyalty (Cohen and Burnk 1983; Deckard 1976).  
More recently, scholars have assessed how party loyalty affects electoral vulnerability, and these 
findings suggest that party loyalty hurts MCs on Election Day and can actually contribute to 
vulnerability (Carson et al. 2010).  In sum, there is no consistent conclusion about the effect of 
competition on party loyalty.  
A second strand of research examines how competition affects the policy congruence, or 
the degree of agreement on issue positions, between legislators and their districts.  Here, it is 
expected that the congruence in issue positions between districts and MCs should be high, 
especially for vulnerable legislators.  Miller and Stokes’ (1963) foundational study set the stage 
for research on policy congruence.  Looking at specific policy areas, they found, surprisingly, a 
relatively weak overall level of policy congruence between legislators’ roll calls and the 
preferences of their districts.  These results raise a number of questions about the extent to which 
legislators actively represent the views of their constituents.  They suggest that the representation 
of constituents’ preferences in Congress might be less far-reaching and more issue-specific.  On 
some issues, Miller and Stokes found a high level of association between legislators’ and 
constituents’ policy positions, while on other issues, they found less.  As they note, “No single, 
generalized configuration of attitudes and perceptions links Representatives with constituency 
but rather several distinct patterns, and which of them is invoked depends very much on the issue 
involved .” (56) 
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Following Miller and Stokes (1963), a number of studies looked more closely at 
legislator-district policy congruence (see, for example, Erikson 1978; Kuklinski 1977; Stone 
1979),
4
 and research also examined the role of competition in affecting this congruence.  These 
latter studies anticipated that vulnerability would increase the level of policy congruence 
between legislators and their district.  However, the evidence supporting this is inconsistent 
(Fiorina 1974; Kuklinksi 1977; Miller 1970), with only more recent research suggesting that 
MCs from marginal districts are more responsive to the opinions of their districts (Griffin 2006). 
Scholars have also taken other approaches in studying the linkage between competition 
and representation and responsiveness.  Some have sought to understand the connection between 
ideology and electoral vulnerability.  The idea here is that competition should lead MCs to 
become more moderate and more responsive to the ideological center.  Much like other research 
in this area, the findings are mixed.  Indeed, studies suggest that vulnerable MCs are more 
ideologically moderate (Erikson and Wright 2000), but, at the same time, scholarship also 
indicates that they are less responsive to the ideological center (Gulati 2004).   
In addition, research examines the relationship between legislators’ behavior in Congress 
and subsequent vote shares.  Some studies find that legislators from marginal districts are 
considerably more likely to win if their policy positions are congruent with their districts 
(Sullivan and Uslaner 1978), and that voters punish MCs for being too partisan (Bovitz and 
                                                 
4
 However, Arnold (1990) contends that we cannot directly map district preferences onto the 
legislative behavior.  He argues that the preferences of districts are not fixed, but are flexible, 
and legislators and constituents learn from and respond to each other.  In addition, he suggests 
that MCs anticipate future opinion, or potential preferences, of their districts and this influences 
their legislative behavior. 
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Carson 2006).  But, evidence also indicates that regardless of vulnerability, all MCs are punished 
for being too ideologically extreme (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002).  Further adding to this debate, 
some posit that MCs are safe precisely because they are responding to the interests of their 
constituents, and become vulnerable when they are not (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002; Sulkin 2005; 
2011).  
Although the evidence supporting the idea that competition induces legislative 
responsiveness is mixed at best, the assumption that undergirds the literature is that competitive 
elections should enhance representation, and that this is good for democracy.  As argued, it is the 
uncertainty surrounding competitive elections that drives incumbents to actively represent and 
respond to their constituents so that they can get reelected.  This means that legislators should 
return to their districts to campaign while at the same time becoming more active in representing 
the interests of their districts in Washington, DC.  This responsiveness to the district both at 
home and in Congress, so it goes, is good for representation. 
Competition Might Be Bad 
Rarely do we pause to consider the opposite scenario—that competition might have 
negative effects.  The reelection connection, the need to get reelected to stay in office, might 
have less than desirable consequences on both the representation of the district and perhaps 
aggregate policy outcomes.  Indeed, competition might reduce the amount of time legislators 
spend policy-making, and the policy-making process itself might be a function of the reelection 
imperative, rather than substantive policy ends. 
Because legislators must campaign for reelection while simultaneously working in 
Washington, DC, a competitive election means legislators may be less present in Congress than 
their colleagues without such challenges.  Although it might be good that competition forces 
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MCs to return to their districts to campaign, this might actually hurt representation of the district 
in Congress.  Representation in government requires that elected representatives actually be 
present, and the act of campaigning may mean that MCs vote at lesser frequency, participate less 
in committees, and are less engaged in policy-making. 
Moreover, research suggests that even when present in Washington, DC, competition 
causes legislators to focus less on their legislative priorities and to attend more to constituency 
service (Wawro 2001).  Constituency casework has long been noted as electorally beneficial 
(Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1989).  As Wawro (2001) discusses, providing constituency service 
(such as guiding constituents through the bureaucratic processes) might have higher electoral 
return than, for example, actively participating in committee mark-up.  Given this, legislators in 
competitive elections might attend less to their roles as policy-makers and spend more time 
providing constituency service.  But, this has consequences for representation.  By focusing more 
on individual constituent-specific problems, legislators are not as active in the policy-making 
process, thus representing their districts’ interests less in governing. 
It could also be that competition negatively affects both the legislative process and 
policies that are enacted.  First, it might be that legislative policy outcomes are a direct result of 
elections.  Schumpeter (1942), for example, suggests that elections lead representatives to pursue 
short-term goals and overlook the long-term interests of the nation as a whole.  He warns that 
“the dosing that a government decides on with an eye to its political chances is not necessarily 
the one that will produce the results most satisfactory to the nation.” (287)   
Mayhew (1974) builds on this and suggests that MCs who want to stay in office must get 
reelected, so what legislators do in office may actually be a response not to what is “best” for 
their districts, but what will most likely get them reelected.  He contends that both the structure 
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of Congress and the behavior of its members are a result of the reelection imperative.  Mayhew 
asserts that Congress as an institution is organized and maintained in order to promote reelection.  
The committee system, for instance, is structured so that legislators can claim credit over such 
activities as blocking legislation. Even more, some committees allocate distributive benefits, or 
funding for programs and projects.  This allows MCs in these committees to further make 
claims—regardless of their actual efforts—in securing funds for such programs as agricultural 
subsidies or more specific projects in their districts such as the building of a bridge or the repair 
of a highway.  In other words, this helps legislators tell their districts, “Hey, look what I’ve done 
for you lately.” 
Considering this, Mayhew and others (see, for example, Eulau 1986; Eulau and Karps 
1977) assert that reelection leads MCs to pursue symbolic activity—that which has no real 
substantive or policy outcome.  Rather, legislators seek to retain electoral support by gaining 
trust from their constituents through legislative activities (Eulau 1986; Eulau and Karps 1977).  
This trust can be built in a number of ways varying from voters’ perceptions of elected officials’ 
qualifications (Fenno 1978) to voters acknowledging the asymmetry in information in regards to 
legislative proposals and processes (Arnold 1990).  Further, legislators can do things that make 
constituents feel as though their representative is actively working on their behalf, regardless of 
whether the legislator is successful in effectively changing policy outcomes.  From this it is 
argued that symbolic responsiveness rests on building credit among constituents in order to 
remain in office (Eulau and Karps 1977). 
 I follow others (Koger 2003; Schiller 1995; Sulkin 2005; 2011) and argue that such 
“symbolic” activity is actually meaningful legislative behavior because these activities are what 
voters elect policymakers to do in Congress and also serve as the starting point for policy 
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changes.  However, the notion that competition creates incentives for legislators to pursue 
election goals while ignoring what might be best in the long term, or for the country as a whole, 
is worth considering.  If MCs are overlooking important policy implications of their actions in 
Congress in order to do things to help them get reelected the next time around, then perhaps 
competitive elections do not necessarily yield the most desirable effects.  Removing electoral 
uncertainty frees incumbents from having to adhere to the popular sentiment of their constituents 
and allows them to assess the long-term impact of policy.  
Primaries, Timing, and District Heterogeneity 
 Any predictions about the effects of competition on representation are complicated by the 
two-stage nature of the election process.  Competition can surface in primaries, in general 
elections, or in both.  In order to proceed on to the general election, legislators must first win the 
party nomination.  This two-stage process means that legislators have two different reelection 
constituencies.  The primary constituency is more ideologically extreme, while the general 
electorate is typically a more moderate sub-group of the broader district.  These two 
constituencies—the primary and general election—tend to have different political leanings.   
If competition drives MCs to become more responsive, competitive primaries should lead 
legislators to become more responsive to the primary constituency, the party base.  In doing so, 
for example, legislators might become more partisan in their legislative behavior, something that 
political scientists and political pundits alike deem potentially detrimental to governing.  This 
lends itself to further questioning the inherent desirability of competitive elections.  In fact, 
increased responsiveness to the party base could be very bad if, as some contend, it leads to 
greater polarization in Congress.  After all, polarization in Congress causes gridlock, tension, and 
decreased public approval of the institution. 
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But the two-stage election process also presents another complication.  Because primaries 
occur at various points in time over the course of a campaign season ranging anywhere from 
January to October, legislators might react differently to their primary election contexts 
depending on the time between their primary election date and the general election.  When MCs 
have more time to adjust their behavior between the primary and general election, (i.e., if they 
have an early February or March primary), then they will likely focus on their primary election 
constituency first and then move on to their general election constituency.  In contrast, MCs who 
have primaries that are close to the general election, say September or October, have less time to 
adjust their behavior and will likely be campaigning for the primary and the general election at 
the same time.  The extent to which these incumbents appeal to the primary constituency might 
be reduced compared to their colleagues with primaries that are earlier in the primary campaign 
season.  In turn, primaries might have different impacts on the quality of representation for 
congressional districts depending on the timing of the primary.  As suggested, incumbents with 
primaries in the early part of the campaign season may be more induced to seek to appeal to the 
party base during their primary campaigns, perhaps representing the policy interests of the larger 
district to a lesser extent in Congress.   
However, some districts have a propensity for competitive primaries, while other districts 
tend to have competitive general elections.  These tendencies are in large part due to the 
ideological balance of the district.  For example, districts that are ideologically homogenous (i.e., 
districts that are uniform in their ideology) encourage competitive primaries because the district 
is more unified in its partisanship and thus intra-party competition is more common (Brunell 
2008).  In these districts, the party base more closely resembles the general electorate.  The 
policy congruence, or issue position correspondence, between MCs and constituents in 
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homogenous districts is high.  Because of this, legislators from these districts are typically 
electorally safe in general elections, but are vulnerable to primary challenges (Key 1956).  As 
Fenno (1978) notes, “…it is precisely when reelection margins are greatest that the threat of a 
primary is most serious.” (14)  
 In contrast, ideologically diverse districts promote competitive general elections (Fiorina 
1974).  These districts are more politically balanced, and this results in a heterogeneous, or 
diverse, electorate (Brunell 2008).  Policy congruence between the district and the legislator is 
much lower in these districts because the electorate is more evenly split between the two parties.  
Given this, MCs in these districts are more inclined to draw challenges from the opposing party 
(Brunell 2008; Koetzle 1998).  
Competition may exert different effects on the quality of representation depending on 
both the ideological balance of the district and the stage in the election process.  For example, 
primary competition might inversely affect the level of representation in heterogeneous and 
homogenous districts.  Primary competition should lead MCs to become more responsive to the 
party base.  This is good for constituents in homogenous districts where the general electorate 
would more likely resemble the party base (Brunell 2008).  But, this is potentially bad in 
heterogeneous districts because MCs are responding to the interest of only a small group of their 
larger constituency.   
 In sum, the composition of the district affects when we are likely to see competition in 
congressional elections, and this has implications about representation and responsiveness.  Still, 
the reality is that MCs in any type of district can find themselves with a challenge at some stage 
in the reelection process.  Whether the competition is in the general election or the primary, we 
should expect that these election experiences affect incumbents’ legislative behavior in 
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Congress.  But, the timing of the primary relative to the general election might have an equally 
important influence on the quality of representation. 
Primaries and Legislative Behavior 
 Up to this point I have focused on the ways that competition might be good for 
representation and responsiveness, and as well as how it might be bad.  I contend that the two-
stage election process and the composition of congressional districts complicate the normative 
assertion that competition is intrinsically good.  In what follows, I examine this by empirically 
testing how MCs’ primary election experiences affect their behavior as policy-makers in 
Congress.  I contend that primary competition influences how legislators allocate their time and 
their responsiveness to the party base. 
 First, competition might force legislators to make decisions about where they should 
spend their time.  Specifically, competition should lead MCs to return to the district and 
campaign.  Although it may be good for incumbents to connect with their districts, the business 
of Washington, DC continues during the campaign season.  Thus, campaigning may draw 
legislators away from their responsibilities in Congress and reduce their representation of the 
district.   
 Second, primary competition should lead MCs to enhance their responsiveness to the 
party base in their legislative behavior.  In particular, incumbents should become more attentive 
to the policy interests of their primary constituency in not only their roll call votes, but also the 
types of issues they are active in introducing and cosponsoring legislation on.   This, in turn, 
might have negative consequences on the representation of the district as a whole.  
 However, the extent to which primaries affects how legislators allocate their time and 
respond to the interests of the party base might be based on the timing of legislators’ primaries, 
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specifically the proximity of the primary to the general election, and the composition of 
legislators’ districts.  When MCs only have to focus on their primary challengers, those with 
early primaries should be more likely to attend to the policy interests of the party base.  
However, when MCs have to juggle the competing demands of the primary and general election 
constituency—those who have primaries closely timed with the general election—they should 
allocate more their time away from Washington, DC and pursue the interests of the larger district 
rather than the party base.  Further, the composition of legislators’ districts may also moderate 
the effects of primaries on legislators’ policy priorities.  Specifically, those with primaries from 
ideologically diverse districts may be less likely to adhere to the policy priorities of the party 
base during primaries compared to MCs from ideologically uniform districts. 
Chapter Overview 
In the next chapter I discuss the congressional primary literature, and further develop the 
hypotheses introduced in this chapter.  Chapter 3 details the data collection and measures used in 
the empirical chapters.  Following this, the subsequent three chapters test my hypotheses.  In 
Chapter 4, I investigate how primary competition affects the volume of legislators’ activity.  I 
examine the extent to which primaries cause legislators to simultaneously increase their activity 
on bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships, while at the same time decrease their 
activity on roll call votes and amendments.  Chapters 5 and 6 explore the extent to which 
primaries promote responsiveness to the particular interests of the primary constituency, the 
party base.  In Chapter 5, I investigate whether legislators become more focused on issues that 
are important to the party base while they are campaigning in their primaries, and Chapter 6 
looks at the effects of primaries on partisanship in Congress.  Finally, in Chapter 7 I discuss the 
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institutional-level effects of primary competition.  I also address the implications of the role of 
competition in promoting representation and responsiveness.   
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Chapter 2: Congressional Primaries 
 
In Chapter 1 I discussed how competition might have both good and bad effects on 
representation.  To assess the normative assertion that competition is good for the political 
system, I study the effects of primaries on legislative behavior.  Although congressional general 
elections have been widely studied, primaries have not.  Examining how primaries affect 
legislators’ behavior as policy-makers provides important insight into how competition might 
have less-than-desirable effects.  This chapter outlines extant approaches to investigations of 
congressional primaries and details my argument about the dynamic relationship between 
primaries and legislative behavior.  Before I begin, it is important to first consider the changing 
role of congressional primaries in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, as it sets the stage for the 
study of the primary-legislative behavior linkage.   
The Birth of Primaries 
Prior the early 1900s, there were no congressional primaries like we know today.  Before 
this time, nearly all local, state, and federal candidates were nominated at state party conventions 
or caucuses by powerful party officials (Key 1956; Meyer 1902; McFarland 1963; Ware 2002).
5
 
The public had little involvement in deciding party nominees in congressional elections as the 
parties controlled all elements of the primary nomination process.  Party control over the 
nominations led to a system of party patronage in government (Merriam 1928). 
In the late 1880s, reformers pressed for changes to limit the parties’ influence over 
primary nominations.  These reformers wanted political power out of the hands of party elites 
and placed in the hands of citizens (Key 1956).   By taking the nominating power away from 
                                                 
5
 In those few places where voters could vote in a primary, the candidates were selected by the 
party, the ballots were made by the party, and the votes were counted by the party (Ware 2002). 
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party bosses, the electorate would be able to choose its elected representatives.  In turn, elected 
representatives would be free of party control and accountable to the citizens who nominated 
them. With popularly elected nominees for office, the traditional use of elected office as a way 
for party bosses to control government processes and outputs would be inhibited (Key 1956).  
Thus, the direct primary would be an instrument for accountability to, and representation of, the 
electorate.  This would lead to a more open system of government whereby patronage to the 
party leaders and corruption would be drastically reduced (Meyer 1902).  
Transformation in the North 
Although the largely Republican-dominated north and the Democratic-controlled south 
simultaneously adopted the direct primary, the origins of the policy change were somewhat 
different (Galderisi and Ezra 2001; Ware 2002).  Conventional wisdom holds that in the North, 
the Progressives led the primary election charge against the Republican party establishment. 
However, this explanation fails to recognize that the Republican party in the North also had 
much to gain from a change in the system (Ware 2002).  During this time, the geographic 
composition of the north was changing due to immigration waves and industrialization.  Such 
geographic and socioeconomic shifts had political consequences on the stability of the 
Republican party.  The expanding population led to urbanization with large concentrations of 
diverse people (Merriam 1928; Ware 2002).  This rapid expansion of population required more 
public services and governmental action (Merriam 1928), something that neither the government 
nor the parties were prepared to handle.  At the same time, the vastly heterogeneous electorate 
increased factionalization within the Republican party, with many groups competing for power 
in the party’s political system (Ware 2002).   
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This was a critical moment for the political parties in the north.  The newly created 
concentrations of population created openings for fraudulent behavior in both parties (Ware 
2002).  In rural communities where everyone knew each other and knew who could vote, 
deceptive activity by the parties was limited.  However, in urban areas with high concentrations 
of people and no rules governing election procedures, abuse and corruption were rampant 
(Merriam 1928; Ware 2002).  This fueled the charges made by reformers.  The Republican party 
did not want its internal disagreements to cause the party to break apart, or give the Democrats in 
the north the upper hand (Key 1956; Ware 2002).  In addition, the diverse groups that were 
competing for offices under the Republican label created disputes with no mechanisms to solve 
internal party disputes.  Thus, the informal arrangements and loose organizational structure that 
the parties previously relied upon led to disagreements within the organizations, and frequent 
allegations of fraud and corruption from those outside and inside the party (Ware 2002).  Both 
Democrats and Republicans saw the need for institutionalization of rules and government 
regulations in order to deal with the changing conditions, and to unite their coalitions.   
Among these new regulations was the creation of state-run elections where the 
government created and disseminated the ballot, and tabulated the election returns.  Previously, 
the parties controlled these aspects of elections.  In addition, states began adopting mandatory 
state direct primary legislation with popular control over elections and government (Merriam 
1928; Ware 2002).  These changes, it was argued, would reduce incidents of bribery and fraud 
that were all too pervasive, legitimize the parties and the election process to the public, help the 
government deal with the changing geographic and political conditions, and provide structure 
and rules that would reduce intraparty disagreements.  Without such regulations, the Republican 
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party, particularly in the north, was certain not to survive (Ware 2002).  Given this, the parties 
agreed to a radical change in the nomination process. 
Transformation in the South 
The roots of the direct primary in the South can be reduced to issues surrounding race.  In 
the south, the Democratic party was largely the all-white old Confederacy, while the Republican 
party in the south was the party of African Americans (Kousser 1976).  The Democratic party 
had an overwhelming base of support and controlled all local, state, and national offices, and 
competitive general elections were rare.  Thus, the candidates selected as the party nominees 
were the nearly automatic office holders. 
During the late 1890s, an independent movement consisting of economically depressed 
white Democrats took root in the south (Key 1956; Kousser 1976).  Like reformers in the north, 
this group sought a more open political system to replace backroom deals and under-the-table 
nominating procedures.  Division within the party grew as more argued for a popularly elected 
nomination system.  The Democratic party establishment in the south, much like the Republican 
party in the North, was concerned that such dissatisfaction within the party could result in defeat 
in general elections (Kousser 1976).  Unlike northern Republicans, however, the reorganization 
of the nominating system was largely racially motivated.  Above all else, those in the Democratic 
party did not want the Republican party, the party of African Americans, winning elections in the 
south (Kousser 1976).  A fractured Democratic party, they feared, would lead to African 
Americans, or their Republican sympathizers, in office.  Thus, the party reformed the nomination 
system in order to appease those within the party that were upset with the status quo while at the 
same time maintaining white control in elected office.   
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These reforms did not decisively eliminate party bosses and machine politics at the start 
of the 20
th
 century, but they did start a movement for greater party organization, transparency, 
and public input through primaries. Over time, every state adopted the direct primary.
6
  Along 
with it, congressional elections began to change.  In some areas, competitive general elections 
were widely present, while in other areas competitive primaries were frequent.   
With the emergence of primaries, political scientists became interested in their effects.  
Three strands of congressional primary research developed.  First, scholars became interested in 
the presence, or causes, of competitive congressional primaries.  Here, research centered on how 
district conditions and the motivations of ambitious politicians led to contested primaries (see 
Ewing 1953; Jewell 1967; Key 1949; Turner 1953).  Other studies examined the primary-general 
election linkage.  For some, the focus was on the effects of primaries on general elections.  Here, 
the central question was whether primaries help or hurt candidates in general elections (see Born 
1981; Comer 1976; Johnson and Gibson 1974; Kenney and Rice 1987; Lazarus 2005; Lengle 
1980; Romero 2003; Southwell 1986; Stone 1986; Sullivan 1977-78).  The last strand studied 
how legislators juggle the competing demands of the primary and general election constituencies 
in Congress (see Adams, Brunell and Grofman 2010; Aronson and Ordeshook 1972; Coleman 
1971; 1972; Downs 1957; Owen and Grofman 2006).  Below, I discuss each of these agendas in 
more depth.  
Causes of Contested Primaries 
 Beginning in the 1950s, scholars sought to understand why some congressional districts 
have competitive primaries, others competitive general elections, and still others have both.  In 
                                                 
6 Some states still hold caucuses in presidential elections.  Connecticut and Virginia held party 
conventions to select congressional nominees through the early 2000s.   
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the early decades of modern political science research, the South was still dominated by the 
Democratic party.  Given this, many were concerned that without a competitive two-party 
system where voters are given options on Election Day, representative government could not be 
achieved.  In response to this, some argued that in states and congressional districts with a large 
partisan bias where only one party is present in both the electorate and in government, primaries 
could perhaps serve as a substitute to competitive general elections (Ewing 1953; Jewell 1967; 
Key 1949).  If voters were presented with choices during the primary stage, then the system 
would promote accountability and representation.    
   Early explorations confirmed that competitive primaries typically emerge in electorally 
safe (i.e., districts highly skewed to one party) congressional districts.  In these districts, the real 
elections were considered to be in the primary, not the general election, and as such primary 
competition could be a successful alternative to competitive general elections.  Turner (1953) 
and Key (1956) were the first to examine the relationship between seat safety and competitive 
primaries.  States with one-party dominance, typically seen in the South, tended to have higher 
levels of competitive primaries than those states with competitive two-party competition (Turner 
1953).  Looking specifically at congressional districts, Key (1956) found that as the percentage 
of the Republican (Democratic) vote share increased, so did the percentage of competitive 
Republican (Democratic) primaries.  The implication is that one-party districts—those with a 
large proportion of the district voting for the same party—promote competitive primaries.  Put 
another way, primaries are most intense when the outlook for a win for the party in the general 
election is high.  Studies following this largely confirm these early findings (Grau 1981; Jewell 
and Olson 1982; Snyder and Ting 2011), and also suggest that voters turn out in higher numbers 
if their party’s primary is competitive (Jewell and Sigelman 1981).   
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Scholarship has also looked beyond the partisan composition of the district to examine 
how constituent diversity affects competitive elections.  When districts consist of a wide variety 
of voters with different demographic groups or ideological leanings, then this might affect the 
presence of competitive elections.  For example, in districts that are relatively homogenous, 
contested general elections should be rare, but competition in primaries should be common.  In 
other districts where citizens have diverse views and there is more balanced support between the 
two parties, then competitive general elections should be quite frequent, but contested primaries 
should be rare. 
The evidence supporting such claims is mixed, and largely centers on the connection 
between constituent diversity and competition in general elections.  Initial research into this 
question revealed that demographic diversity and competition are linked, but that this 
relationship varies by geographic region, emerging particularly in the South (Fiorina 1974; 
Froman 1963).  Following this, Bond’s (1983) study examined congressional districts in the 
1970s and found no evidence to suggest that district diversity has any effect on levels of 
competition.  The constituent diversity-competition linkage might therefore be a feature of a 
previous era of one-party dominance in the South. 
However, Koetzle (1998) develops a more sophisticated measure of constituent diversity, 
arguing that previous measures are flawed because they do not take into account that 
demographic groups are linked to certain parties.  His measure centers on whether the various 
demographic groups in congressional districts lean to the same or different parties.  If all the 
groups favor the same party, then there should not be competitive general elections.  But, if the 
groups are spread out between the parties, then there should be highly competitive elections.  In 
short, when groups have competing interests and diverging political leanings, then this 
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complexity or diversity leads to competing interests in general elections, and, hence, two-party 
competition. 
 We should expect that district diversity also affects the presence of primary elections.  If 
competing sociodemographic groups affect two-party competition, then competing groups within 
the same party are likely to lead to competitive primaries.  When the party base is largely 
homogenous, then they may be able get behind and support the same candidate because they all 
agree.  However, when the party base is made up of diverse groups, then the diverging interests 
within the same party might mean that candidates from each of these groups will compete 
against each other for the party nomination (see Herrnson and Gimpel 1995).   
 Evidence supporting this argument indicates that Democratic and Republican primaries 
have different dynamics (Herrnson and Gimpel 1995).  Only for Democrats does the diversity of 
the party base yield a higher number of contested primaries because the Democratic party base 
has traditionally been more splintered than the Republican party base.  Democrats tend to have 
more diverse cultural, ethnic, racial, and economic interests, leading to a large number of 
competing groups in Democratic primaries. 
 These studies focus almost exclusively on the composition of congressional districts as 
causes of competitive elections.  There is also reason to suspect that competition is linked to 
features outside of the electorate, such as incumbency-related factors.  In the next section I 
outline how both the presence and vulnerability of incumbents affects competition in 
congressional primaries. 
Incumbent Vulnerability and Open Seats 
When a district has an open seat or when its incumbent is viewed as vulnerable, we see 
more competition.  This in large part arises from candidates’ perceptions about their chances of 
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getting elected into office.  The strategic politician thesis, first introduced by Jacobson and 
Kernell (1983), contends that candidates, specifically high quality candidates, are only likely to 
run when they think they can win. The congressional studies literature points to the presence and 
vulnerability of incumbents as key considerations for those considering running for office (Grau 
1981; Rice 1985).   
 Incumbents are argued to hold advantages in elections contributing to high levels of 
reelection rates for House members both in primaries (Ansolabehere et al. 2006) and general 
elections (see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) for a review of the literature on incumbency 
advantage in general elections). The benefits incumbents have in elections stem not only from 
their election experience—they have run for office and won—but also from institutional features 
of Congress.  As members of Congress, legislators are armed with resources that aid their 
reelection efforts.  The institution is structured so that MCs are able to provide benefits to their 
districts such as pork (Alvarez and Saving 1997; Bickers and Stein 1996; Feldman and Jondrow 
1984).  In turn, incumbents are able to claim credit for these actions (Mayhew 1974) through 
their campaign activities (Sulkin 2005), or through the franking privilege—a key advantage that 
allows legislators to tell their districts all they have done for them on the taxpayers’ dime (Cover 
1978; Cover and Brumber 1979).   
Legislators also have direct contact with constituents in their districts.  For example, 
incumbents have large staffs working in Washington, DC and in their districts to field calls from, 
and provide help to, constituents.  Each legislator has a team of staff to focus on constituency 
service to aid those in their districts (Fiorina 1977; 1979 Fiorina and Rivers 1989; Johannes and 
McAdams 1981; Serra 1994; Serra and Covers 1992).  In addition, incumbents are able to raise 
large sums of money and develop war chests that deter challengers (Box-Steffensmeier 1996; 
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Epstein and Zemsky 1995; Fritz and Morris 1992, but, see also Goodliffe 2001; 2004).  Knowing 
they cannot possibly compete with such large campaign funds, challengers find it difficult to run 
against incumbents. 
Taken as a whole, legislators are able to use the institutional features of Congress—the 
allocation of distributive benefits, the franking privilege, and constituency service—to build 
credibility in their districts, and along the way are able to secure large campaign war chests that 
ward off challengers.  Turner (1953) nicely summarizes the incumbency advantage: 
“…the fact that he has been in office is often enough to impress his name (but rarely his record) 
on the mind of the voter.  In the case of congressmen, the franking privilege and other perquisites 
give the incumbent an advantage over his usually unknown opponent which can be overcome 
only by unusual circumstances in primary elections….The field is left, therefore, in a majority of 
cases, to the incumbent alone.” (209) 
 
 When incumbents do receive challenges in elections it is typically because they are 
already vulnerable.  Incumbent vulnerability can arise from national conditions or from factors 
related to incumbents’ performance.  National tides such as the president’s job performance, 
successes or failures of a party, and the state of the economy can lead to incumbent vulnerability.  
When the public is unhappy with a party’s performance in office, this makes the party, and the 
incumbents in that party, electorally vulnerable.  In turn, politically experienced candidates are 
more likely to emerge to challenge incumbents from the failing party.  Thus, on Election Day, 
voters in these districts have the option to choose between two high quality candidates (Jacobson 
1989; Jacobson and Kernell 1983).  At the same time, potential candidates from the party that is 
being punished by the public will likely not see the election cycle as favoring them.  These 
conditions may also lead some incumbents to strategically retire rather than go down in a defeat 
(Jacobson and Kernell 1983). 
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 In addition, if incumbents won by narrow margins in the previous elections, or if their 
overall levels of support decline over time, then this signals vulnerability.  Potentially strong 
candidates are more likely to challenge the incumbent, thus creating a competitive election.  In 
congressional elections, those who struggled in the previous primary are more likely to have 
primaries in the next election (Lazarus 2008).  
Incumbents can also make themselves vulnerable by failing to represent their constituents 
(Jacobson 2001).  As Turner (1953) discusses, “…experienced politicians avoid fruitless contests 
with incumbents unless the officeholder has made a glaring error in representation.” (209) 
Indeed, research indicates that legislators are punished at the polls for their legislative activity, 
particularly their records on roll calls (Arnold 1990; Bovitz and Carson 2000; Erickson 1971; 
Fiorina 1974).  In congressional primaries, voting out of step with the party base hurts legislators 
in primaries (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007).  Those who have primaries are often seen as lacking 
competence and integrity (Mondak 1995), or have been involved in political scandals (Welch 
and Hibbing 1997).   
An open congressional seat (i.e. one without an incumbent) creates opportunities for 
potential candidates.  Candidates can campaign on their own records, not the failings of 
incumbents (Gaddie and Bullock 2000).  This may lead voters to select candidates based on 
potential rather than previous performance, thereby leveling the field across candidates.  This 
means that there is great uncertainty and enhanced competitiveness in open seat races, as 
opposed to those with incumbents present (Banks and Kiewet 1989; Bianco 1984; Carson 2005; 
Gaddie and Bullock 2000; Jacobson 1989; Squire 1989; Wrighton and Squire 1997). 
Empirical research suggests that the effects of open seats on candidate emergence are 
similar in congressional primaries and general elections.  When there is an open seat, there are 
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more candidates competing in the primary, a higher proportion of whom are high quality 
candidates (Grau 1981; Hogan 2003; Schantz 1980).  But, when an incumbent is present, the 
party of the incumbent matters.  Potential candidates are less likely to challenge an incumbent 
from within their party.  In their study of candidate emergence, Maisel and Stone (1997) find that 
one of the most important factors that affect whether potential candidates run is their odds of 
winning the party nomination in the primary.  A key component of this is whether they would be 
challenging the incumbent from their party.  
All told, then, competitive primaries, like competitive general elections, are likely to 
emerge in open seat races.  When an incumbent does get a challenge, it is usually because he or 
she is perceived to be vulnerable.   This is because campaigning in congressional elections 
requires money, time, and an abundant amount of resources.  Ambitious politicians who think 
they can raise enough money, spend enough time, and acquire the needed resources to 
subsequently win will be more likely to run.  Running for office does not come without potential 
costs.  For those who are already in elected positions, running for a higher post might mean they 
have to give up their current offices.  If they were to run and lose, their political careers might be 
over.  Candidates’ decisions to enter congressional races are not taken lightly, particularly for 
those high quality candidates who have a lot on the line.  
Divisive Primaries 
 As discussed previously, one defining feature of the U.S. election system is the two-stage 
election process.  What happens in the first stage, the primary, might shape what happens in the 
second stage, the general election.  Candidates do not start anew in the general election, and the 
lingering effects of a divisive, or highly competitive, primary might follow into the general 
election. 
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 Although some studies contend that divisive primaries can help lesser-known 
congressional candidates in the general election to, for example, gain name recognition (see 
Ware 1979), others find no relationship between divisive primaries and general election 
outcomes (Hacker 1965; Kenney 1998), and most argue that divisive primaries do candidates 
more harm than good (Born 1981; Comer 1976; Johnson and Gibson 1974; Kenney and Rice 
1987; Lengle 1980; Romero 2003; Southwell 1986; Stone 1986; Sullivan 1977-78).  Competitive 
primaries mean that candidates have to use resources to win the party nomination instead of 
reserving funds for the general election (Born 1981; Lengle 1980; Romero 2003).  Replenishing 
these resources requires support from donors.  But, in hard fought contests there is always a 
winner and a loser.  Supporters of the losing candidate might find it difficult to circle the wagons 
and support the party nominee.  Some assert that this is because candidates’ supporters develop 
psychological attachments to candidates (Kenney and Rice 1987; Sullivan 1977-78).  Then, 
following a primary defeat, these members of the party base find it difficult to switch their 
loyalty to the winning candidate (Kenney and Rice 1987; Sullivan 1977-78).  During the general 
election, they may not actively campaign or work hard on behalf of the party nominee and 
perhaps even avoid voting altogether (Comer 1976; Johnson and Gibson 1974; Stone 1986). 
  It might also be that divisive primaries cause disgruntlement among members of the party 
that spills over into the general election.  Southwell (1986) argues that supporters have an 
emotional response to their candidate’s defeat, and are unhappy with the party nominee.  This 
discontent with the party nominee could be because of policy or even personality differences.  
The prediction, then, is the same as the psychological attachment model: divisive primaries 
decrease the support of the party base for the nominee in the general election.  This means that 
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the party nominees have lower vote shares in the general election than they would if they had 
easily sailed through the primary election stage.  
Nonetheless, empirical investigations often fail to account for the idea that the party’s 
prospects in the general election might affect the quality of candidates competing for the party 
nomination, hence leading to divisive primaries (Born 1981; Lazarus 2005; Romero 2003).  
Because candidates run for office when the odds of winning are in their favor (Jacobson and 
Kernell 1983), the field of candidates can get flooded with larger numbers and higher quality of 
candidates.  Thus, divisive primaries might occur when candidates perceive the general election 
outcome favorable to them—that is, the primary is likely to be more competitive because higher 
quality candidates run when the outlook for their victory is high.  This suggests that any previous 
findings about the relationship between divisive primaries and general elections are artifacts of 
the reciprocal relationship connecting primaries and general elections (Born 1981; Lazarus 2005; 
Romero 2003). 
Born (1981) was the first to explore the possibility such a relationship.  His study 
incorporated a control for what is termed “candidate’s perception,” or candidates’ perceived 
chance of winning in the general election.  When candidates foresee general election wins, then 
they are more likely to run.  Even after taking into account candidates’ perception of winning, his 
results indicate that divisive primaries still suppress general election outcomes.  However, there 
are differences in this effect for incumbents and candidates competing in open seat races.  
Incumbents’ vote shares are hurt in the general election by divisive primaries, but in open seat 
races, candidates with divisive primaries are not affected in the general election (Born 1981; 
Romero 2003).    
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Lazarus (2005) follows up by developing the “unintended consequences theory.”  He 
argues that the empirically observed effect of divisive primaries on general election outcomes is 
spurious, and that there is no real effect of divisiveness on general election outcomes.  Rather 
than simply controlling for candidates’ general election perceptions, he contends that these 
perceptions are what drive previous found relationships between divisiveness and general 
election outcomes.  That is, any effects of divisive primaries on general election outcomes are a 
consequence of candidates’ expectations about their general election performance that lead them 
to enter the race.  The implication is that incumbents have lower support in the general election 
because they are vulnerable, regardless of a divisive primary.  Divisive primaries appear to help 
challengers because they are seizing the opportunity to take on a vulnerable incumbent, but will 
do better in the general election regardless of the divisiveness of the primary.   
The evidence supporting the notion that divisive primaries hurt candidates might better 
hold in highly salient presidential elections than congressional elections (Buell 1986; Kenney 
and Rice 1987; Lengle 1980; Lengle, Owen, and Sonner 1985; Sonte 1986; Southwell 1986; 
Stone 1986).  But regardless of the election context, candidates running for most offices face the 
two-stage process. This means that candidates have two different reelection constituencies with 
differing policy positions and priorities.  Although congressional candidates may or may not be 
hurt in general elections by the mere presence of divisive primaries, what they do in primaries 
might follow them into the general election and in Congress.  Specifically, the positions they 
take in the primary might affect their subsequent behavior in the campaign and as policy-makers.  
Positioning in the Campaign and in Congress 
 How should candidates position themselves in elections?  Downs’ (1957) simple spatial 
theory predicts that candidates will converge at the median voter.  In the model, each voter has 
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an ideal point along a single ideological continuum.  If a candidate can win the median voter, 
then he or she can win the election.  Thus, candidates from both parties will converge on the 
median voter, taking the same issue positions in order to win.  Given this, candidates should gain 
electorally from moderating their behavior. 
 However, contrary to Downsian predictions, decades of congressional studies research 
indicates that Democratic and Republican candidates do not take the same positions in elections 
(Ansolabere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Burden 2004; Erikson and Wright 1989; 1993; 1997; 
Fiorina 1974; Sullivan and O’Connor 1972; Sullivan and Minns 1978).  Democratic candidates 
align on the ideological left while Republican candidates align on the ideological right.  
Moreover, evidence suggests that candidates can actually gain electorally when they appeal to 
their partisan constituency (Adams, Bishin, and Dow 2004; Schmidt, Kenney, and Morton 1996). 
 The Downsian model makes a number of assumptions that might account for its less than 
perfect predictions.  First, it assumes that candidates are only motivated to win elections.  But, 
candidates are likely motivated by their own policy goals as well (Mayhew 1974), and the policy 
proposals and positions they take in elections might also be a function of their own personal 
preferences (Calvert 1985; Kartik and McAfee 2007).  Because Democratic candidates and 
Republican candidates typically have a different set of ideological beliefs, this results in 
potentially different policy goals.  In elections, divergence in policy positions is likely to emerge.  
 The Downsian model also does not account for the two-stage nature of the election 
process. As discussed above, candidates must first win the party nomination before proceeding 
on to the general election.  Legislators have to appeal to both their primary and general election 
constituency (Fenno 1978).  It is important to consider how the primary election stage might 
influence or condition the behavior of candidates in the general election stage.  Candidates might 
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feel an outward pull from the party base to position closer to the ideological extreme, while they 
might also feel an inward pull towards the center from the more moderate general election 
constituency (Burden 2004).  At the same time, candidates cannot freely move their positions 
between the primary and general election; otherwise, they would be seen as flip-floppers.  Thus, 
candidates are anchored to their left or right of center positions taken in the primary (Burden 
2004). 
 There have been two basic approaches to updating the traditional Downsian framework 
that incorporate the two-stage election process.  Like Downs, some models focus on candidates’ 
decisions about what issue positions to take.  Here, candidates are constrained by the positions 
they take in the primary, and policy positions are based on the candidates’ expectations about 
both the primary and general election outcomes (Adams, Brunell and Grofman 2010; Aronson 
and Ordeshook 1972).  The prediction is that candidates will take positions closer to the primary 
constituency.  For example, the Adams, Burnell, and Grofman (2010) model assumes that 
candidates decide what positions they should take based on the size of their district partisan 
constituency.  If the partisan constituency is large enough to yield a November victory, 
candidates have little incentive to moderate their positions.  Over time, as congressional districts 
become increasingly skewed towards one party through the redistricting process, candidates have 
fewer reasons to moderate their positions.   
The second set of models focus on the motivations of voters.  Here, voters in the primary 
are concerned about not only the candidates’ policy positions, but also the likelihood of 
candidates winning in the general election (Coleman 1971; 1972; Owen and Grofman 2006).  
This relaxes the Downsian assumption that voters care only about policy.  The prediction is that 
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voters will select candidates who are ideologically extreme while also taking into account the 
perceived electability of the candidates in the general election.    
Taken together, these formal models update Downs’ original prediction and reflect the 
empirical reality that candidates do not converge on the median voter, but are more closely 
aligned with the primary constituency.  It might also be the case that legislators’ behavior in 
Congress is tied to the primary constituency, the party base.  The literature abounds with 
evidence that suggests that Democrats are always to the ideological left of Republicans in 
Congress (see, for example, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001).  But, this does not 
provide insight into which constituency legislators are more responsive to in Congress—the 
primary or general election constituency?  Scholars assess this question in a couple of ways.  
Some studies compare the roll call voting behavior of different party senators from the same 
state (Poole and Rosenthal 1984) and different party legislators elected from the same 
congressional districts (Poole and Rosenthal 1997).  These studies suggest they more often take 
divergent positions on roll calls.  A second group looks more closely at the policy congruence 
between legislators and their general election and primary election constituencies.   These studies 
largely indicate that incumbents tend to align more closely with their party base, rather than the 
district as a whole (Bafumi and Herron 2007; Clinton 2006).   
 In sum, legislators appear to be more responsive to their primary constituency in 
elections.  And once elected, legislators continue to be responsive to the party base in Congress.  
This, many argue, has contributed to an increase in polarization in Congress (Burden 2001; 
Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope; Fiorina and Levendusky 2006; King 2003).  To secure the party 
nomination and subsequently attain office, candidates need support on Election Day and also 
enough financial resources to compete in intraparty and interparty contests.  This latter support 
37 
 
comes most exclusively from the party base.  Because the party base is a more ideologically 
extreme group of voters, it nominates candidates that reflect its views.  Thus, ideologically 
extreme candidates win office and subsequently represent the interests of their primary 
constituency in Congress (Fiorina and Levendusky 2006). 
Role of Congressional Primaries 
 Taken as a whole, the literature points to a number of ways that congressional primaries 
are important not only in elections, but also in Congress.  First, the mere existence of primaries 
forces candidates to take them seriously.  For incumbents, this means always being concerned 
about them (Fenno 1978).  Although primaries are more pervasive in open seat races, incumbents 
who fail to represent their primary constituency might have primary challenges.   
 Primaries are also a deterrent for many potential candidates.  Certainly the presence of an 
incumbent discourages challengers, but having to challenge an incumbent in the primary 
particularly discourages potential challengers (Maisel and Stone 1997).  Incumbents will, unless 
derelict in their duties, likely have established relationships with the primary constituency in 
their districts who back them in the campaign.  Lacking this support, potential challengers will 
not run against widely-popular incumbents.   
 Primaries also set the stage for the general election.  For some candidates, this might be 
good as contentious primaries mean heightened media attention.  For lesser-known candidates, 
divisive primaries can boost name recognition and voter familiarity in the district (Ware 1979).  
For others, however, competitive primaries might hurt in the general election.  Spending 
resources defeating an in-party opponent means fewer resources available for the general 
election.  Divisive primaries might also disenfranchise the supporters of losing candidates.  
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These supporters might not campaign, donate money, or even for vote for the party nominee in 
the general election.   
 Finally, primaries could affect representation in Congress.  The two-stage election 
process means that legislators have to position themselves close to the party base in order to get 
the party nomination.  Further, primary voters are more apt to select candidates who are 
relatively ideologically extreme.  Once in office, then, legislators might pursue the interests of 
the party base, and their behavior may not reflect the interests of the larger district constituency.  
In turn, primaries may fuel polarization in Congress. 
Given the importance of primaries, it is surprising that there is so little attention to 
congressional primaries in the literature.  We know very little about how primaries affect 
candidates in elections, and even less about how primaries affect legislators’ activities in office.  
I propose to study how legislators’ ongoing primary campaign experiences shape their behavior 
in Congress.  This approach gets at the underlying dynamics of congressional elections—that is, 
how primaries affects incumbents while they are simultaneously campaigning for renomination 
and legislating in Washington, DC. 
Behavioral Consequences of Primaries 
 Because legislators must campaign while they are at the same time representing their 
districts in Washington, DC, I posit that these election experiences also influence what they do in 
Congress.  If competition creates incentives for incumbents to represent and respond to their 
constituents, then we should expect those with primaries to increase their responsiveness to their 
reelection constituencies.  In other words, MCs should adapt their behavior as policy-makers to 
their present election experiences.  It is commonsensical that candidates will use the tools they 
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have to aid in their reelection efforts.  For incumbents, this means using their offices as vehicles 
for reelection.   
 Of course, voters are not actively monitoring legislators’ activities in Congress.   In fact, 
much of what legislators do in Congress is communicated not only through such mediated 
venues as local newspapers, but also campaigns.  Incumbents are eager to discuss their 
legislative achievements.  At the same time, challengers are happy to take on the task of pointing 
to incumbents’ failures during campaigns (Arnold 1990; Sulkin 2005).  During campaigns, then, 
legislators can actively work on beefing-up their legislative records as evidence of their 
commitments to their districts, and also to dissuade criticism of their opponents as the campaign 
unfolds.  
Although studying the election-legislative behavior linkage is not in itself novel, 
examining how legislative behavior changes over the course of legislators’ reelection campaigns 
is new to the study of the intersection of congressional elections and legislative behavior.  The 
project I undertake here assesses the extent to which primary competition prompts MCs to 
change their legislative behavior while they are concurrently campaigning and legislating.  In 
other words, I investigate whether the present campaign context causes legislators to adjust their 
legislative activity in Congress.  Much of this, I argue, is conditioned on the timing of 
legislators’ primaries.  In doing so, this provides greater insight into the connection between 
elections and legislative behavior.  
 I explore the ways in which primaries prompt MCs to change their legislative behavior in 
two ways.  First, competition of any type—primary or general election—should affect how 
legislators allocate their time between campaigning in the district and legislating in Washington, 
DC.  Second, primary competition in particular should lead MCs to become more attentive to 
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their primary constituency, the party base. Third, the timing of the primary to the general election 
might moderate the impacts of primaries on legislators’ behavior. The hypotheses I test are 
outlined in more detail in the forthcoming chapters, but below I provide some explanation of the 
theoretical motivations for each.    
Allocation of Time  
 I hypothesize that competition affects how legislators allocate their time.  Legislators 
must make a variety of decisions in office and one of the most important is how to allot their 
efforts.  As Bauer and his coauthors (1963) note, “The decisions most constantly on his mind 
[the MC’s] are not how to vote, but what to do with his time, how to allocate his resources and 
where to put his energy.” (405)  
 How specifically will competition affect how MCs allocate their time?  MCs who are 
concerned about their reelection prospects want to show voters they are actively representing 
their interests in Congress (Hall 1996; Mayhew 1974).  When faced with a challenge, 
incumbents might increase their legislative activity in order to demonstrate their commitment to 
their districts.  Constituents want their MCs aggressively working on their behalf in Congress 
(Arnold 1990).  If anything, legislative activity should enhance legislators’ visibility to their 
constituents (Johannes 1983).  Although most citizens are largely unaware of what legislators are 
doing in Washington, DC, incumbents are able to point to their legislative actions and 
achievements in Congress, or what Mayhew (1974) referred to as credit-claiming, position-
taking, and advertising—all of which should help on Election Day.  Given this, being active in 
Congress should be particularly important in legislators’ reelection efforts.   
 Although this prediction is intuitively appealing, some empirical investigations have 
revealed that vulnerability and the volume of legislators’ activity may not be linked.  Evidence 
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suggests that while floor statements are associated with legislators’ vote shares, bill introductions 
and cosponsorship activity levels are not (Johannes and McAdams 1981; Ragsdale and Cook 
1987).  But these studies focus on how legislators’ behavior in Congress affects subsequent vote 
shares, and it might be that the causal arrow runs the other way—that is, the campaign affects 
legislative behavior.  I expect that legislators with primary challenges will become more active in 
introducing and cosponsoring bills and resolutions during the primary campaign season than 
their colleagues without such challenges.  However, when legislators have primaries close the 
general election, their volume of bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships should not 
be influenced by their primary election experiences because they are likely spending a good deal 
of time and attention on their elections in the district rather than policy-making in Congress. 
On the other hand, competition could depress legislators’ volume of activity in Congress 
in other ways.  When legislators have to compete for office, they must return to the district to 
campaign (Fenno 1978; Jones 2003; Mayhew 1974; Rothenburg and Sanders 1999).  Even 
though the campaign season commences, Congress is still very much in session.   As legislators 
seek to juggle campaigning in the district and legislating in Washington, DC, their reelection 
efforts might take first priority thus resulting in MCs spending less time in Congress.  Of course, 
it may be that legislators are physically present in Washington, DC, but are not necessarily doing 
their legislative duties because they are focusing on the campaign.  For example, MCs may be 
meeting with potential donors, or working on campaign strategy or advertisements during the 
time in which they should be legislating in Congress.  Taken together, then, legislators might 
actually decrease their volume of legislative activity on those activities which they cannot 
control the timing of the activity.  Unlike bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships 
where legislators could, for example, cosponsor thirty bills in a single day, there are other 
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activities where others set the calendar.  For example, legislators do not have full control over the 
amendment process.  Amendments are constrained by time (e.g., some have to be proposed 
before the bill or resolution leaves the Rules Committee and goes up for a floor vote), and special 
rules over legislation can determine how many, or if any, amendments can be offered on specific 
bills and resolutions (Sinclair 1994). Given that the act of campaigning takes MCs back to their 
districts and therefore unable to be present legislating in Congress, I anticipate that legislators 
will be less active on amendments when they are campaigning in the primary.  Similarly, 
legislators also do not control when legislation comes up for a roll call vote.  If legislators are not 
present in Washington, DC because they are spending time in the district campaigning, I expect 
they will miss more votes in Congress.
7
  I expect that the impacts of primaries on amendment 
sponsorships and missed votes will be most prevalent on MCs whose primaries are closer to the 
general election as these incumbents will be focusing on their primary and general elections. 
In sum, I anticipate that primaries will lead incumbents to increase their activity on some 
legislative activities, but decrease their activity on other legislative activities.   Primary 
competition should increase MCs’ activity on bill and resolution introductions and 
cosponsorships as reelection-oriented legislators seek to heighten their legislative profile while 
they are campaigning.  However, because legislators cannot both campaign in their districts and 
legislate in the halls of Congress at the same time, MCs with primaries might be less active 
amending legislation and miss more roll call votes during the primary season.   
 
                                                 
7 The ideal measure would be to have data on the number of trips home legislators took during 
their campaigns.  However, the reimbursement reporting rules in Congress do not allow for 
pinpointing precise dates of these trips. 
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Appeals to the Party Base 
 I contend that primary competition affects legislators’ responsiveness to the party base.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is a long literature on the “marginality hypothesis” (Bovitz and 
Canes-Wrone et al. 2002; Carson 2006; ; Carson et al. 2010; Cohen and Burnk 1983; Deckard 
1976; Erikson and Wright 2000; Froman 1963; Griffin 2006; Gulati 2004; Huntington 1950; 
Kuklinski 1977; MacRae 1952; Miller 1970; Miller and Stokes 1963; Patterson 1961; Shannon 
1960; Sulkin 2005; 2011; Sullivan and Ulsaner 1978).  Studying how competition affects 
legislative responsiveness while legislators are actually campaigning provides insight into this 
puzzle.  If competition induces responsiveness, it will be most evident when MCs are in the thick 
of their campaigns.  As such, I hypothesize that primaries should cause legislators to become 
more responsive to their primary constituencies in two distinct ways.  First, primary competition 
will influence the content of legislators’ activity.  If competition prompts MCs to become more 
active in introducing and cosponsoring legislation, then it may also influence what types of 
issues they are active on in Congress.  MCs with primary challenges will likely respond to the 
preferences of the party base by refocusing their issue agendas toward those issues that are 
important to these voters.  I expect that legislators might therefore be more active on the issues 
that their party “owns”—those issues that the public generally views their party as “better able to 
handle” and are linked to the party’s long-standing coalitions (Petrocik 1996).  At the same time, 
MCs should be less active on the issues that are important to the other party’s base.  For 
example, Democratic legislators with primaries should become more active on Democrat-owned 
issues such as education and the environment during the primary season, and less active on 
Republican-owned issues such as defense and foreign policy.  Republican MCs, on the other 
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hand, should become more active on such issues as defense and foreign policy, and less active on 
such issues as education and the environment. 
Second, I expect that primary competition should lead MCs to become more partisan in 
their roll call voting behavior.  Simply put, primaries may prompt MCs to toe the party line 
more.  Legislators are sensitive to their electoral prospects, and their patterns of roll call votes 
reflect this (Arnold 1990; Mayhew 1974).  In general elections, voters might punish legislators 
for being too partisan (Carson et al. 2010), but in primaries the party base should reward 
incumbents for their partisanship.  Thus, legislators should become more partisan (i.e., vote more 
in line with their party) when they are campaigning in their primaries as MCs will want to avoid 
giving their primary challengers recent examples of unresponsive behavior. 
However, the effects of primaries on legislators’ responsiveness to the policy priorities 
and partisan interests of the party base may be predicated on the timing of legislators’ primaries.  
Because primaries occur at different times ranging from one to nine months before the 
November general election, MCs with primaries earlier in the campaign season, say February, 
may react differently to their primary election experiences than those with later primaries, say 
September.  Specifically, those with primaries closer to the general election may have to juggle 
the competing interests of the party base and the broader general election constituency at the 
same time.  Those with earlier primaries, on the other hand, can focus solely on their primary 
elections and, following their primary dates, can turn to their attention to their general election 
contests.  Given this, we should expect that the legislative behavior of MCs with primaries that 
are further from the general election to be more influenced by their primary election experiences 
than those with primaries closer to the general election.  I expect that incumbents with early 
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primaries will be more responsive to the party base while they are campaigning compared to 
their colleagues with primaries closer to the general election date.  
Importantly, though, political scientists have long noted that the degree of diversity varies 
widely across congressional districts and this might affect how legislators represent and respond 
to their constituents (see Bailey and Brady 1998; Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1974; Gerber and Lewis 
2004; Goff and Grier 1993; Katz and Zupan 1990).  Although legislators are responsive to their 
reelection constituencies, which reelection constituency they respond to might depend on the 
composition of the district.  As discussed previously, empirical research suggests that legislators 
from heterogeneous, or diverse, districts are less attentive to the district median voter (Gerber 
and Lewis 2004) and more attentive to their core party supporters (Bailey and Brady 1998; 
Fiorina 1974).  Along the same lines, Senate candidates in homogenous states are more 
responsive to their state constituencies than those from heterogeneous states (Bishin et al. 2006).  
The theoretical explanation for this is that legislators can more easily identify the median voter 
of the district when the district is relatively homogenous.  As districts become more complex, 
identifying the median voter becomes more problematic.  MCs in diverse districts therefore find 
it difficult to position themselves closer to the median voter and instead align more with their 
party base (Bailey and Brady 1998). 
However, in recent years the compositions of congressional districts have been changing.  
Voters have become more aligned with parties as a result of partisan sorting as party and 
ideology are now more closely tied than ever before. This is due to the party elites polarizing on 
issues, allowing voters to better match their views to the parties (Levendusky 2013). When at 
one time voters engaged in high levels of cross-party voting, liberals today vote overwhelmingly 
for Democrats and conservatives do the same for Republicans.  In addition, congressional 
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districts are becoming increasingly safe.  Redistricting practices have become creative partisan 
gerrymandering exercises whereby the parties create districts that are packed full of like-minded 
partisans (Owen and Grofman 1988).  Taken together, not only are voters within the parties more 
homogenous, but the congressional districts in which they reside are also more uniform.   
Given these geographic and political changes, I expect that primary competition exerts 
different effects on legislative behavior depending on the ideological composition of legislators’ 
districts.  In homogenous districts where voters have similar policy preferences, the party base 
should closely approximate the median of the district.  Because these districts are electorally 
“safe” for the party, incumbents do not necessarily have to be concerned with an out-party 
challenge in the general election, and thus do not have to moderate their behavior.  When these 
MCs have primary challenges, they should grow even more responsive to the party base in their 
policy priorities (i.e., legislative issue agendas).  However, in heterogeneous districts where the 
district is more evenly split between the two parties, legislators with primaries should exhibit less 
change in their responsiveness to the party base.  This is because diverse districts have a higher 
propensity for competitive general elections (Brunell 2008; Koetzle 1998), and legislators in 
these districts should have an eye towards the general election.  Because of this, the legislative 
behavior of these MCs should be less affected by primary challenges.   
Conclusion 
The project I undertake here examines the link between primary competition and 
legislative behavior.  I investigate how primaries affect the volume of legislators’ activity, the 
content of that activity, and their levels of partisan voting while MCs are campaigning for 
renomination.  Assessing how primaries affect legislative behavior while MCs are actively 
engaged in their campaign provides critical insight into the dynamic relationship between 
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competition and representative and responsiveness.  Before delving into the hypotheses tests, 
however, it is important to discuss the data collection strategy and variable measurement, all of 
which are detailed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Data, Measures, and Research Design 
 To investigate the effects of primaries on legislative behavior, it is necessary to collect 
data on the primary election experiences of incumbents seeking reelection and measures of their 
concurrent legislative behavior.  In this chapter I detail my data collection strategy, the specific 
measures of the dependent and independent variables central to my argument, and larger research 
design considerations for the project.   
The data are drawn from the 105
th 
- 110
th
 Congresses/ 1998 - 2008 election cycles.  This 
timeframe is selected for a number of reasons.  First, studying a large number of Congresses 
allows for variation in the key independent variables, the presence and quality of primary 
challengers.  Because only a small number of congressional primaries are contested, it is 
necessary to include several election cycles in order to make generalizations.  Analyzing a large 
number of Congresses also allows for both cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons.  I can 
compare not only the change in legislative behavior of those with and without primaries, but also 
compare MCs’ own change in legislative behavior when they have and do not have primaries.  
Finally, the time period under investigation includes both Republican and Democratic control of 
the House.  This is useful because it allows for generalizations across parties, and enables me to 
examine whether the effects of primaries are party-specific.   
Because most of my analyses center on how MCs change their legislative behavior 
during the course of a single term (i.e., before, during, and after the primary), only those who 
were present during the entire term are included in the sample.  Omitted are incumbents who 
were appointed or won a special election after the beginning of the first session, and those who 
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switched parties during or between Congresses.
8
   These MCs are excluded because their 
legislative activity does not span the length of the Congress, and thus their changes in behavior 
are not comparable to that of those who were in Congress at the start of the legislative term.  The 
unit of analysis is the individual legislator in each Congress/election cycle, resulting in a total of 
2336 observations (641 unique legislators) in in the dataset.  Table 3.1 presents the breakdown of 
the number of incumbents running for reelection by Congress. 
Presence and Quality of Congressional Primaries 
 To examine the effects of primaries on legislative behavior, the two independent 
variables at the forefront of the analyses are the presence and quality of primary challengers.  I 
expect that the mere presence of a primary challenge should affect incumbents’ legislative 
behavior, but this effect should be larger for those with high quality primary challengers.  
Following Jacobson (1989), a high quality challenger is one who has previously held elected 
office.  This includes experiences ranging from city council to the state legislature.   
Although it would seem that the ideal measure of primary challengers would tap varying 
types of challengers that might be present in primaries (i.e., ideological challenge, challenge 
stemming from scandal surrounding an incumbent), such categorization is not possible due to the 
lack of news coverage at the congressional level.  Measuring primary challengers as low and 
high quality, on the other hand, is feasible and allows me to study candidates’ degree of 
vulnerability, as a high quality challenger is likely to emerge when an incumbent is vulnerable.  
Of course, this vulnerability may indeed be a result of legislators not being ideological enough 
for the party base, or some sort of scandal that the incumbent is involved in, as it is likely that a 
                                                 
8
 In 2000, Virgil Goode (R-VA) and Matthew Martinez (R-CA) changed their party affiliation 
from Democrat to Republican.  They are both omitted in the 106
th
 Congress. 
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high quality opponent will challenge an incumbent in the primary when such conditions are 
present.  Because of this, using a measure of challenger quality allows me to study the larger  
issue of vulnerability and its effects on legislators’ behavior in Congress. 
My source of data on the presence of primary challenges is the Almanac of American 
Politics (Barone 2000-2010), and I collected data on the quality of those challenges from local 
newspapers.  The Almanac provides the names of all candidates running in each House race, 
including the primary election.  For each incumbent running for reelection, I noted whether he or 
she had a primary challenge, and, if so, the name of the challenger(s).  To determine the quality 
of MCs’ primary challengers, I relied on local newspaper coverage of campaigns.  Locating 
information on challengers in congressional races, especially those without political experience, 
is difficult.  But newspapers not only document the goings-on of campaigns, they also profile 
candidates.  Using Newsbank, I search the newspapers of each legislator’s state during the year 
before the primary election date to find information about the political backgrounds of primary 
challengers.  For most congressional races, I was able to locate newspapers from communities 
within the actual district.  For a small collection of others, however, I relied on coverage of the 
race from newspapers in communities outside the district.  If a congressional district did not have 
a large town within its borders, then it likely did not have a newspaper with an online format that 
I could access with Newsbank.   This did not pose a problem for data collection because I was 
able to retrieve this information from neighboring communities outside of the district whose 
newspapers were available online.  
Figure 3.1 presents the percent of legislators with primary challenges and the percent 
with high quality challengers by election and the combined average across election cycles for the 
105
th
 - 110
th
 Congresses/ 1998 - 2008 election cycles.  During this time, challengers ran against 
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incumbents in 490 congressional primary races (291 unique legislators).  Most legislators (58 
percent) did not have a primary challenge, and only 12 percent had a quality primary challenger.  
On average, 21 percent of legislators have a primary in any given election cycle, and 4 percent 
have high quality challenges. This is largely consistent across election cycles. 
The extent to which legislators have primaries throughout their congressional careers also 
varies.  Some MCs get the same token challenge in every election cycle.  For instance, between 
1998-2008, Kenneth Wiezer repeatedly challenged Representative Jerry Costello (D-IL) for the 
Democratic nomination.  Although Wiezer had no prior elected office experience and 
consistently received only 10 percent of the primary vote, he continued to run in every election 
cycle. There are also instances where legislators do not have any history of primary challenges 
but are suddenly opposed by a high quality primary challenger.  In 2002, seven-term 
Representative Paul Gillmor (R-OH) whose only previous primary challenge was in 1988, was 
opposed by state senator Rex Damschroder for the Republican nomination.  Although Gillmor 
won the primary, the threat was new for someone who easily sailed through the primary for 14 
years.  Conversely, there also incumbents who never have a primary challenge throughout their 
congressional careers.  Representative James Leach (R-IA), for instance, has been a member of 
Congress since 1976 and did not have a challenge in even his first primary election.  In general, 
however, most incumbents at some point have at least one primary challenge in their career.  Of 
those incumbents present in the House during the period under investigation, only 13 percent 
(88) of the legislators in the dataset had never received a primary in their congressional careers. 
In general, most MCs have general election challengers.  As shown in Table 3.2, 92 
percent of those in the sample have a challenger in the general election.  This percentage is 
slightly higher for those with primaries (over 94 percent of those with primaries also have 
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general election challengers).  What this suggests is that legislators who are vulnerable in the 
primary are likely also vulnerable in the general election. 
Timing of Congressional Primaries 
One inherent feature of primaries is that unlike general elections which take place on a 
common date, states hold their primaries at different times. Some states, such as Illinois and 
Texas, hold their primaries quite early, in February - April.
9
  Other states, like Louisiana and 
Minnesota, hold their primaries later, in September or October.  Figure 3.2 aggregates the timing 
of congressional primaries by states and legislators from 1998-2008.  This figure demonstrates 
that primaries tend to be clustered in May/June and August/September.  This holds in both 
presidential and midterm election cycles.  However, there are more early primaries during 
presidential elections due to front-loading.  For example, Mississippi holds its primaries in 
March during presidential elections, while its midterm primaries are in June.  In midterm election 
cycles, less than 5 percent of states and 16 percent of legislators have early primaries (February – 
April).  However, in presidential election cycles, 10 percent of states and 26 percent of 
legislators have early primaries.    
At first glance this might seem problematic in our study of change in legislative behavior, 
but this variation in the timing of congressional primaries actually provides further insight into 
the dynamics of elections and legislative behavior.  If, for example, the effects of primaries on 
legislative behavior differs for those with early and late primaries, this suggests that that the two-
stage nature of the election process might be influential—that is, the closeness of the primary to 
the general election affects how MCs change their behavior in response to primary and general 
                                                 
9
 Only in the most recent election cycle did states move their primaries up to January. 
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election challenges.  Legislators with primaries close to the general election might have an eye 
towards their general elections more so than those with late primaries.   
This arguments leads to a number of hypotheses related to the dynamic relationship 
between legislators’ election experiences and their behavior as policymakers.  As discussed 
earlier, I suspect that the timing of primaries does indeed impact the extent to which primaries 
influence legislative behavior.  As incumbents’ primary election dates move closer to the general 
election, those with primaries will likely be battling challengers on two fronts, the primary and 
the general election.  I expect, then, that incumbents with primaries close to the general election, 
say September or October, will be less likely to seek to appeal to the party base in their 
legislative activity as compared to their colleagues with earlier primary dates, say March or 
April.  Thus, the timing of the primary moderates the impact of primaries on legislative behavior.   
This is an important consideration and I discuss the specific theoretical expectations of 
the effects of primary timing on changes in legislative behavior in the following empirical 
chapters.  To test the hypotheses, I separate the data into three categories based on the timing of 
legislators’ states’ primary election dates: spring primaries, February-April, summer primaries, 
May-August, and fall primaries, September-November.  On average, most primaries occur in the 
summer (51 percent), while nearly one-quarter are spring primaries (24 percent), and another 
quarter are fall primaries (25 percent). 
District Heterogeneity 
 One of the central pieces of my argument is the claim that the effects of primaries on 
appeals to the party base might be more intense for MCs from ideologically homogenous 
districts.  In homogenous districts where the median voter more closely approximates the party 
base, legislators with primaries should become more responsive to the interests of that base.  In 
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heterogeneous districts where the district is more balanced between the two parties, primary 
competition should exert less of an effect on legislators’ appeals to the party base, as these 
incumbents need to keep an eye toward their more moderate general election constituency. 
Thus, in addition to collecting and coding data on incumbents’ primary election contexts, I also 
gather data on district ideological diversity, or heterogeneity, in order to assess how primaries 
might differently affect MCs in homogeneous and heterogeneous districts.   
 Congressional studies scholars have utilized a variety of measures to gauge district 
preferences, ranging from district-level presidential vote shares (Ansolabehere et al. 2001; 
Canes-Wrone et al. 2005; Erickson and Wright 1980), to district demographic characteristics 
(e.g., Bishin 2000; Froman 1963; Peltzman 1984), to simulated preferences (Ardoin and Garand 
2003; Levendusky and Pope 2010).  But these measures fail to directly measure district ideology.  
Thus, for my purposes, I use survey-based measures of district ideology.  Although imperfect, 
survey-based measures permit me to measure district ideological diversity using citizens’ own 
preferences, and likely that of the incumbents from those districts, and aggregate to the district 
level.  Direct measures of district ideology have been difficult to obtain because self-reports at 
the district level from surveys with district samples large enough for aggregation had not been 
previously implemented.  More recently, however, such large scale survey endeavors have 
produced sizable samples for each congressional district thus allowing for aggregated measures 
of district preferences.  Among these are measures of self-reported ideology at the district level.   
 For the 105
th
 and 106
th
 Congresses/1998 & 2000 election cycles, I use Clinton’s (2006) 
aggregated district-level measures of ideological heterogeneity, drawn from the 1999 Knowledge 
Networks (KN) Survey and the 2000 National Annenberg Election Study (NAES).  These data 
have a total of 100,814 respondents across all 435 congressional districts.  Because of the 2000 
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redistricting, updated data for the 107
th
 – 110th Congresses/ 2002-2008 election cycles is needed.  
For this, I use data from Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).  Data for the 107
th
 – 
109
th
 Congresses/ 2002-2006 election cycles are drawn from the 2006 CCES, and data for the 
110
th
 Congress/2008 election are from the 2008 CCES.  The 2006 and 2008 CCES surveys each 
consist of over 30,000 respondents with average district-level samples of 84 and 75 respectively.  
These range from a low of 16 respondents in California’s 34th district in the 2006 survey, and a 
high of 190 in Montana’s at-large district in the 2008 survey.   
Both the Clinton (2006) data and the CCES surveys ask respondents to place themselves 
on a five point ideological scale.  The CCES data is recoded according to Clinton’s coding 
scheme ranging from very conservative (-2) to very liberal (2).  I aggregate the CCES data to 
create a mean district ideology score.  To get the overall level of diversity in each district, I am 
interested in how concentrated district preferences are around the mean district ideology.  I take 
the absolute value of district ideology where (2) indicates an ideological extreme district and (0) 
indicates a moderate district.  District ideological heterogeneity, then, is the standard deviation 
of each district’s mean ideological extremity.   
To illustrate, Figure 3.3 plots district heterogeneity in the 110
th
 Congress/2010 election.  
A high variance indicates an ideologically diverse district, while a low variance suggests an 
ideological homogenous, or highly concentrated, district.  As this distribution suggests, there is a 
good deal of variation in the degree of ideological diversity across congressional districts.  As an 
illustration, we can look at three Democratic MCs from California whose districts have three 
different levels ideological diversity—California’s 8th, 18th, and 34th congressional districts. 
Representative Dennis Cordoza’s 18th district is representative of the larger sample of 
congressional districts with a mean level of ideological heterogeneity of 1.12.  Former House 
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Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 8th Congressional district is one of the most homogenous in the 110th 
Congress with a score of .85, while Lucille Roybal-Allard’s 34th district is of the most 
ideological diverse districts with a score of 1.54.  This means that Pelosi’s district has a high 
concentration of people with similar ideological preferences, while Roybal-Allard’s district 
consists of a large variety of people with both conservative and liberal leanings.  This example 
demonstrates that even within a single state, congressional districts vary in their degree of 
ideological heterogeneity. 
Volume of Activity 
In Chapter 4 I test the effect of primaries on legislators’ volume of activity using two 
measures of legislative activity.  First, I assess whether primaries lead MCs to spend less time 
legislating, hence missing more votes during the primary campaign season.  Second, I study how 
primary competition influences legislators’ activity on bill and resolution introductions and 
cosponsorships.   
Missed Votes 
 To examine whether primaries prompt MCs to change their volume of activity on roll call 
votes, I use roll call voting data compiled by Poole and McCarty (105
th 
-109
th
) and Lewis and 
Poole (110
th
).  MCs tend to miss, on average, 3.82 percent—about 50 total—roll call votes in any 
given congressional term.  As shown in Figure 3.4, this ranges from a high of 4.31 percent (51 
votes) in the 108
th
 Congress to a low of 3.25 percent (39 votes) in the 105
th
.   Looking at specific 
legislators, Representative Bobby Rush (D – IL) missed the largest percentage of votes in the 
110
th
 Congress/ 2008 election cycle.  During the legislative session he missed 598 roll call votes.  
This was in large part a result of his medical problems stemming from cancer (Skiba 2012).  On 
the other hand, 16 legislators did not miss any votes in one or more terms during the 105 - 110
th
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Congresses.  Five of these legislators had exemplary roll call participatory records in more than 
one Congress.  Representative Dave Kildee (D-MI), for example, did not miss any votes in the 
105
th
 Congress and the 107
th
 – 109th Congresses.  In the 106th and 110th Congresses, Kildee 
missed only one vote in each Congress.   
Introductions, Cosponsorships, and Amendments 
To examine the effect of primary competition on the number of bills and resolutions 
legislators introduce and cosponsor, I utilize Sulkin’s bill and resolution introductions (105th-
110
th
) and cosponsorships (105
th
-108
th
) data.  From the Library of Congress’ THOMAS site, the 
dataset is updated to include cosponsorships from the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses.  I also used 
THOMAS to collect amendment sponsorships. 
Table 3.2 shows the mean number of bill and resolution introductions, cosponsorships, 
and amendments by Congress as well as the mean level across all six Congresses.  The average 
legislator in the 105
th
 – 110th Congress introduced 13 bills and resolutions, cosponsored 242, and 
sponsored 2 amendments during his or her term.  There is some variation in these levels across 
Congresses.  For instance, activity levels were particularly low in the 105
th
 Congress where MCs 
were the least active introducing and cosponsoring legislation, 11 and 196 bills and resolution 
respectively.  By the 110
th
 Congress, however, there is a steady increase in activity, particularly 
in the 110
th
 Congress where MCs were the most active introducing an average of nearly 17 bills 
and resolutions and cosponsoring an average of 288.  Amendment activity follows this general 
trend as incumbents were the most active sponsoring amendments in the 109
th
 and 110
th
 
Congresses. 
This is not to suggest that all legislators have the same levels of activity when it comes to 
bill and resolution introductions, cosponsorships, and amendments.  Indeed, some MCs are in 
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general more active than others throughout their legislative careers.  As an illustration, Democrat 
Robert Andrews (NJ) is the most active MC in the 106
th
 – 109th Congresses introducing 94, 102, 
105, and 119 bills and resolutions respectively during these Congresses.  Having served in 
Congress since 1990, these high levels of activity may be a result of Andrews looking to run for 
higher office as he was a candidate for U.S. Senate in 2008.  On the other hand, some MCs are 
less active in Congress.  Party leaders such as Nancy Pelosi (D – CA) and Dennis Hastert (R –
IL) have among the lowest number of bill and resolution introduction and cosponsorship activity 
levels in Congress.  In the 107
th
 – 109th Congresses, Hastert as Speaker of the House introduced 
only 5 bills and resolutions in each of these Congresses and cosponsored an average of 23 per 
Congress—considerably lower levels of activity than that of the average MC.  This is not 
necessarily surprising given that party leaders have a host of leadership responsibilities in the 
House, yet we still see these MCs active to some degree in the more basic legislative activities. 
Content of Activity 
My second set of dependent variables focuses on the content of legislators’ activity, 
specifically their bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships.  I contend that primaries 
will cause legislators to adjust their legislative issue agendas.  In Chapter 5 I examine if 
primaries encourage MCs to craft their legislative agenda towards those issues that are important 
to their party base—that is, those issues that which their party “owns” and devote less attention 
to issues owned by the other party.    
To do this, I use Sulkin’s data that codes each bill and resolution in the time period under 
investigation into specific issue categories (see Sulkin (2005) for a description of these coding 
procedures, but the issues include the following: agriculture, budget, campaign finance, 
children’s issues, civil rights, consumer, corporate regulation, crime, defense, education, 
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environment, government operations, health, jobs and infrastructure, Medicare, moral issues, 
social security, taxes, and welfare).  Figures 3.5 and 3.6 present the mean number introductions 
and cosponsorships by issue categories for a legislator in an average Congress.  We see that, on 
average, legislators are most active on jobs and infrastructure, defense, and government 
operations bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships.  Conversely, MCs, on average, 
are the least active on issues related to the budget.  
The next step is to create aggregate measures of the content of legislators’ issue agendas 
for each MC in the dataset.  Specifically, I code each bill and resolution as a “Democrat owned” 
issue, a “Republican owned” issue, or a non-party owned issue.  Again, party-owned issues are 
those for which each party not only has an established record handling specific issues (Petrocik 
1998; Petrocik et al. 2004), but also are issues that are important to their party’s base (Egan 
2013).  Table 3.3 lists Democrat-owned issues, Republican-owned issues, and non-owned issues. 
Following Petrocik (1998) and Petrocik et al. (2004), Democrat-owned issues are education, 
health care, welfare, Social Security, Medicare, environment, and jobs and infrastructure.  
Republican owned issues are any issue relating to defense, taxes, moral issues, or crime.  Non-
party owned—those not owned by any party—include agriculture, budget, campaign finance, 
children’s issues, consumer issues, corporate regulation, and government operations.  
Then, I calculate the percent of each legislators’ bill and resolution introductions and 
cosponsorships that are issues that his or her party “owns,” the percent of bills and resolutions 
the legislator introduced and cosponsored where the legislator “trespassed” onto the issues that 
the other party “owns,” and the percent of bills and resolutions that the legislators introduced and 
cosponsored an issue where neither party owns.  As an illustration of this calculation, we can 
look at the legislative issue agenda of Representative Jim Talent (R – MO) in the 105th Congress.  
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Talent introduced 21 bills and resolutions and cosponsored 238 thus resulting in a count of 259 
bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships in the 105
th
 Congress.  Of these bills and 
resolutions, 25 percent, or nearly 65, of his bills and resolutions were on the issues his party 
owns, such as defense and crime.  Another 24 percent, or 62, of these bills and resolutions were 
issues that he trespassed onto the Democratic party’s issues, such as Medicare and Social 
Security.  The bulk of his introduction and cosponsorship activity, however, was on non-party 
owned issues.  Nearly 51 percent, or 130, of the bills and resolutions he introduced or 
cosponsored legislation on were issues that neither party owned, such as the campaign finance 
and agriculture. 
Talent’s legislative agenda mirrors that of his contemporaries.  Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show 
the mean percent of legislators’ issue agendas that consist of party-owned issues, trespassed 
issues, and non-party owned issues aggregated across legislators in each Congress separated out 
by party.
10
  On average, legislators are most active on non-party owned issues followed by issues 
that their party owns.  Across Congresses and MCs, incumbents’ legislative issue agendas 
consist of 42 percent non-party owned issues and 33 percent party owned issues.  In the 110
th
 
Congress, though, Democrats were most active on party owned issues.  Incumbents tend to be, 
on average, the least active on the issues that are owned by the other party.  The average 
legislator’s issue agenda consists of 25 percent bill and resolution introductions and 
cosponsorships that are issues owned by the other party.   
 
 
                                                 
10
 I separate the means because of the differing number and content of issues that each party 
“owns.” 
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Partisan Roll Call Voting Behavior  
To assess whether primaries prompt MCs to become more partisan in their legislative 
behavior, I use measures of legislators’ roll call voting records.  Many congressional studies use 
measures of party loyalty and party unity to examine trends of party support and party 
polarization over time (see, for example, Deckard 1976; Carson et al. 2010; Cox and McCubbins 
1993; Leighton and Lopez 2002).  The terms party unity and party loyalty are often used 
interchangeably and are typically measured using two types of votes: party votes and party 
leadership votes.  Party votes are those roll calls where the majority of one party votes against 
the majority of the other party (Brady and Althoff 1974).  These votes, as discussed by Cox and 
McCubbins (1991), are measures of the “like-mindedness” between legislators and their parties 
(552).  Aligning with the party expresses partisanship, and the extent to which legislators are in 
step with their party.  I calculate party votes based on those votes where 75 percent of one party 
votes against 75 percent of the other party, or votes where the parties are deeply divided. 
Figure 3.9 presents the mean party loyalty across 105
th
-110
th
 Congresses.  As shown, 
partisan roll call voting has increased over time. In the 105
th
 Congress, for example, legislators, 
on average, voted with their party at a rate of just over 92 percent.  This grows to its highest level 
in the 110
th
 Congress to nearly 95 percent.  Although the sample covers only a short time period, 
this pattern corresponds to what other research finds about enhanced partisanship in Congress 
(Sinclair 2006; Theriault 2008).   
Change in Legislative Behavior 
 As discussed in previous chapters, I contend that incumbents change their legislative 
behavior in reaction to the electoral conditions they face in their districts.  Because MCs must 
simultaneously campaign for reelection and legislate in Washington, DC, I suspect that 
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legislative behavior is not constant within a single Congress, but rather adjusts in response to 
these election experiences.  I envision that each incumbent’s congressional term is divided into 
three key time periods: pre-primary, primary campaign season, and post-primary.  I expect that 
primaries will cause legislators to change their behavior between the pre-primary period and the 
primary campaign season, and as a result there will be a difference in behavior between these 
two time periods.   
 To create measures of the change in legislative behavior, I map each legislator’s activity 
(i.e., roll call votes, bill and resolution introduction and cosponsorship activity) onto the 
corresponding time period.  To do this, I first identify the primary date for every MC’s state in 
the dataset, and then designate the six months prior to that as the primary campaign season.  
Official candidate filing dates for congressional primaries range anywhere from a few weeks to a 
couple of months before the primary election date.  Given the variation in the timing of filing 
dates, measuring the primary campaign season based on formal filing dates is not ideal.  In 
addition, even in those states where the filing dates are two months before the primary, 
campaigning undoubtedly begins well before this time.  Thus, the six month time period 
represents the time when legislators would be campaigning for renomination.   
 To enable comparisons between those with and without primaries, I identify the primary 
season for all legislators—even those without a primary challenge.  For example, during the 
105
th
 Congress, incumbents were running for reelection in the 1998 election.  Texas held its 
primary on March 10, 1998 and Alabama had its primary on June 2, 1998.  The primary 
campaign season is designated as September 10, 1997 through March 10, 1998 for MCs in 
Texas, and December 2, 1997 through June 2, 1998 for incumbents from Alabama.  I classify the 
time between the first day of the first session of Congress through the day before each 
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incumbent’s primary season as the pre-primary period.  So, for MCs from Texas in the 105th 
Congress, the pre-primary period is the time from the beginning of the first session to September 
9, 1997, and, for legislators from Alabama from the start of the first session to December 1, 
1997.   The post-primary period is every day after legislators’ states’ primary election dates 
through the end of the second session (i.e., March 11, 1998 through the end of the 105
th
 Congress 
for MCs from Texas and June 3, 1998 through the end of the 105
th
 Congress for MCs from 
Alabama).  Figure 3.10 presents a general overview of the time period/legislative activity 
breakdown.  Following this, I then categorize each incumbent’s legislative activity into the time 
that it occurred (i.e., pre-primary, primary season, and post-primary).  I follow this procedure in 
the coding all measures of legislative activity.   
 Table 3.4 details the specific measures of the dependent variables and categorizations 
used in the analyses.  I provide a detailed discussion of each of these in the following empirical 
chapters, but below is a general overview of the key measures of change in legislative activity. 
The first set of dependent variables measures changes in legislators’ volume of activity 
(Chapter 4).  I calculate the percent of votes legislators missed before (pre-primary period) and 
during their states’ primary campaign seasons for all legislators in the dataset.  The dependent 
variable, then, is the difference or change in missed votes between the pre-primary period and 
the primary campaign season.   Changes in introduction and cosponsorship activity are also 
measured by subtracting the pre-primary activity (e.g., number of introductions before primary 
season) from the primary season activity (e.g., number of introductions during six month primary 
campaign season).  Because legislators introduce so few amendments during their terms, changes 
in amendment activity are calculated as a dichotomous variable indicating whether a legislator 
introduced an amendment in the pre-primary period but did not do so in the primary campaign 
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season.  The expectation is that MCs with primaries will be less active in the primary campaign 
season, so an indicator of whether the activity decreased during the primary campaign season is 
measured as such. 
Chapter 5 investigates whether MCs change the content of their legislative issue agendas. 
The three dependent variables measures changes in party owned, trespassed, and non-owned bill 
and resolution introductions and cosponsorships.  I subtract the percent of party owned issues 
each legislator introduced and cosponsored during her pre-primary period from the percent of 
party owned issues she introduced during her primary campaign season to produce the dependent 
variable, percent ∆ party owned.  I follow this same procedure to measure changes in trespassing 
activity and activity on non-party owned issues to create dependent variables percent ∆ 
trespassed and percent ∆ non-owned. 
To examine the extent to which primaries cause legislators to change their partisan roll 
call voting behavior, the models considered in Chapter 6 use primary Δ party support and post-
primary Δ party support.   Primary Δ party support measures changes in partisan voting by 
taking the percent of 75-75 party votes that each legislator voted with his or her party during the 
pre-primary stage subtracted from the percent of party votes that each legislator voted with his or 
her party during the primary.  Post-primary Δ party support measure whether MCs moderate 
their partisan voting following their primaries by subtracting the primary campaign season 75-75 
party vote score from the post-primary 75-75 party vote score. 
Research Design 
 Up to this point I have focused on the key predictors that I expect to influence legislative 
behavior—the presence and quality of primary challengers, timing of primaries, and district 
ideological diversity—and also detailed the data collection and measurement of the dependent 
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variables.  In testing my hypotheses, I use a multivariate approach that accounts for the separate 
effects of individual and structural variables on changes in legislative behavior.  For example, 
there are other features that might also affect the extent to which legislators change their 
behavior during the primary season.  When examining how MCs allocate their time, it might be 
important to control for how far legislators must travel back and forth from their districts to 
Washington, DC.  The theoretical motivation and measurement of these variables are discussed 
in detail in the forthcoming chapters. 
A key research design consideration is the type of comparisons we should make in the 
analyses.  If, for example, we are interested in whether MCs who have primaries change their 
legislative behavior during the primary season more than those who do not (a between-subject 
comparison), then a cross-sectional study is an appropriate approach.   Here, I group all instances 
of incumbents with primaries and see if they exhibit larger changes in behavior during the 
primary season as compared to the instances in which incumbents do not have primaries. 
But one feature of my sample is that legislators are in the dataset multiple times (i.e., 
each Congress they are an incumbent).  This allows me to further study the effects of primaries 
on legislative behavior by examining whether the effects of primaries in the cross-sectional 
analyses hold across legislators over time.  Here, I can explore, via a within-subject comparison, 
whether legislators exhibit larger changes in behavior when they have primaries compared to 
when they do not.  A longitudinal design component provides further leverage on the research 
puzzle at hand because it allows me to teases out whether the observed effects of primaries are 
function of individual features of MCs who get primaries, or a consequence of primary elections.  
The advantages of such an approach are revealing in the following example.  Imagine 
that the cross-sectional analysis confirms the hypothesis that primaries cause MCs to become 
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more partisan in their legislative behavior.  However, one question that emerges is whether these 
legislators become more partisan because of the primary, or if some other factor(s) might be 
inducing this change in behavior.  It could be, for example, that incumbents who tend to get 
primaries always become more partisan during the primary campaign season, but this may be a 
result of their general behavioral patterns, not the threat of a primary challenge.  These MCs may 
consistently be concerned about potential primaries (given that they get them often), so they act 
as though they have a challenge in every election cycle.  In this scenario, then, MCs who 
regularly vulnerable in elections change their behavior during their congressional terms because 
of their perceived sense of electoral uncertainty.  Using a longitudinal approach allows us to 
compare MCs’ own legislative behavior when they do and do not have primaries.  If these MCs 
do not change their behavior when they are not challenged in the primary, then this provides 
further evidence that primaries cause incumbents to change their legislative behavior.  
Plan of Analysis 
In the analyses that follow, I use a mix of cross-sectional and longitudinal design, and the 
unit of analysis is always the individual legislator.  The particular approach varies depending 
upon the specific research question.  In Chapter 4, I examine the impact of congressional 
primaries on legislators’ roll call vote participation and bill and resolution introduction, 
cosponsorship, and amendment activity using a cross-sectional approach.  Chapter 5 investigates 
the influence of primaries on the content of legislators’ bill and resolution introductions and 
cosponsorship using a cross-sectional approach.  More specifically, I test whether primaries 
prompt MCs to adjust their legislative issue agendas toward the issues that are important to their 
party base.  Finally, Chapter 6 seeks to connect the presence and quality of primary challengers 
to incumbents’ partisan roll call voting behavior.  Here, the comparison is both cross-sectional 
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and longitudinal as I compare changes in activity for incumbents with and without primaries, and 
also compare changes in activity for a subset of legislators when they do and do not have 
primaries.   
In the previous chapters I presented the hypotheses and theoretical motivation for the 
dissertation.  In this chapter I presented an overview of my data collection effort, discussed the 
measures of the critical dependent and independent variables, and detailed  the research design 
approaches that the follow in the next three empirical chapters.  Chapter 4 is the first step to 
analyzing the impact of congressional primaries on legislators’ activity, particularly their volume 
of activity. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Table 3.1: Incumbents Seeking Reelection 
 
Congress 
# Reelection  
Seeking MCs 
105 373 
106 390 
107 389 
108 398 
109 398 
110 388 
Total 2336 (641 unique) 
Note: Cell entries reflect the number of legislators  
Per Congress who sought reelection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Primary and General Election Challenges 
  
General Challenge  
 
No General  
Challenge 
 
Total 
Primary Challenge   463   27   490 
No Primary  
   Challenge 
1690 156 1846 
Total 2153 183 2336 
Note: This table presents the number of observations in the sample with a primary and a  
general election challenge, a primary challenger and no general election challenger, no  
primary challenger but a general election challenger, and no challenge in either the primary  
or general. 
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Table 3.3: Bill and Resolution Introductions, Cosponsorships, and Amendment Activity 
Congress  
 Introductions Cosponsorships Amendments 
105 11 196.2 1.9 
106 12.7 244.2 2.2 
107 13.2 241.2 1.2 
108 12.4 239.1 1.6 
109 14.6 238.8 2.7 
110 16.8 288.5 2.6 
Mean 13.5 241.7 2.0 
Note: Cell entries are the mean number of bill and resolution introductions, cosponsorships, and   
amendments made by legislators in each Congress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Issue Ownership Categorization 
Democrat Owned Issues Republican Owned Issues Non-Party Owned Issues 
Civil Rights Crime Agriculture  
Education Defense Budget 
Environment and Public 
Lands 
Taxes 
Moral Issues 
Campaign Finance 
Children’s Issues 
Health Care  Consumer Issues 
Jobs and Infrastructure  Corporate Regulation 
Medicare  Government Operations 
Social Security   
Welfare   
Note: The table lists the issue areas into issue ownership categories.  
Date Source: Sulkin (2005; 2011). 
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Table 3.5: ∆ in Activity Dependent Variables  
 
Volume of Activity 
 
  Percent  ∆ Missed Votes 
    
 
   ∆ Introductions 
     
 
   ∆ Cosponsorships 
    
 
   ∆ Amendments 
 
 
 
% Primary Season Roll Call Votes Missed – 
% Pre-Primary Roll Call Votes Missed  
 
# Primary Season Bill and Resolution Introductions – 
# Pre-Primary Bill and Resolution Introductions   
 
# Primary Season Bill and Resolution Cosponsorships – 
# Pre-Primary Bill and Resolution Cosponsorships   
 
Indicator (0,1) whether MCs introduced an Amendment in 
Pre-Primary period but not Primary Season  
 
Content of Activity 
 
   Percent ∆ Party Owned 
 
 
   Percent ∆ Trespassed 
 
 
   Percent ∆ Non-Owned 
 
 
 
% Primary Season Party Owned Issues –  
% Pre-Primary Owned Issues 
 
% Primary Season Trespassed Issues –  
% Pre-Primary Trespassed Issues 
 
% Primary Season Non-Party Owned Issues –  
% Pre-Primary Non-Party Owned Issues 
 
Partisan Roll Call Activity 
 
  Primary Δ Party Support 
 
 
  Post-Primary Δ Party Support 
 
 
 
% Primary Season Votes w/ party on 75-75 Roll Calls –  
% Pre-Party Votes w/ party on 75-75 Roll Calls  
 
% Post-Primary Votes w/ party on 75-75 Roll Calls –  
% Primary Season Votes w/ party on 75-75 Roll Calls  
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Figure 3.1: Presence and Quality of Primary Challenges in U.S. House Races (1998-2008) 
 
Note: Data collected from the Almanac of American Politics 2000-2010 and local newspaper coverage.   
Omitted from the data are MCs who did not start their terms at the beginning of the first session and  
those that retired or died in office.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2:  1998-2008 Congressional Primary Dates 
 
Note:  Data collected from the Federal Election Commission (fec.gov) and the Congressional Research Service.  
Primary dates grouped by midterm and presidential election cycles, and data are aggregated across Congresses by 
the percent of states with primaries in each month, and the percent of legislators with primaries in each month.    
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Figure 3.3: District Heteorgeneity in the 110
th
 Congress/2008 Election Cycle 
 
Note: Figure represents district ideological heterogeneity of congressional districts for  
those legislators running for reelection in the 110
th
 Congress. District heterogeneity  
measured as the standard deviation of respondents’ ideological self-placement on a five 
point scale by congressional district.  
 
Figure: 3.4: Mean Percent of Missed Votes by Congress 
 
Note: The figure presents the average proposed of votes missed by legislators in each  
Congress.  
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Figure 3.5: Bill and Resolution Introductions Issue Content 
 
Note: The figure represents the mean number of bill and resolution introductions that the  
average legislator sponsors in an average Congress by issue cateogory. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Bill and Resolution Cosponsorships Issue Content 
 
Note: The figure represents the mean number of bill and resolution cosponsorships that the  
average legislator sponsors in an average Congress by issue cateogory. 
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Figure 3.7: Issue Ownership (Democrats) 
 
 
Note: The figure reprsents the mean percent of party-owned, party- 
trespassed, and non-owned issues that Democrats, on average, introduce  
and cosponsor legislation on by Congress. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Issue Ownership (Republicans) 
  
Note: The figure reprsents the mean percent of party-owned, party- 
trespassed, and non-owned issues that Republicans, on average, introduce  
and cosponsor legislation on by Congress. 
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Figure 3.9:  Party Support across Congresses 
 
Note: Data are the mean party loyalty scores on party votes where 75 percent of Democrats  
opposed 75 percent of Republicans aggregated across Congress. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Categorizing Pre-Primary, Primary Season, and Post-Primary Activity 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All measures of legislative activity are categorized according to this scheme.   
The dependent variables in the analyses are the change in the activity between the pre-primary  
and primary campaign season. 
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Chapter 4: Primaries, Timing, and the Volume of Legislators’ Activity 
 
In July of 2012 Representative Charles Boustany (R-Louisiana) introduced the “No 
Show, No Pay” bill.  Under this proposal, legislators who miss even a single vote would not 
receive pay for that day.  This bill was introduced at the same time that Boustany was competing 
in the Republican primary against fellow incumbent Representative Jeff Landry (R-Louisiana) 
for the redrawn 3
rd
 congressional district.  In his announcement of the bill, Boustany said, “They 
[legislators] habitually miss important votes on key policy initiatives and legislation by leaving 
early or arriving late in order to attend fundraising and campaign events” (Blum 2012).  Landry, 
his opponent, had at that time missed nearly 10 percent of roll call votes, and this was a clear 
way for Boustany to target Landry during the campaign.  In response, Landry was quoted as 
saying that through this bill “He's [Boustany] trying to slap me around” (Delaney 2012). 
This example points to a number of important considerations about the election-
legislative behavior linkage.  First, elected representatives are expected to be present in Congress 
and those who skip out on their official duties can find that such actions will come back to haunt 
them, particularly in election years.  Second, legislators will use everything in their arsenal to 
win elections.  In the case of Boustany, this means introducing a bill that targets the 
shortcomings of his opponent.  Finally, campaigning, especially in highly competitive races, 
requires time even during the legislative session.  Legislators must balance their commitments of 
their elected office with electioneering, and electioneering often wins out.    
In this chapter I explore how legislators deal the competing demands of staying in 
Washington, DC to legislate with the need to return to their districts to campaign.  Here, I 
examine how the presence and quality of primary challengers affect legislators’ volume of 
activity on bill and resolution introductions, cosponsorships, amendments, and roll call votes.  I 
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find that primaries influence legislators’ activity levels differently depending on the timing of the 
primary (i.e., spring, summer, fall).  In turn, this highlights the meaningful impacts that 
congressional primaries have on legislative behavior. 
Competition and the Volume of Legislators’ Activity 
 
 Constituents want MCs actively representing their interests in Congress (Arnold 1990).  
They send their elected representatives to Congress to act on the district’s preferences in the 
legislative process.  For elected representatives, what they do in Congress not only sends signals 
to the district about their issue positions (Mayhew 1974), but also their policy priorities in 
Congress (Koger 2003; Schiller 1995; Sulkin 2005), and their overall commitment to 
representing their districts in Washington, DC.  There are a large number of legislative activities 
that MCs may engage in.  From roll call votes, to bill and resolution introductions and 
cosponsorships, to committee work, and to floor speeches just to name a few, legislators who 
wish to be active in Congress have many opportunities to do so.    
Not participating in Congress opens the door to potential critiques (Arnold 1990; Salmore 
and Salmore 1989; Sulkin 2005; but see Rothenberg and Sanders 2000).  Indeed, challengers are 
eager to point to shortcomings of incumbents, and criticism of legislative inactivity is an easy 
claim to make.  In the Boustany-Landry congressional race, Landry’s inactivity was the center of 
criticism and even Boustany’s own legislative activity in Congress.  In short, being present in 
Congress and actively participating in the legislative process means that incumbents are earning 
their keep.  
 Given the reelection-legislative behavior linkage, we should expect that competitive 
elections will prompt MCs to become more attentive to the wishes of their constituents.  In 
particular, I expect that this attentiveness should itself manifest in their volume of activity in  
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Congress.  Specifically, competition should affect how active incumbents are in Congress.  To 
gauge the ways in which primaries, and perhaps competitive elections more broadly, affect 
legislators’ volume of activity, I examine how legislators respond to electoral conditions while 
they are in the heat of their battles—that is, while they are actively campaigning for reelection.   
As discussed previously, there are competing expectations as to the direction of the 
effects of primaries on legislative activity levels.  On the one hand, vulnerable legislators will 
want to demonstrate their commitment to their constituents by actively representing their districts 
in Washington, DC.  Incumbents are able to build their legislative records while they 
simultaneously campaign for reelection and legislate in Congress.  We should expect MCs will 
use every tool at their disposal while they are running for reelection, especially those that come 
with elected office.  Given this, I anticipate that MCs with primaries should be more active in 
introducing and cosponsoring legislation while they are campaigning for renomination than their 
colleagues who do not have primaries.   
Introducing and cosponsoring legislation has a number of advantages.  These legislative 
activities are traceable and can easily connect legislators to specific outcomes (Arnold 1990), 
thus allowing MCs to claim credit over particular bill or issue area (Campbell 1982; Mayhew 
1974), or signal their policy priorities (Koger 2003; Schiller 1995; Sulkin 2005).  Those who are 
electorally vulnerable can highlight their active participation in Congress and point to specific 
bills or issue areas that they have been active on.  For example, research shows that bill 
cosponsorship activity is related to electoral marginality whereby those who are vulnerable tend 
to be more active in cosponsoring legislation (Campbell 1982).   
However, legislators cannot be in both in the halls of Congress and back in their districts 
at the same time (Fenno 1978; Jones 2003; Mayhew 1974; Rothenberg and Sanders 1999), and 
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this balance between legislating in Congress and being in the district can be one of the most 
challenging tasks for MCs (Bauer et al. 1973; Fenno 1978).  This should be especially true when 
incumbents are challenged in elections.  In order to continue representing their districts in 
Washington, DC, incumbents must get reelected.  But, the business in Congress continues even 
during the campaign season.  When competition emerges, then, legislators will likely make the 
choice to return to their districts to campaign for reelection; hence they should be less present in 
Washington, DC. 
 This has implications for the volume of legislators’ activity.  As discussed above, MCs 
with primaries should be more active on those activities where they can choose the timing, like 
introductions and cosponsorship.  At the same time, legislators should be less active on activities 
for which participation requires that incumbents be present in Washington, DC at a particular 
time.  In particular, I expect that legislators who are back in the district campaigning will be less 
active amending legislation and will also miss more votes.  Unlike bill and resolution 
introductions and cosponsorships where legislators can choose when or even if to introduce or 
cosponsor, decisions about amending legislation and when roll calls are cast are regulated by 
House leaders.  For example, the leadership determines whether bills and resolutions can be 
amended and also the allotted time period for amendments (Sinclair 1994).  The leadership also 
controls the timing of roll call votes.  If legislators are not present in Washington, DC at the time 
of the amendment period or when bills and resolutions are up for roll call they will not be able to 
submit amendments or vote.  Given this, I expect that MCs with primaries will be less active in 
sponsoring amendments and casting roll call votes during the primary campaign season as 
compared to their colleagues who do not have challenges.  
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 In sum, I anticipate that primaries will impact legislators’ volume of activity in two ways.  
First, during their states’ primary campaign season, those with primaries should be more active 
introducing and cosponsoring legislation than their colleagues without such challenges.  
However, on those activities where legislators cannot pick and choose the timing of their 
activity—amendments and roll calls—incumbents with primaries should be less active during 
their states’ primary campaign season than their colleagues without primaries.  
Data and Measures 
The first two dependent variables are measures of bill and resolution introduction and 
cosponsorship activity.  These measures are the total number of bills and resolutions each 
legislator introduced and cosponsored during his or her state’s six month primary campaign 
season.  The third dependent variable is amendment activity.  This is a dichotomous variable that 
indicates whether an MC sponsored an amendment during the primary campaign period.
11
  To 
assess roll call vote participation, the fourth dependent variable, I calculate the percent of roll 
call votes each legislator missed during their states’ primary campaign season. 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of legislators’ activity levels on bill and resolution 
introductions, cosponsorships, amendments, and roll call votes.   As shown, incumbents 
introduce about 3 bills and resolutions and cosponsor 53 during their states’ primary campaign 
season.  There is no difference in bill and resolution sponsorship activity levels for those with 
and without primaries.  However, differences do appear to exist for cosponsorships.  MCs with 
primaries cosponsor an average of 3 more bills and resolutions while they are campaigning in 
                                                 
11
 Because legislators, on average, sponsor less than 2 amendments per Congress, an indicator 
variable of whether a legislator introduced an amendment is used in the analysis rather than the 
total number of amendments. 
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their primaries than their colleagues without primaries (t = -2.25, p < .05).  This difference in 
even more pronounced for those with high quality challengers (i.e., MCs who challengers have 
previous elective office experience) as they cosponsor about 8 more than those without such 
challenges (t = - 2.75, p < .01).  This corresponds to my expectations about how primaries 
influence legislators’ volume of activity. 
What about amendment and roll call activity?  On average, 27 percent of legislators 
introduce amendments during their states’ primary campaign season.  However, MCs with a 
primary challenger are less active in amending legislation (24 percent vs. 28 percent of MCs 
without primaries (t = 1.96, p < .05)).  Although MCs with high quality challengers introduced 
amendments at the highest rate, there is no substantive difference in amendment activity levels 
between those with high quality challengers and incumbents without such challengers.  
 MCs with primaries, especially those with high quality primary challengers, appear to 
miss more roll call votes.  Legislators miss an average of 4 percent, or 13 total, roll call votes 
during their states’ primary campaign season.  Those with primaries miss nearly 5 percent of roll 
call votes during their primary campaign season compared to those without primary challengers 
who miss 3.8 percent—a difference of over 1 percent, or an average of 4 more votes (t = -5.17, p 
< .01).
12
  This difference is even larger when comparing those with and without high quality 
challengers.  Incumbents with high quality primary challengers miss 5.84 percent of votes when 
they are campaigning for renomination while those without such challengers miss 3.97 percent—
a difference of 1.87 percent, or an average of 6 more votes (t = -3.97, p < .01).   
                                                 
12
 The difference in means tests for roll call votes are based on the percentage of roll calls 
missed. 
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In sum, the results thus far suggest that legislators with primaries, especially those with 
high quality primary challengers, are more active on the behaviors in their control and less active 
on those that are not.  As shown, MCs with primaries are cosponsor more legislation than their 
colleagues without primaries during the primary campaign season.  At the same time, MCs with 
primaries are less in active amending legislation and casting roll calls. 
Modeling Volume of Activity 
To more fully assess the effects of primaries on legislators’ volume of activity, I develop 
multivariate models that control for a number of variables that might explain legislators’ level of 
activity on bill and resolution sponsorships, cosponsorships, amendments, and roll call votes.  
One important set of control variables to include in the models is other election characteristics 
that might influence the volume of legislators’ activity.  For example, the timing of congressional 
primaries might matter.   As discussed in Chapter 3, primaries in the sample occur between 
February and November.  Because of this, those in states with later primary dates have more time 
to introduce, cosponsor, and amend legislation in the pre-primary period than those in states with 
earlier primary dates.  Thus, months from general indicates the number of months between the 
legislators’ primary election dates and the November general election.  This variable ranges from 
0 for MCs from Louisiana who have November primaries in the 2000-2006 election cycles, to 9 
for MCs from Illinois and Maryland with February primaries in the 2008 election cycle.  
 In addition, legislators might have an eye towards their general election during their 
states’ primary campaign season and this might affect their volume of activity in Congress.  For 
instance, incumbents might be anticipating their general election challengers and thus beef-up 
their legislative activity during their states’ primary campaign season.  Ninety-two percent of 
legislators have general election challenges, and the presence of a general election challenger is 
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controlled for in each model.  Of course, not all general election challengers may have emerged 
during this time, but in most cases this is known.   
It is also important to consider that not only might legislators’ present electoral 
conditions affect their volume of legislative activity, but it is also likely that their past election 
experiences do as well (Koger 2003; Sulkin 2005; 2011).  Primary last indicates whether MCs 
had a primary in the last election cycle.  In my sample, 27 percent of incumbents had a primary 
in the previous election cycle. 
I also include variables that control for legislator and district characteristics that have 
been linked to legislative activity level.  I expect, for example, that MCs on a larger number of 
committees will be more active in formulating legislative policy and will thus introduce, 
cosponsor, and amend more frequently (Schiller 1995; Sinclair 1989; see also Koger 2003).  For 
legislators in my sample, this count ranges from 0 to 5 committees.   In addition, freshman 
legislators should introduce and cosponsor less (Koger 2003; Schiller 1995), while those with 
seniority should be more active introducing legislation and less active cosponsoring legislation 
(Campbell 1982; Koger 2003; Schiller 1995).  I use an indicator variable for freshman, and a 
count of the number of years each legislator has been in office for the measure of seniority.  In 
each Congress, about 13 percent of legislators are freshman, while the average years of seniority 
is 8.72.  Research also indicates that liberal MCs are more active in Congress (Campbell 1982; 
Koger 2003).  Ideology is the 1
st
 Dimension Common Space Score for each legislator ranging 
from -1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative).  I also control for a number of other legislator 
characteristics such as their status as a majority party member, party leader, and their party 
affiliation (Democrat).  
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A number of features related to the district might also impact incumbents’ activity levels.  
I anticipate that MCs from large state delegations will cosponsor more bills as committees often 
require the support of a state’s delegation to push forward a bill (Koger 2003).  Given this, 
incumbents from large states should collectively cosponsor more bills than those from smaller 
states.  Delegation size is the number of MCs from the state, this ranges from 1 (for legislators 
from Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) to 53 
(for those from California in the 106
th
 - 107
th
 Congresses).  I also expect that the geographic 
location of legislators’ districts will impact their volume of activity.  Although legislating in 
Washington, DC is an important part of representatives’ positions, MCs must also maintain a 
relationship with their districts (Fenno 1978).  Incumbents that have to travel further between 
their districts and Washington, DC might be less present in Congress, and perhaps less active.  
For example, James Moran represents Virginia’s 8th congressional district and resides in 
Alexandria, Virginia—6 miles from Washington, DC.  Neil Abercrombie, on the other hand, 
represents Hawaii’s 1st congressional district and resides in Honolulu—4829 miles from 
Washington, DC.  I suspect that, regardless of primary status, legislators like Moran will be more 
present, and thus more active, in Congress because of the relative ease of traveling between their 
homes and Washington, DC.  Distance is the number of miles from the district to Washington, 
DC.    
Finally, the composition of legislators’ districts might affect the extent to which they 
sponsor, cosponsor, and amend legislation.  MCs from districts with a diverse set of interests 
(i.e., ideologically heterogeneous) might be more active introducing, cosponsoring, and 
amending in their efforts to represent those varied interests in Congress.  I include the district 
heterogeneity measure described in the previous chapter in each of the models. 
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Primary Campaign Activity 
At the outset it is clear that the results of the difference in means tests for bill and 
resolution cosponsorships do not hold after accounting for other variables (Table 4.2).  After 
controlling for the structural control variables, it appears that primaries exert no effect on the 
legislators’ volume of cosponsorship activity during the primary season. At first glance, this is 
unexpected given that I anticipated that primaries would increase legislators’ activity.  But, if we 
consider the second hypothesis—the act of campaigning draws incumbents away from 
legislating in Washington, DC to electioneer in the district—then perhaps this null finding is 
intuitive.   
Indeed, the evidence does lend support to the assertion that MCs with primaries are less 
present in Congress while they are campaigning.  Those with primaries are less likely to sponsor 
amendments and tend to miss more votes.  MCs with primaries are 4.5 percent less likely to 
introduce an amendment during the primary campaign season.
13
  In addition, the OLS model 
predicting the percent of votes legislators miss suggests the presence of a primary challenge 
leads legislators to miss more votes.  The size of these effect might at first seem small, but if we 
consider that legislators, on average, miss 4.04 percent of votes, .79 percent more missed votes 
for those with primaries is an increase of nearly 20 percent over that of the average legislator.  
This decrease in participation in Congress suggests that primaries have a very real impact on 
legislators’ behavior.  Those who are concerned about their reelection prospects participate less 
in the day-to-day activities of Congress. 
 Other election variables also affect legislators’ volume of activity during the primary 
campaign season.  As incumbents’ states’ primary campaign dates move further away from the 
                                                 
13
 This is based on calculations of marginal effects. 
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general election date, they introduce, cosponsor, and amend less while also missing fewer votes.  
It makes sense that legislators will be most present in Congress at the beginning of their terms, 
but as electoral pressures begin to mount incumbents will begin to miss votes.  Another 
campaign effect that emerges is that those with general election challenges introduce more 
legislation, and also miss fewer votes during the primary campaign season.  This suggests that 
legislators anticipate their general election contests and are thus more active before their general 
election campaigns begin in full force.   
The legislator and district control variables in the introduction, cosponsorship, 
amendment, and roll call voting models largely conform to expectations.  Incumbents who are on 
a larger number of committees are more active in introducing and cosponsoring legislation, as 
are liberal MCs and those with more seniority.  But party leaders tend to be less active on bill 
and resolution sponsorships and cosponsorships.  This is unsurprising given that party leaders 
have a good deal more responsibility in Congress.  MCs with more seniority are less active 
amending legislation and tend to miss more votes.  In addition, freshman legislators, those in the 
majority party, Democrats, and liberals miss fewer roll call votes.  Also, MCs whose districts are 
further away from Washington, DC cosponsor less.  One somewhat surprising findings is the 
effect of district ideological heterogeneity.  Jones (2003) finds when legislators represent 
districts with more diverse interests they miss more votes.  He attributes this to the diversity of 
the preferences in the district and that these MCs likely find it difficult to please everyone, so 
they avoid voting on those issues that might hurt them electorally, especially controversial 
legislation.  The results thus far show just the opposite: legislators from ideologically mixed 
districts miss fewer votes.  This different finding may be a result of the time period under 
investigation.  Whereas I study roll call voting participation during a specific segment of the 
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congressional term, Jones examines the effects of ideological heterogeneity over the entire term.  
It may be this difference that leads to opposing findings.  In the next chapter I look more closely 
at the effect of district heterogeneity on legislative behavior. 
 Taken as a whole, the results up to this point suggest that compared to their colleagues 
without primaries, legislators with primaries are less active in amending legislation and tend to 
miss more votes while they are actively campaigning for renomination.  The hypothesis that 
primaries cause MCs to be more active in introducing and cosponsoring legislation has no 
support once other variables are included into a multivariate model.  Thus far, then, it appears 
that, in the aggregate, primaries depress legislative activity in Congress. 
Timing of Congressional Primaries 
Perhaps one reason for the mixed support for the hypotheses is that the time in which 
legislators have their primaries impacts how MCs respond to their election experiences.  Because 
congressional primary dates vary from February to November, those with earlier primaries might 
react differently to their primary campaign experiences than those with late primaries.  In the 
previous set of models, I found that the timing of legislators’ states’ primary dates influences 
their volume of legislative activity, as those from states with earlier primaries introduce, 
cosponsor, and amend less and also miss fewer votes than their colleagues from states with later 
primary dates.  But, the influence of timing might also extend to how MCs respond to their 
primary election contexts. 
We know, for example, that following their primaries, MCs with earlier primaries 
become less ideological in their roll call votes than MCs with later primaries (Burden 2001).  As 
suggested, incumbents with early primaries have a longer amount of time to refocus their energy 
on their general election challengers following their primaries as compared to incumbents with 
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later primaries.  Thus they moderate their positions more as the general election approaches. This 
logic should also apply to legislators’ volume of activity.  In particular, the volume of activity for 
MCs with primaries that are in the spring might be differently affected as compared to legislators 
with fall primaries.  While the former may only need to focus on their primary challenge, the 
latter will likely be battling two challengers at the same time—the primary and the general.   
I suspect that the moderating effect of primary timing works in two ways.  First, those 
with spring primaries should have fewer time constraints than those with summer or fall 
primaries.  MCs whose primaries are early in the spring are likely focusing solely on their 
primary contests.  They should have the time to use every legislative tool at their disposal to 
defeat their opponent.  Thus, when presented with a primary challenger, spring primary MCs 
should increase their activity on bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships.  This same 
expectation might not hold for those with later primaries. When battling challenges on both the 
primary and general election fronts (again 94 percent of those with primaries also have general 
election challengers), MCs with primaries in late primary states likely will have neither the time 
nor the resources to spend policymaking.  Thus, incumbents with primaries in the fall should be 
less active in introducing and cosponsoring legislation than their fall primary colleagues who do 
not have primaries as these activities require time and resource that which fall primary MCs 
likely do not have.  This effect should be particularly pronounced for those with high quality 
challengers who are involved in heated battles for the primary.   
Similarly, the roll call voting participation rates and amendment activity for those with 
summer and fall primaries should be particularly sensitive to primary challenges.  I expect that 
the effect of primaries on the volume of legislators’ amendment activity and roll call 
participation will become more prominent as legislators’ primaries grow closer to the general 
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election.   In short, those with primaries that align closely with the general election season should 
be especially prone to missing votes and amending less legislation because they should be less 
present in Congress compared to the their colleagues without primaries and even their colleagues 
with primaries in spring primary states.  Again, this is because of the proximity to the general 
election. 
Given that the evidence thus far suggests that legislators from states with earlier 
primaries introduce, cosponsor, and amend less while also tending to vote with more regularity 
than those from later primary states, the next step is to examine whether the effect of the 
presence and quality of primary challengers is different for those with spring, summer, and fall 
primaries. To do this, I group observations by the timing of the primary (spring, summer, and 
fall) and run models using the same election, legislator, and district characteristics used in the 
previous analysis.    
Timing and Volume of Activity 
 Table 4.3 presents the results of the models predicting the volume of legislators’ bill and 
resolution introduction and cosponsorship activity.  From these models it is clear that primaries 
have different effects on legislators’ volume of activity depending on the timing of the primary. 
Those with at least a token primary challenger present in spring primary states are more active 
introducing and cosponsoring legislation than their colleagues in these states that do not have 
primary challenges.  On average, these MCs introduce and cosponsor .4 and 4.9 more bills and 
resolutions as compared to their colleagues without primaries. This effect is not present for MCs 
with summer and fall primaries.  In fact, those with primaries in fall primary states are less active 
introducing legislation than MCs without primaries by .5 bills and resolutions.  This conforms to 
the expectation that MCs with later primaries are juggling challengers on two fronts and are thus 
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less present, and less active, in Congress.  The results also explain the null findings on the 
volume of bill and resolution introductions from the previous set of analyses.  Although at the 
outset the effect of primaries on bill and resolution sponsorships might appear small, the results 
demonstrate a clear pattern in how primaries differently impact incumbents’ volume of 
legislative activity depending on the timing of the primary election date.  This effect continues to 
emerge in the models predicting legislators’ volume of amendment and roll call activity. Table 
4.4 presents these results. 
 Looking first at amendment activity, for those in states with summer primaries, 
legislators with at least a token primary challenger present are 7 percent less likely to amend 
legislation during their states’ primary campaign season as compared to their colleagues from 
these states without such challenges.  This effect does not appear for spring or fall primary MCs. 
This is somewhat surprising as I would expect that the volume of activity for those with fall 
primaries would be susceptible to the presence of a primary challenge. However, given that most 
primaries occur in the summer (over half), this means that primaries influence amendment 
activity for a large number of incumbents in the 105
th
 – 110th Congresses. 
However, a clear pattern emerges when we examine roll call voting participation.  
Primaries do not have an effect on the level of missed votes for those in spring primary states.  
However, legislators with primaries in the summer miss 1.31 percent more votes (4.86 percent 
compared to 3.40 percent) than those in these states without such challenges.  This effect is 
considerably larger for incumbents with high quality challenges in fall primary states.  Although 
the mere presence of a primary challenge does not exert an effect, when a high quality challenger 
is present incumbents miss 2.24 percent more votes than those without such challenges—a 55 
percent increase in missed votes over the average  missed roll call vote score of MCs without a 
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high quality primary challenger.  This suggests that as primaries dates converge upon the general 
election season, legislators’ attention is on both races and they are thus less present in Congress.   
Primaries, Timing, and Change in Activity  
 These analyses point to two important dynamics.  First, primaries have different effects 
on the volume of legislators’ activity depending on the type of activity.  The influence of 
primaries is most prominent for legislators’ bill and resolution cosponsorship activity and roll 
call vote participation.  Second, the influence of primaries on incumbents’ volume of activity is 
moderated by the timing of the primary.  MCs with spring and summer primaries respond 
differently to primary challengers than those with fall primaries.  This, I contend, is a result of 
the proximity of the primary to the general election.  However, what these findings do not tell us 
is whether it is legislators’ primary election experiences that cause them to behave differently 
than their colleagues without primaries.  For example, it might be that those who tend to get 
primaries also tend to be, on average, less present in Washington, DC and thus vote with less 
regularity.  This would likely lead them to become electorally at risk, resulting in challenges in 
the primary and general election.  Given this, it could be argued that the results presented so far 
only point to different behavioral patterns of electorally vulnerable MCs.   
One way to more fully examine the relationship between primaries and the volume of 
legislative activity, then, might be to see whether legislators with primaries change their 
legislative behavior during the primary season more than their colleagues without such 
challenges.  More specifically, do those with primaries shift their legislative behavior during 
their primary campaigns more or less than those without primaries? Here, we can explore 
whether MCs adjust their legislative behavior as they respond to their election contexts.  If the 
findings from the previous primary activity analysis do not emerge when modeling the impact of 
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primaries on legislators’ change in activity, then this suggests that those with primaries behave 
the same way in the pre-primary period as the primary campaign period.  As such, we should 
pause to consider whether the results in the primary campaign models are a function of the 
presence and quality of primaries, or simply a manifestation of behavioral patterns of those who 
get primaries.  In turn, I apply a stricter criterion to assess the effects of primaries on legislative 
behavior and more clearly define the relationship between the two.   
MCs, regardless of whether they have a primary challenger, should, on average, be more 
active at the start of their terms in their bill and resolution cosponsorship activity, and over the 
course of their terms all legislators should decrease their activity.  This is because most 
legislative activity occurs at the beginning of the congressional term.
14
  However, I expect that 
those with primaries will be less likely to decrease their activity on bill and resolution 
sponsorships and cosponsorships during the primary season as compared to their colleagues who 
do not have primaries.  In this way, then, primaries should cause MCs to maintain higher levels 
of activity going into their primary campaign season than they would otherwise and thus exhibit 
smaller changes in activity than their colleagues without primaries.  On the other hand, MCs with 
primaries should be less present during the primary season.  Given this, I expect that those with 
primaries will become less likely to amend legislation and should also vote with less regularity 
compared to their colleagues without primaries during the primary campaign season.  In other 
words, the change in activity before and during the primary season on amendment sponsorships 
and roll call participation should be larger for those with primaries. 
                                                 
14
 A cursory look at bill and resolution introductions in the House reveals that most legislation is 
introduced at the beginning of each Congress. 
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Approaching the problem in this way requires measures of activity from not only during 
the primary campaign, but also before the onset of the primary season, the pre-primary period.  
Then, we can assess the degree to which legislators adjust their behavior during the primary 
campaigns season by operationalizing this change in activity between the two periods (i.e., as a 
difference between the pre-primary activity levels and primary campaign activity levels).  It is 
important to consider that, as Mayhew (1974) notes, MCs are always running for reelection.  
This means that we should expect vulnerable MCs to be anticipating their upcoming contests 
well before the six month primary campaign season, and as such we should not expect large 
changes in behavior between the pre-primary period and primary campaign season.  I begin first 
with a general overview of legislators’ volume of pre-primary activity and then examine how 
MCs change their volume of activity over the course of their terms.  Next, I separate the sample 
by the timing of legislators’ primaries and model the change in activity. 
Measuring Change in Volume of Activity 
Turning to pre-primary activity, legislators on the whole are more active at the beginning 
of their terms (i.e., the pre-primary period) than during their primary campaign season, as 
incumbents introduce, cosponsor, amend, and vote at higher rates during this time.  Table 4.5 
presents the mean activity levels in the pre-primary period, the time period before the onset of 
legislators’ states’ six month primary campaign season.  There is no difference in sponsorship 
activity levels for those with and without primaries in the pre-primary period, but there is for 
cosponsorship activity.  Indeed, those with at least a token primary challenger present cosponsor 
over 7 more bills and resolutions in the pre-primary period (t = -1.69, p < .10).  This becomes 
more pronounced when we look at the activity for those with high quality challengers.  These 
MCs cosponsor an average of nearly 15 more bills and resolutions than their colleagues without 
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such challenges during this time (t = -1.66, p < .10).  Legislators with primaries were no more or 
less active in amending legislation in the pre-primary activity, but a difference does emerge in 
roll call voting behavior.  Those with high quality primary challengers are less active in the pre-
primary period than their colleagues without such challenges, as they miss .60 percent more 
votes during this time (t = - 1.66, p < .10).   
This account of legislators’ volume of activity suggests that legislators with primaries 
might be gearing up for their primary campaigns before the primary campaign season even 
begins.  These incumbents are more active in cosponsoring legislation and also appear to miss 
more votes during this time.  Again, the expectation is that MCs with primaries will maintain 
their higher levels of cosponsorship activity into the primary campaign season and also continue 
to grow more likely to miss votes.   
Figures 4.1 – 4.4 present the pre-primary activity levels, primary season activity levels, 
and the change in volume of activity for bill and resolution introductions, cosponsorships, 
amendments, and missed roll call votes by the average activity level across legislators, those with 
and without primaries, and those with high quality challengers.  This latter measure, change in 
activity, is the dependent variable of the subsequent analysis. 
For both introductions and cosponsorships the dependent variables are the pre-primary 
activity subtracted from the primary season campaign activity (i.e., the set of dependent variables 
used in the previous models).  On average, legislators tend to decrease their activity on bills and 
resolutions by 5.71 introductions during their states’ primary campaign season (Figure 4.1).  
Across legislators, this change ranges from a decrease of 95 bills and resolutions to an increase 
of 49 bills and resolutions, and there is no substantive difference in the change in activity for 
those with and without primaries. 
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For change in cosponsorship activity, the average legislator decreases his or her 
cosponsorship activity by 98.45 bills and resolutions (Figure 4.2).  This ranges from a decrease 
of 460 to an increase of 33 cosponsorships, and the change in legislators’ volume of activity does 
not vary by either the presence or the quality of primary challenges.  
To measure change in amendment activity, the dependent variable is an indicator of 
whether a legislator introduced an amendment in the pre-primary period but did not do so in the 
primary campaign season.   Measuring the dependent variable in this captures whether legislators 
decrease their activity between the pre-primary and primary campaign season.  The expectation 
is that compared to incumbents who do not have primaries, those with primaries will amend less 
in the primary campaign season.   Figure 4.3 presents the summary statistics on the percent of 
legislators that amended in the pre-primary period, the primary campaign season, and those that 
amended in the pre-primary period but did not do so in the primary season.  On average, 16 
percent of legislators amended in the pre-primary period but do not do so in the primary 
campaign season, and there is no difference in the change in activity for those with and without 
primaries.  
To measure change in roll call voting behavior, I subtract the primary missed votes 
percent (the dependent variable from the previous analysis) from the pre-primary percent missed 
votes.  As shown in Figure 4.4, the average legislator misses 3.37 percent of votes in the pre-
primary period and 4.04 in the primary campaign season.  Since most legislators tend to miss 
fewer votes at the start of their terms, it makes sense to examine what causes legislators to miss 
more votes.  On average, legislators tend to increase the percent of roll calls missed between the 
two time periods by .68 percent.  However, for those with primaries the increase is 1.39 
percent—a .90 percent increase over those without primaries (t = -3.96, p < .01).  This increase is 
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even larger for those with high quality primary opponents.  These MCs miss 1.90 percent more 
votes during the primary campaign season than they did in the pre-primary period—a 1.27 
increase over MCs who do not have such a challengers (t = -2.67, p < .01).   
Taken as a whole, this preliminary descriptive account sheds light on overall patterns.  
Indeed, MCs with primaries might be anticipating their upcoming primary contests by increasing 
their activity on bill and resolution cosponsorships in the pre-primary period.  This suggests that 
MCs build up their legislative records before their primary campaigns officially begin.  This 
conforms to the notion that MCs foresee their upcoming contests before the campaigning is in 
full swing.  At the same time, these MCs also tend to travel back to the districts and miss votes in 
Congress.  Once the primary campaign season commences, however, legislators with primaries 
keep up these high levels of activity throughout their campaigns (i.e., there is no difference in 
change in activity for those with and without primaries) while also decreasing their activity in 
Congress on roll call votes. This latter finding is particularly evident for incumbents with high 
quality challengers.  This indicates that the act of campaigning itself draws MCs away from their 
duties in Washington, DC as they electioneer in their districts.   
Primaries and Change in Volume of Activity 
To examine the effects of primaries on legislators’ change in activity, I again separate the 
data by legislators’ states’ primary election dates (spring, summer, fall) given the different 
impact that primaries appear to exert on legislators’ volume of activity in the primary campaign 
season.  The change in legislators’ volume of activity is then modeled as a function of the 
presence and quality of primary challengers and included are the election, legislator, and district 
characteristics used in the previous analyses.  Table 4.6 presents the models of the change in bill 
and resolution introductions and cosponsorships.   
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 In these models, the dependent variables reflect a change in activity.  Most MCs decrease 
their activity on bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships during the primary 
campaign season because legislators tend to be most active at the beginning of each Congress, 
but this change should be less for those with primaries.  Thus, when interpreting the effect of the 
independent variables, a negative coefficient indicates a larger decrease in activity and a positive 
coefficient indicates a smaller decrease in activity.  For example, if MCs with primaries tend to, 
on average, decrease their activity on bill and resolution introductions in the primary campaign 
season, then the coefficient for the primary campaign variables will be positive and significant.   
The results indicate that primaries impact legislators’ change in activity levels on bill and 
resolution sponsorships differently in summer primary states and fall primary states.  MCs in 
summer primary states are less likely to decrease their activity between the pre-primary period 
and the primary campaign season.  These incumbents, on average, tend to decrease their 
sponsorship activity by 1.3 bills and resolution less than their colleagues without primaries (4.3 
introductions for MCs with primaries compared to 5.8 for those who do not have primaries).  In 
short, incumbents with primaries in summer primary states maintain their pre-primary activity 
levels to a larger degree than incumbents without primaries in these states.  In contrast, MCs with 
primaries in fall primary states are more likely to decrease their activity on bill and resolution 
introductions during the primary campaign season.  Compared to fall primary state MCs who do 
not have a primary challenge present, those with primaries decrease their bill and resolution 
activity by 1.8 more sponsorships.  This is not necessarily surprising given that from the previous 
analysis MCs with primaries in the fall were less active in introducing legislation compared to 
MCs in fall primary states without primaries.  These results provide further evidence that those 
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who have to battle challengers on two fronts (i.e., fall primary MCs), find it difficult to be active 
in Congress while they are campaigning. 
There is also a primary campaign effect on change in cosponsorship activity, but it runs 
counter to my predictions.  The results suggest that legislators with primaries in spring primary 
states decrease their cosponsorship activity by 11.1 bills and resolutions as compared to their 
colleagues without such challengers.  This effect is somewhat surprising and points to a 
substantial effect that the presence of a primary challenge has on those in spring primary states.  
One potential explanation for this finding might be related to activity in the pre-primary period.  
As suggested, MCs with spring primaries might be gearing up for their primary contexts in the 
pre-primary period by increasing their levels of bill and resolution introductions and 
cosponsorships. Indeed, the average legislator in spring primary states cosponsors 130 bills and 
resolutions in the pre-primary period, but those with primaries, however, introduce an average of 
145. Further, as shown in the models predicting primary campaign cosponsorship activity, 
legislators with at least a token primary challenger present in early primary states are also more 
active in cosponsoring legislation in the primary campaign period.  Taken as a whole, then, the 
results suggest that MCs in spring primary states are more active in cosponsoring legislation in 
the pre-primary period, decrease their activity on bill and resolution cosponsorships more than 
incumbents without primaries, and yet are still more active than their colleagues without 
primaries during the primary campaign season.    
Although I expected that all MCs with primaries, regardless of the timing of their 
primaries, will exhibit smaller changes in activity on bill and resolution cosponsorships during 
the primary season, this is not the case for summer and fall primaries.  Indeed, primaries exert no 
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effect of incumbents’ change in activity on bill and resolution cosponsorships for those with 
summer or fall primaries.   
 Turning to amendment activity and missed roll call votes, Table 4.7 shows the results of 
the change in the volume of legislators’ activity.  The only primary effect that emerges is in the 
roll call model.  The positive coefficient indicates that the presence of a primary challenge causes 
incumbents to miss more votes.  Those with summer primaries increase their percent of missed 
votes by .97 percent more while they are campaigning than their colleagues in these states 
without such challenges.  Given that over half of those in the dataset have summer primaries, this 
suggests that primaries do have a direct influence on many MCs as they respond to their election 
experiences and shift their patterns of roll call voting participation. 
Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter point to some initial conclusions about the effects of 
primaries on legislators’ volume of activity in Congress.  On the one hand, MCs with primaries 
are more (or less) active during the primary campaign season depending on the activity, but this 
depends on the timing of legislators’ primary election dates.  Incumbents with primaries further 
from the general election tend to respond to their primary election experiences by being more 
active in introducing and cosponsoring legislation.  Those with primaries closer to the general 
election, however, appear to respond to the contexts of their primary elections by missing more 
votes and amending less legislation.  But, these findings are not consistent across the models, and 
once legislators’ volume of activity is modeled as a change in activity, however, many of the 
results dissipate and even run counter to expectations.  This is not necessarily a problem because 
it appears that MCs with primaries anticipate their primary contexts by becoming more active 
before the onset of their primary campaign seasons.  In some ways, this is exactly how we should 
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expect competition to impact legislative behavior.  Electoral insecurity is supposed to prompt 
elected representatives to become responsive to their constituents.  In the case of primaries and 
legislative behavior, we see incumbents who are concerned about their reelection prospects being 
more active than those who are not electorally vulnerable. 
But it may be that primaries more directly impact legislative activity in other ways.  For 
example, perhaps legislators’ electoral contexts do not influence the volume of bill and 
resolution sponsorships, but might affect the content of what they introduce (Schiller 1995).  In 
the next chapter I examine if primaries influence the issue content of legislators’ activity, 
specifically their bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships. This provides a broader 
perspective on the role of primaries in affecting legislators’ behavior in Congress.  
  
101 
 
Figures and Tables 
 
Table 4.1: Primary Campaign Season Activity Levels  
 Introductions  Cosponsorships  Amendments Missed Votes (%) 
     
   No Primary Challenge 2.84 52.36 .28 3.80 
   Primary Challenge 2.83 55.55 .24 4.97 
   High Quality Challenge 2.82 60.81 .30 5.84 
   All MCs 2.83 53.03 .27 4.05 
Note: Data are the mean number of bill and resolution introductions cosponsorships, the mean percent of legislators 
that introduced an amendment, and the mean level of missed votes during legislators’ states’ primary season by the 
presence of a primary challenge and that of a high quality primary challenger. 
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Table 4.2: What Explains Primary Campaign Season Activity Levels? 
 Introductions Cosponsorships Amendments Missed 
Votes 
Election Characteristics     
   Primary Challenge .02 
(.07) 
.04 
(.03) 
-.14
* 
(.09) 
.79
*** 
(.29) 
   High Quality Primary Opponent .08 
(.13) 
.06 
(.05) 
.23 
(.15) 
1.09 
(.71) 
   Months From General -.04*** 
(.01) 
-.03
*** 
(.01) 
-.09
*** 
(.02) 
.14
** 
(.05) 
   Primary Last -.10* 
(.06) 
-.01 
(.02) 
.01 
(.08) 
.42# 
(.25) 
   Challenge in General .17** 
(.08) 
.08
* 
(.04) 
.10 
(.12) 
-1.83
*** 
(.48) 
Legislator & District Characteristics     
   Number of Committees .18*** 
(.04) 
.07
*** 
(.02) 
.14
** 
(.04) 
__ 
   Freshman -.02 
(.08) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.08 
(.11) 
-1.44
*** 
(.29) 
   Seniority .02*** 
(.00) 
-.01
*** 
(.00) 
.01
* 
(.00) 
.04
** 
(.02) 
   Party Leader -.50*** 
(.17) 
-.24
** 
(.12) 
-.23 
(.20) 
-.87 
(.64) 
   Majority Party Member .19***
 
(.07) 
-.09
*** 
(.02) 
.10 
(.08) 
-.50
* 
(.25) 
   Democrat -.28 
(.24) 
-.25
** 
(.10) 
-.01 
(.23) 
-1.36
* 
(.74) 
   Ideology -.30 
(.33) 
-.91
** 
(.14) 
-.20 
(.31) 
-2.48
** 
(1.10) 
   Distance from DC to District -.00 
(.04) 
-.00
** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
   District Heterogeneity -.57* 
(.33) 
-.13 
(.15) 
-.11 
(.38) 
-2.36
* 
(1.10) 
   State Delegation Size __ 
 
.00
* 
(.00) 
__ __ 
Constant  1.68***
 
(.40) 
4.46
*** 
(.20) 
-.55 
(.50) 
8.88
*** 
(1.78) 
Wald χ2
 
Prob > χ2
 
Pseudo R
2 
R
2 
N 
202.57 
.0000 
 
 
2336 
500.82 
.0000 
 
 
2336 
 
 
.05 
 
2336 
 
 
 
.09 
2336 
***
 p < .01; 
**
 p < .05; 
***
 p < .10 
Note: Data are from the 105
th
-110
th
 Congress/1998-2008 election cycles.  Each model predicts the volume of 
legislators’ activity during their states’ six month primary campaign season. The second and third columns represent 
the coefficients from negative binomial regression models predicting a count of the total number of bill and 
resolution introductions and cosponsorships respectively. The fourth column presents the results of the probit model 
predicting whether an MC introduced an amendment.  The fifth column is the results of the OLS model predicting 
the percent of votes MCs missed. The standard errors are clustered by legislator and fixed effects for Congress and 
legislator are included in each model.   
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Table 4.3: The Effect of Primary Season Timing on the Volume of Introductions and Cosponsorships 
 
           Introductions 
Spring     Summer     Fall 
         Cosponsorships 
Spring    Summer     Fall 
Election Characteristics       
   Primary Challenge .18* 
(.11) 
.05 
(.11) 
-.19
** 
(.11) 
.10
** 
(.05) 
.01 
(.04) 
.04 
(.05) 
   High Quality Primary Opponent -.04 
(.26) 
.03 
(.17) 
.13 
(.17) 
-.03 
(.08) 
.09 
(.07) 
.06 
(.14) 
   Primary Last -.23**
 
(.10) 
-.11 
(.09) 
-.02 
(.09) 
-.04 
(.04) 
-.00 
(.04) 
.00 
(.04) 
   Challenge in General -.34** 
(.16) 
.30
** 
(.12) 
.25
** 
(.10) 
-.07 
(.10) 
.11
* 
(.06) 
.07 
(.06) 
Legislator & District Characteristics       
   Number of Committees .12** 
(.05) 
.22
*** 
(.05) 
.12
* 
(.05) 
.08
*** 
(.03) 
.07
*** 
(.02) 
.04 
(.03) 
   Freshman .12 
(.13) 
.01 
(.12) 
-.11 
(.15) 
.07 
(.06) 
.02 
(.05) 
-.07 
(.06) 
   Seniority .00 
(.01) 
.02
*** 
(.01) 
.02
*** 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01
** 
(.00) 
-.01
** 
(.01) 
   Party Leader -.99** 
(.33) 
-.17 
(.16) 
-.74
*** 
(.28) 
-.34 
(.22) 
-.18 
(.16) 
-.21 
(.25) 
   Majority Party Member .07 
(.13) 
.23
** 
(.10) 
.25
** 
(.12) 
-.09
** 
(.05) 
-.08
** 
(.03) 
-.16
** 
(.06) 
   Democrat -.98 
(.49) 
-.24 
(.26) 
-.19 
(.32) 
.00 
(.18) 
.33
** 
(.13) 
-.54
** 
(.20) 
   Ideology -.23 
(.70) 
-.36 
(.36) 
.11 
(.39) 
-.68
*** 
(.24) 
-.97
*** 
(.17) 
-1.28
*** 
(.24) 
   Distance from DC to District -.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00
** 
(.00) 
.00
** 
(.00) 
   District Heterogeneity -.73 
(.59) 
-.23 
(.48) 
-1.10
** 
(.48) 
-.06 
(.31) 
-.13 
(.21) 
-.09 
(.26) 
   State Delegation Size __ __ __ .01 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01
** 
(.00) 
Constant  2.43** 
(.63) 
.71 
(.58) 
2.06
** 
(.62) 
4.09
*** 
(.36) 
4.36
** 
(.28) 
4.54
** 
(.41) 
 
Wald χ2
 
Prob > χ2 
 
N 
 
77.25 
.0000 
 
568 
 
116.59 
.0000 
 
1183 
 
113.66 
.0000 
 
585 
 
193.12 
.0000 
 
568 
 
308.31 
.0000 
 
1183 
 
223.45 
.0000 
 
585 
***
 p < .01; 
**
 p < .05, 
* 
p < .10 
Note: Data are from the 105
th
-110
th
 Congress/1998-2008 election cycles. Each model predicts the volume of 
legislators’ activity during their states’ six month primary campaign season separated by the timing of the primary: 
early (February-April), middle (May-August), and late (September-November). Each column represents the 
coefficients from negative binomial regression models predicting a count of the total number of bill and resolution 
introductions and cosponsorships respectively. The standard errors are clustered by legislator and fixed effects are 
included in each model. 
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Table 4.4: The Effect of Primary Season Timing on Amendment and Roll Call Activity   
 
           Amendments 
Spring    Summer     Fall 
         Missed Votes 
Spring      Summer        Fall  
Election Characteristics       
   Primary Challenge -.16 
(.17) 
-.23
** 
(.12) 
-.06 
(.16) 
.76 
(.57) 
1.31
*** 
(.46) 
-.19 
(.42) 
   High Quality Primary Opponent .05 
(.35) 
.32 
(.20) 
.31 
(.42) 
3.46 
(2.23) 
-.22 
(.68) 
2.24
** 
(1.08) 
   Primary Last .14 
(.16) 
-.04 
(.12) 
-.00 
(.15) 
.48 
(.56) 
.37 
(.33) 
.26 
(.390 
   Challenge in General .17 
(.37) 
.27 
(.19) 
-.04 
(.17) 
-2.77 
(1.78) 
-1.84
** 
(.59) 
-1.41
**
 
(.62) 
Legislator & District Characteristics       
   Number of Committees .16** 
(.08) 
.16
*** 
(.06) 
.09 
(.08) 
__ __ __ 
   Freshman .02 
(.22) 
-.04 
(.15) 
-.12 
(.20) 
-1.61
** 
(.66) 
-1.34
*** 
(.37) 
-1.14
** 
(.62) 
   Seniority .01 
(.01) 
.01
** 
(.01) 
.01
* 
(.01) 
.07
** 
(.03) 
.03 
(.02) 
.07 
(.04) 
   Party Leader .50* 
(.30) 
-.47 
(.31) 
__ -1.50 
(1.19) 
.17 
(.79) 
-3.24
** 
(.60) 
   Majority Party Member .04 
(.16) 
.18
** 
(.10) 
.01 
(.22) 
-.28 
(.70) 
-.55
* 
(.31) 
.38 
(.38) 
   Democrat .14 
(.42) 
.33 
(.31) 
-.38 
(.55) 
-.82 
(1.46) 
-1.91
* 
(1.00) 
.39 
(1.33) 
   Ideology .01 
(.55) 
.33 
(.42) 
-.65 
(.71) 
-2.20 
(2.25) 
-2.46
* 
(1.49) 
-2.13 
(1.67) 
   Distance from DC. to District .00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00
** 
(.00) 
-.00
* 
(.00) 
   District Heterogeneity -.17 
(.81) 
-.30 
(.50) 
-.15 
(.69) 
-2.89 
(3.76) 
-2.53 
(1.72) 
-.88 
(1.95) 
Constant  -1.09 
(1.03) 
-1.33
** 
(.65) 
-.25 
(1.01) 
11.83
** 
(5.22) 
9.31
** 
(2.12) 
4.94
** 
(2.51) 
 
Pseudo R
2 
R
2 
N 
 
.04 
 
568 
 
.05 
 
1183 
 
.02 
 
585 
 
 
.14 
568 
 
 
.08 
1183 
 
 
.14 
585 
***
 p < .01; 
**
 p < .05, 
*
 p < .10 
Note: Data are from the 105
th
-110
th
 Congress/1998-2008 election cycles. Each model predicts the volume of 
legislators’ activity during their states’ six month primary campaign season separated by the timing of the primary: 
early (February-April), middle (May-August), and late (September-November). The first set of results represent the 
coefficients from the probit models predicting whether an MCs introduced an amendment in during their states’ 
primary campaign season.  The indicator variable for leader is omitted in the model because of collinearity. The 
second set of results is the coefficients from the OLS models predicting the percent of votes MCs missed during the 
primary campaign season.  The standard errors are clustered by legislator and fixed effects are included in each 
model. 
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Table 4.5: Pre-Primary Campaign Activity Levels  
 Introductions  Cosponsorships  Amendments Missed Votes (%) 
     
   No Primary Challenge 8.63 149.97 .47 3.31 
   Primary Challenge 8.20 157.17 .47 3.59 
   High Quality Challenge 8.61 165.65 .46 3.94 
   All MCs 8.55 151.48 .47 3.37 
Note: Data are the mean number of bill and resolution introductions cosponsorships, the mean percent of legislators 
that introduced an amendment, and the mean level of missed votes during legislators’ states’ pre-primary period. 
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Table 4.6: Primary Campaign Season ∆ Introduction & Cosponsorship Activity  
 
           Introductions 
Spring     Summer     Fall 
         Cosponsorships 
Spring      Summer          Fall 
Election Characteristics       
   Primary Challenge -.57 
(.50) 
1.30
** 
(.63) 
-1.75
* 
(1.04) 
                       
(5.13) 
-1.70 
(4.12) 
-4.00 
(6.62) 
   High Quality Primary Opponent -1.00 
(1.45) 
-.34 
(.90) 
1.87 
(1.51) 
16.78 
(10.18) 
-5.21 
(7.92) 
-8.98 
(18.45) 
   Primary Last -.58 
(.53) 
.74 
(.52) 
.06 
(.86) 
2.55 
(4.46) 
-4.58 
(4.02) 
4.38 
(6.51) 
   Challenge in General 1.79 
(2.66) 
-.74 
(1.15) 
-2.35
*** 
(.89) 
3.71 
(12.96) 
2.33 
(7.19) 
2.65 
(10.87) 
Legislator &  
District Characteristics 
      
   Number of Committees -.58 
(.37) 
-.58
** 
(.28) 
-.49 
(.73) 
-3.41 
(3.29) 
-6.51
** 
(2.31) 
-4.62 
(4.08) 
   Freshman 3.72** 
(.86) 
2.71
** 
(.58) 
1.76 
(1.16) 
22.61
** 
(9.02) 
30.55
** 
(5.26) 
31.04
*** 
(9.09) 
   Seniority -.11* 
(.06) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.24
*** 
(.07) 
-.02 
(.56) 
.95
** 
(.31) 
1.16 
(.77) 
   Party Leader 1.81** 
(.73) 
2.97
** 
(.92) 
5.84
** 
(2.36) 
29.64
** 
(13.76) 
28.59
** 
(13.98) 
48.12
** 
(18.90) 
   Majority Party Member -1.61** 
(.61) 
-1.87
*** 
(.70) 
-3.58
** 
(.93) 
-2.50 
(5.19) 
-19.89
** 
(3.30) 
-21.10
*** 
(6.65) 
   Democrat -1.60 
(3.30) 
3.12
* 
(1.82) 
.66 
(3.08) 
9.18 
(21.88) 
21.52* 
(12.81) 
32.77 
(27.14) 
   Ideology -1.30 
(5.05) 
7.24
** 
(2.44) 
4.59 
(3.47) 
74.93
** 
(33.43) 
105.95
** 
(18.55) 
159.073
*** 
(37.57) 
   Distance from DC to District -.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01* 
(.01) 
   District Heterogeneity 3.23 
(4.20) 
.59 
(3.60) 
.56 
(4.14) 
-20.28 
(38.01) 
6.03 
(22.27) 
-2.67 
(40.67) 
   State Delegation Size __ 
 
__ __ .25 
(.86) 
-.25
* 
(.14) 
-.62 
(.44) 
Constant  -4.99 
(5.85) 
-5.09 
(3.83) 
-3.09 
(5.17) 
-84.33
* 
(45.75) 
-127.17
*** 
(29.35) 
-146.02
*** 
(54.85) 
Adjusted R
2 
N 
.14 
568 
.09 
1183 
.16 
585 
.27 
568 
.31 
1183 
.39 
585 
***
 p < .01; 
**
 p < .05
, *
 p < .10 
Note: Data are from the 105
th
-110
th
 Congress/1998-2008 election cycles. Each OLS model predicts the  change in 
volume of legislators’ activity during their between the pre-primary period and primary campaign season separated 
by the timing of the primary: early (February-April), middle (May-August), and late (September-November). Each 
column represents the coefficients from OLS models predicting a count of the total number of bill and resolution 
introductions and cosponsorships respectively. The standard errors are clustered by legislator and fixed effects are 
included in each model. 
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Table 4.7: Primary Campaign Season ∆ Amendment Activity & Missed Votes 
 
           Amendments 
Spring    Summer     Fall 
         Missed Votes 
 Spring    Summer    Fall  
Election Characteristics       
   Primary Challenge .19 
(.18) 
-.11 
(.12) 
.05 
(.20) 
.92 
(.60) 
.97
** 
(.44) 
-.07 
(.49) 
   High Quality Primary Opponent -.21 
(.37) 
.22 
(.23) 
-.42 
(.50) 
2.67 
(1.75) 
-.23 
(.77) 
1.20 
(1.05) 
   Primary Last -.31* 
(.17) 
-.04 
(.12) 
-.10 
(.18) 
.56 
(.48) 
-.28 
(.34) 
.41 
(.41) 
   Challenge in General .42 
(.37) 
.05 
(.18) 
.05 
(.20) 
-1.74 
(1.37) 
-.92 
(.56) 
-.37 
(.62) 
Legislator & District Characteristics       
   Number of Committees .02 
(.08) 
.09
* 
(.06) 
-.03 
(.09) 
__ __ 
 
__ 
 
   Freshman .09 
(.22) 
.08 
(.16) 
.02 
(.25) 
-1.03
* 
(.62) 
-.09 
(.41) 
-.15 
(.46) 
   Seniority .00 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.04 
(.03) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.05
** 
(.03) 
   Party Leader -.63 
(.52) 
.68
** 
(.31) 
__ .21 
(.58) 
-.95 
(.92) 
-2.35
** 
(.99) 
   Majority Party Member -.02 
(.18) 
.12 
(.11) 
-.04 
(.23) 
-.33 
(.63) 
.05 
(.32) 
-.24 
(.38) 
   Democrat .09 
(.39) 
.23 
(.27) 
-.27 
(.47) 
.01 
(1.11) 
-.10 
(.86) 
1.09 
(1.11) 
   Ideology -.12 
(.46) 
.20 
(.37) 
-.34 
(.56) 
-.78 
(1.39) 
-.09 
(1.29) 
.80 
(1.41) 
   Distance from DC to District .00 
(.00) 
-.00
** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00
** 
(.00) 
   District Heterogeneity -.27 
(.85) 
-1.01
* 
(.53) 
-.30 
(.81) 
-1.28 
(2.63) 
-.90 
(1.75) 
1.32 
(1.81) 
Constant  -1.22 
(1.05) 
-.16 
(.67) 
-.14 
(1.12) 
5.84 
(3.57) 
3.58
* 
(2.12) 
1.67
* 
(2.14) 
 
Pseudo R
2 
R
2 
N 
 
.02 
 
568 
 
.03 
 
1183 
 
.01 
 
585 
 
 
.09 
568 
 
 
.06 
1183 
 
 
.06 
585 
*** p < .01; ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Note: Data are from the 105
th
-110
th
 Congress/1998-2008 election cycles. Each model predicts the change volume of 
legislators’ activity between the pre-primary and primary campaign season by the timing of the primary: early 
(February-April), middle (May-August), and late (September-November). The first set of results represent the 
coefficients from the probit models predicting whether an MCs introduced an amendment in during their states’ pre-
primary period but did not in the primary campaign season.  The indicator variable for leader is omitted in the model 
because of collinearity. The second set of results is the coefficients from the OLS models predicting the percent 
change in missed votes between the pre-primary period and primary campaign season (primary missed votes – pre-
primary missed votes).  The standard errors are clustered by legislator and fixed effects are included in each model. 
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Figure 4.1: Pre-Primary, Primary Campaign Season, and Change in Introduction Activity 
 
Note: Data are the mean number of bill and resolution introductions in the pre-primary period, primary campaign 
period, and the change in activity between the two periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Pre-Primary, Primary Campaign Season, and Change in Introduction Activity 
 
Note: Data are the mean number of bill and resolution cosponsorships in the pre-primary period, primary campaign 
period, and the change in activity between the two periods. 
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Figure 4.3: Pre-Primary, Primary Campaign Season, and Change in Amendment Activity 
 
Note: Data are the percent of legislators that amended in the pre-primary period, the primary  
campaign season, and those that amended in the pre-primary period but not in the primary campaign  
season.    
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Pre-Primary, Primary Campaign Season, and Change in Missed Votes  
 
Note: Data are the percent of missed in the pre-primary period, primary campaign period, 
and the change in activity between the two periods. 
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Chapter 5: Primaries and Legislative Issue Agendas 
 
 In the previous chapter I focused on the extent to which competition and the act of 
campaigning influences legislators’ volume of activity.  The findings point to different dynamics 
for those in spring, summer, and fall primary states, and also to variation in the effects of 
primaries depending on the type of legislative activity (i.e., introductions, cosponsorships, 
amendments, and roll call votes).  In this chapter I build on this foundation to explore how 
primaries influence the content of legislators’ activity.  It might be that primaries impact MCs’ 
introduction and cosponsorship activity through not only the sheer volume of their activity, but 
also through the types of issues on which they introduce and cosponsor legislation. 
MCs who are concerned about reelection have incentives to use their offices as vehicles 
for reelection.  We should expect, then, that vulnerable incumbents will focus their legislative 
issue agendas on those issues that are important to their reelection constituency.  This means that 
in primaries in particular, legislators should attend to the policy interests of the party base.   In 
this chapter I investigate the extent to which MCs in the heat of their primary battles become 
more active on the issues that the party “owns.” The results point to the ways in which primaries, 
and elections more broadly, impact representation and responsiveness. 
Competitive Elections and Issue Ownership 
What issues should candidates focus on during elections?  This can be answered quite 
simply: candidates should concentrate their attention on the issues that are electorally beneficial.  
Which issues are electorally beneficial, however, is not as easily recognizable and has been a key 
question in studies of campaigns.  One theory, for example, contends that candidates should 
center their campaigns on owned issues—that is, issues for which their party holds an advantage 
over the other party.  As discussed in Chapter 2, both the Democratic party and the Republican 
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party are said to have ownership over particular issues.  These reputations for issue-handling are 
built by the parties’ records on issues, and also the enduring coalitions within the party (Petrocik 
1996; Petrocik et al. 2004).  Republicans are typically associated with taxes, defense, and moral 
issues, while Democrats are generally linked to social welfare and domestic policy issues such as 
education and the environment.  Because each party holds an advantage on specific issues, issue 
ownership theory predicts that, during campaigns, candidates will talk about the issues their 
party “owns.”    
Highlighting issues that the party owns is advantageous for a number of reasons.  First, if 
the party has a proven record on the issue area, candidates can easily talk about that issue in a 
convincing way.  It is believable that a Democrat who talks about his or her commitment to the 
environment firmly believes in this given the party’s record on the issue.  Similarly, Republicans 
discussing defense issues tie in with their reputation as “hawks.”  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, when candidates discuss issues their party owns, they are priming voters to think 
about those issues.  If voters are primed to think about an issue they will then incorporate that 
issue into their voting calculus (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2004).  In turn, if they view one 
party as better at dealing with that issue, then they should be more likely to lean towards that 
party on Election Day.  Thus, candidates should adhere to an issue ownership strategy during 
campaigns, and stray from trespassing onto the other party’s owned issues so as to not prime 
voters to think about the issues on which the other party holds an advantage (Petrocik 1996; 
Petrocik et al. 2004; Simon 2002).   
But, the evidence is mixed not only as to whether candidates actually follow an issue 
ownership strategy, but also if it is even electorally beneficial to do so.  Initial investigations into 
issue ownership as a campaign strategy largely have indicated that, at least at the presidential 
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level, candidates in both parties largely center their campaign issue agendas on the issues that 
their party owns (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Petrocik 1996).  More recently, however, as 
scholarship has looked at issue ownership over time and also applied issue ownership to 
congressional campaigns, evidence supporting the notion that candidates stick to an issue 
ownership strategy is more tenuous (Damore 2004; Dulio and Trumbore 2009; Holian 2004; 
Sides 2006).  Further, some studies suggest that competing candidates converge on issues more 
so than previously thought (Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006; Sigelman and Buell 2004).  Holian 
(2004), for example, finds that Bill Clinton was successful in repackaging the issue of crime, a 
Republican-owned issue, and used the issue to his advantage in the 1992 presidential election.  
And as competiveness increases, candidates are more likely to talk about the same issues in their 
campaigns (see Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006).  In competitive races, we should expect 
candidates to make appeals to the median voter (Downs 1957). 
One possible reason for these mixed findings is that candidates cannot ignore the issue 
priorities of the public (Aldrich and Griffin 2003; Damore 2004).  In order for candidates to win 
on Election Day, they need to talk about the issues that are important to their constituents.  As 
Damore (2004) finds, candidates will trespass onto the other party’s issues if those issues are 
salient during the election.  For example, in the 2006 midterm election when the Iraq War was at 
the forefront, Democrats could not ignore this Republican-owned issue area.  Research 
examining the advertisements of congressional campaigns indicates that candidates from both 
parties addressed this issue at the same level (Dulio and Trumbore 2009).   
Further, these studies largely examine campaign agendas from the perspective of general 
elections when candidates from opposing parties are competing against each other.  When we 
consider the first step in the election process, the primary, and the issues for which candidates 
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should place at the center of their campaigns, it makes sense that this is when an issue ownership 
strategy would be most advantageous.  This in large part stems from the origins of issue 
ownership.  Not only are the issue ownership reputations built by the parties’ records and 
performance on specific issue areas, but, more importantly, these issues are linked to the 
coalitions within each party (Petrocik 1996).  Indeed, the issues owned by each party are also the 
very same issues that are the priorities of rank-and-file members (Egan 2013).  The parties are 
active on these issues because they are fundamental concerns of their party base.  Unsurprisingly, 
evidence indicates that presidential candidates are more focused on party-owned issues in 
primaries than in general elections (Benoit and Hansen 2002).   
Issue Ownership and Legislative Issue Agendas 
It is important to note that extant research on issue ownership focuses almost entirely on 
what candidates talk about in campaigns, not what legislators do in Congress.  This may be 
another reason for the mixed findings on issue ownership.  Given the link between party-owned 
issues and the party base, I expect that primaries will prompt congressional candidates to become 
more focused on party-owned issues in their legislative issue agendas.  Because incumbents are 
simultaneously campaigning and legislating, legislators on the campaign trail can point to their 
legislative activity as evidence of their responsiveness to the concerns of their districts.  During 
elections incumbents are able to not only discuss what they will do for their constituents when 
they are reelected, but can actually try to initiate or change policy through their bill and 
resolution introductions and cosponsorships.  In primaries, if the issues of most importance to 
their party base are party-owned issues, then we should expect that legislators with primaries 
should become more active on these issues in Congress while they are campaigning for 
reelection in order to demonstrate their commitments to the policy interests of their partisan core.   
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At the same time, MCs should be less attentive to the issues that the other party owns 
while they are campaigning in their primaries.  Because the other party’s owned issues are not 
issue priorities of an incumbent’s own party base, there is no incentive to be active on these 
issues.  Of course, it is important to acknowledge that at some points in time there are issues that 
are highly salient and cross-cutting.  In the period under investigation in this analysis, the Iraq 
War was one such issue.  Democrats may have been prompted to sponsor or cosponsor 
legislation that would, for example, lead to a drawback on military action as a way of appealing 
to the preferences of their party base who largely was opposed to the Iraq War.  Yet, we should 
still see incumbents who are concerned about their primary election prospects increase their 
attention on the larger issue priorities of the party base and shy away from those issues which are 
core policy concerns of the other party’s base. 
 As an illustration, we can look at the legislative activity of Representative Deborah Pryce 
(R – OH).  In the 108th Congress/2004 election cycle, Pryce was challenged in the primary by 
Republican Charles Morrison II.  Although Morrison was not widely known in the congressional 
district and Pryce defeated him 84 percent to 16 percent, the issue content of Pryce’s 
introductions and cosponsorships changed during her primary campaign season.  Before the 
primary campaign season, 15 percent of her bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships 
were on issues that her party owned.  During the primary campaign season, however, 20 percent 
of her bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships were on the issues her party owned—
a five percent increase.  Just the opposite pattern emerges when we look at her activity on 
Democrat-owned issues during this time.  Before the primary campaign season nearly 27 percent 
of Pryce’s bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships were on issues that the 
Democrats own.  But during her primary campaign season only 11 percent of the bills and 
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resolutions Pryce introduced and cosponsored were on these issues. Taken as a whole, this 
suggests that the presence of even a token challenge may have prompted Pryce to change her 
legislative activity while she was campaigning in the primary.  During her primary campaign 
season she simultaneously increased her legislative activity on the policy priorities of the 
Republican party’s base, and also decreased the extent to which she trespassed onto the 
Democrat’s party-owned issues. 
Assessing Changes in Issue Agendas 
The approach I undertake in my analysis is to assess whether primaries prompt legislators 
to change their issue agendas while they are actively campaigning in the primary campaign 
season.  It is not enough to explore whether those with primaries are more active on the issues 
that are important to the party base.  Rather, I investigate the campaign-legislative behavior 
linkage more deeply by asking if, during the primary season, those with primaries change their 
attention to party-owned and trespassed issues. 
Studying responses to primaries as a change in behavior—the differences in activity 
before and during the primary campaign season— allows me to directly attribute any change in 
behavior to legislators’ campaign experiences.   This approach applies a particularly strict test of 
the effects of primaries on legislative behavior because, as Mayhew (1974) notes, candidates are 
always running for reelection.  Further, speculation and even challengers’ official campaign 
announcements to enter into the race are undoubtedly made before this six month window, so 
MCs have at least an inkling about whether they will be challenged before the primary season 
begins.  Given this, MCs should be anticipating their upcoming battles by focusing on party-
owned issues well before the primary season begins.  Thus, I expect that the effects of primaries 
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on changes in incumbents’ legislative issue agendas will not be large, but that any effects that are 
found can be directly linked to legislators’ primary campaign experiences.   
Measurement 
 I develop measures of legislators’ issue agendas using the content of their bill and 
resolution introductions and cosponsorships.  As discussed in Chapter 3, I calculate the percent 
of legislators’ bill and resolution sponsorships and cosponsorships (combined) that are on party-
owned, party-trespassed, and non-owned issues (i.e., issues not owned by either party) using 
Petrocik’s (1996; 2004) categorization of owned issues.15  Measures of the content of non-owned 
issues are important to include because it may be that legislators react to their election 
experiences by shifting their focus to party-neutral issue areas such as children or consumer 
issues.   
For each legislator, I calculate the percent of all the bills and resolutions he or she 
introduced or cosponsored that are issues his or her party “owns” in the pre-primary period and 
in the primary campaign season.  Calculating issue agendas as a percentage is particularly useful 
given that legislators, on average, are most active in introducing and cosponsoring legislation at 
the start of their terms and thus mostly decrease their activity between the pre-primary and 
primary campaign season.   Given this, the percentage allows us to examine the overall 
composition of incumbents’ legislative activity.  I subtract the pre-primary percent owned issues 
                                                 
15
 The categorization of issues is discussed in Chapter 3. Democrat-owned issues are civil rights, 
education, environment and public lands, health care, jobs and infrastructure, Medicare, Social 
Security, and welfare.  Republican-owned issues are crime, defense, taxes, and moral issues.  
Non-owned issues are agriculture budget, campaign finance, children’s issues, consumer issues, 
corporate regulation, and government operations. 
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from the primary campaign season percent owned issues to create the dependent variable, ∆ 
party-owned.  For example, going back to the earlier example of Representative Deborah Pryce 
in the 108
th
 Congress, her pre-primary percent owned issues is 15 percent and her primary 
percent owned issues is 20 percent.  Her score for the dependent variable, ∆ party-owned, 
reflects a 5 percent increase in party-owned issues in the primary campaign season.  
I follow this same coding procedure to measure the extent to which legislators decrease 
their activity, or trespass less, on the issues that the other party owns, and also changes in activity 
on non-owned issues.  For each legislator, I calculate the percent of all the bills and resolutions 
he or she sponsored or cosponsored in the pre-primary period that are issues that the other party 
“owns.”  I followed this same process in coding the primary season percent of trespassed bills 
and resolutions.  The pre-primary percent is subtracted from the primary campaign season 
percent to arrive at the dependent variable, ∆ party-trespassed.  ∆ non-owned measures the 
change in activity on non-party owned issues between the pre-primary and primary campaign 
season. 
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 present the percent of legislators’ issue agendas that are party-
owned, trespassed, and non-owned broken out by the presence and quality of primary 
challengers before and during the primary campaign season.  The last column in each of the 
tables shows the percentage change, or difference, between these two periods, which is the 
dependent variables of the analysis.  A positive change indicates that there is an increase in 
activity on that type of issue during the primary campaign season, while a negative change 
reflects a decrease in activity on that type of issue during this time.   
As shown in Table 5.1, MCs tend, on average, to decrease their activity on party-owned 
issues during their states’ primary campaign season.  However, incumbents with high quality 
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challengers become more active on these issues during their primary campaign season.  On 
average, these legislators increase their activity on party-owned issues by 1.37 percent between 
the pre-primary period and the primary campaign season (t = - 3.09, p < .01).   
This pattern continues when we look at activity on trespassed issues (Table 5.2).  
Incumbents with high quality challengers are the only group of legislators that, on average, 
decrease their attention to the issues that the other party owns.  These legislators decrease 
activity on trespassed issues by 1.98 percent between the pre-primary period and the primary 
campaign season (t = 2.45, p < .05).   
In Table 5.3 we see that all MCs, regardless of their primary contexts, grow more active 
on non-owned issues during the primary campaign season.  There is no substantive difference in 
this change for those with primaries, however.  In sum, it appears that primaries exert the most 
impact on legislators when they have high quality challengers, as incumbents become more 
active on the issues priorities of their party’s base and less active on that of the other party’s 
base.   
To more fully examine whether primaries prompt incumbents to change the content of 
their bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships, I develop multivariate models that 
predict changes in the percent of owned issues (∆ party-owned), trespassed issues (∆ party-
trespassed), and non-owned issues (∆ non-owned) between the pre-primary period and primary 
campaign season.  A number of structural control variables discussed in Chapter 4 are included 
in the analysis as we should expect that many of the variables that influence changes in 
legislators’ volume of activity might also affect changes in the content of their legislative 
activity.   
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Of the election variables, an indicator variable of whether the MC had a primary 
challenge in the previous election cycle is included as well as a control for whether a challenger 
is present in the upcoming general election.  In addition, the timing of legislators’ primaries 
might impact the extent to which they change their issue agendas.  For example, those in spring 
primary states, regardless of their primary campaign context, may be less focused on the general 
election than their colleagues in fall primary states, so spring primary state MCs might become 
more focused on their primary constituency during their states’ primary campaign season and 
less attentive to the policy priorities of the other party’s base. 
 Also included in the models are controls for the number of committees a legislator is on in 
each Congress, freshman status, years of seniority, party affiliation (Democrat), ideological 
extremity, district ideological heterogeneity, and an anchor for the pre-primary content of 
activity.  Those who are on more committees encompassing more issue areas might exhibit 
different patterns in their content of activity than those who are on fewer committees.  MCs on 
more committees might also have greater knowledge and more opportunities to be active on a 
larger number of issues than their colleagues who serve on fewer committees.
16
  In addition, the 
results from Chapter 4 suggest that new House members tend to change their behavior to a lesser 
degree between the pre-primary and primary campaign season, and this might extend to not only 
the volume of their activity, but also the content of that activity.  Similarly, years of seniority is 
also controlled for in each model.   
                                                 
16
 Of course, some MCs might be on committees that address issues that are the core policy 
concerns of the other party’s base (i.e., Republicans on Energy and Commerce or Democrats on 
Homeland Security).  Even so, the focus of the analysis is on changes in behavior within a 
Congress, and committee assignments remain constant between these time periods. 
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Party affiliation is included as a control variable because the Democratic party “owns” 
more issues than the Republican party.  Given this, Democratic members have greater 
opportunity to expand on party-owned issues than their Republican colleagues.  It might also be 
that MCs who are more ideological also grow more responsive to the party base in their activity 
while they are gearing up for the election season.  These MCs are likely elected out of highly 
partisan districts, and thus focusing on the issue concerns of the party base is natural.  Another 
possibility is that MCs who are ideologically extreme are already adhering to an issue ownership 
strategy and are less likely to change their behavior than more moderate MCs whose attention 
may be more spread out among party-owned and trespassed issues.  In short, ideologically 
moderate incumbents likely have more room to move in their attentiveness to party-owned issues 
as compared to their ideological extreme colleagues.  At the same, however, these MCs have 
little incentive to do so as I suspect that because moderate legislators are likely elected out of 
moderate districts, and thus they will not become more responsive to the policy interests of the 
party base in their legislative activity during their states’ primary campaign seasons. 
 I also incorporate a measure of legislators’ districts’ level ideological diversity in each 
model.  MCs might exhibit different patterns of legislative activity change depending on the 
composition of their congressional districts.  For instance, incumbents whose districts are 
ideologically diverse may find it difficult to cater to the policy priorities of their party base as 
compared to incumbents from ideologically homogenous districts.  In the former the policy 
interests of the party base and the district are divergent, while in the latter the policy priorities of 
the party base and that of the larger district are more aligned.  Regardless of whether they have 
primaries or not, MCs from heterogeneous districts may be less likely to shift their legislative 
activity toward the issue priorities of the party base. 
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Finally, each model also includes a variable that controls for the content of incumbents’ 
legislative issue agendas in the pre-primary period.  In the model predicting change in party 
owned issues, pre-primary issue content is the percent of each legislator’s issue agenda that is 
party owned issues in the pre-primary period.  Incorporating this anchor into the model is 
particularly important given that the dependent variables represent a change in activity (primary 
campaign activity - pre-primary activity).  I control for pre-primary trespassed and pre-primary 
non-owned in the models predicting ∆ party-trespassed and ∆ non-owned respectively. 
Results 
 Table 5.4 shows the results of the models predicting change in owned, trespassed, and 
non-owned issues.  The expectation is that primaries will lead incumbents to increase their 
activity on party-owned issues and decrease their attention on party-trespassed issues.  As we can 
see, the presence of a primary challenger does not impact the content of MCs’ legislative issue 
agendas, but having a high quality primary challenger does.  Incumbents with high quality 
challengers increase their activity on party-owned issues by 2.75 percent and decrease their 
activity on trespassed issues by 2.03 percent.  The substantive significance of these changes 
varies by legislator depending on the number of sponsorships and cosponsorships he or she has 
in the pre-primary and primary campaign period, but nevertheless shows a clear and meaningful 
impact of primaries on the content of MCs’ legislative activity in Congress.  As discussed earlier, 
we should expect that MCs anticipate their upcoming primary elections and should already be 
more responsive to their party base in their legislative behavior before the onset of the primary 
season.  What these results demonstrate is that when MCs are actively engaged in their primary 
campaigns they change their behavior to further correspond to the policy interests of their 
primary constituency.   
122 
 
 This primary-legislative behavior linkage extends back beyond the current race as those 
with primaries in the previous election cycle also alter their legislative behavior during the 
subsequent primary campaign season.  These MCs decrease their activity on trespassed issues by 
.77 percent between the pre-primary and primary campaign season.  It seems, then, that 
legislators’ vulnerability in the previous primary election prompts them to become less 
responsive to the other party’s base.  This finding aligns with previous research on the linkage 
between election and legislation behavior (e.g., Sulkin 2005; 2009; 2011).  Other election 
characteristics also influence legislators’ issue agendas.  As expected, those whose state’s 
primary dates are earlier in the campaign season become less attentive to trespassed issues during 
their primary season.  They also grow more focused on issues that neither party owns.  In 
addition, it appears that MCs anticipate their general election challengers during the primary 
campaign season.  Those with general election challengers become more active on party-owned 
issues while also decreasing their attention to non-owned issues.  This is somewhat surprising 
given that we should expect MCs with general election challengers to shy away from the policy 
interests of the party base.  However, it does fall in line with the general predictions of the issue 
ownership hypothesis—in competitive elections, incumbents should play to their strengths. 
Nevertheless, the size of the effect for the presence of a general election challenger is smaller 
than that of the presence of a high quality primary challenger. 
Of the legislator and district variables, Democrats both increase their activity on party-
owned issues and decrease their attention on non-owned issues more so than their Republican 
colleagues.  This is not surprising given that there are more Democrat-owned issues than 
Republican-owned issues, and there are thus more opportunities for Democrats in Congress to 
expand their legislative issue agendas.  In addition, ideologically extreme MCs grow more 
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attentive to owned issues while at the same time becoming less active on trespassed issues.  As 
suggested, ideologically extreme incumbents are the warriors of their parties.  These MCs are 
elected out of districts composed of like-minded partisans, and as the election season heats up, 
ideologically extreme legislators grow even more responsive to the interests of the party base. 
District Ideological Composition  
The results of the analysis up to this point indicate that incumbents with high quality 
primary challengers become more attentive to the policy interests of the party base during the 
primary campaign season, and focus less on the policy concerns of the other party’s base.  But 
one important consideration is that the ideological composition of congressional districts varies 
widely.  Some congressional districts are packed with like-minded partisans while others are 
much less uniform.  Voters in homogenous districts have a great deal more in common than 
voters in the ideologically diverse or heterogeneous districts.  The policy interests of voters in 
ideologically uniform districts are highly similar, while those of voters in ideologically 
heterogeneous districts are a good deal more diverse.  I expect that the ideological composition 
of congressional districts will impact how MCs respond to their primary election contexts in the 
content of their legislative issue agendas.   
Examining how district composition impacts legislative responsiveness and 
representation is not new to legislative studies research.  Early investigations revealed that when 
citizens hold similar views, it is easier for elected officials to adhere to the wishes of their 
constituents (Kuklinski and Elling 1977).  Study after study indicates that legislators fall in step 
more with their constituents’ preferences when their districts or states are homogenous rather 
than diverse (Adams et al. 2004; Bailey and Brady 1998; Gerber and Lewis 2004), and that party 
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pressures win out against constituent preferences in the roll call voting behavior of senators from 
ideologically heterogeneous states (Harden and Carsey 2012).   
But if we consider the ideological make-up of congressional districts in terms of the 
partisan constituency and the general election constituency, the primary and general election 
constituency are more closely aligned in ideologically homogenous districts than in ideologically 
diverse districts (Brunell 2008).  The party base more closely resembles the larger district in 
homogenous districts where citizens hold similar issue concerns and preferences.  Because of 
this, primaries should prompt MCs from ideologically homogenous districts to become more 
attentive to the policy priorities of the party base in their legislative issue agendas.  Primaries 
should not have such an effect on MCs from ideologically heterogeneous districts.  This is 
because of the policy priorities of the party base does not match those of the larger district.  Even 
incumbents with primaries from such districts will need to be attentive to the larger district’s 
policy priorities, and thus may eschew the policy interests of the party base during their primary 
campaigns.  In short, I expect that MCs from homogenous districts with primaries will become 
more active on party-owned issues during the primary campaign season and less active on 
trespassed issues during this time.  MCs from ideologically heterogeneous districts with 
primaries, on the other hand, should not engage in any policy shifts during their primaries.   
Data and Measurement 
To test whether district ideological composition moderates the effects of primaries on the 
content of legislators’ bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships, I separate the sample 
into ideologically homogenous (uniform) districts and ideologically heterogeneous (diverse) 
districts.  I use the district heterogeneity variable outlined in Chapter 3.  This variable is based on 
surveys with self-reported ideology and responses that are aggregated by congressional district.  
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District heterogeneity captures the degree of variation in ideology within each congressional 
district and is measured as a continuous variable ranging from a 0 (ideologically homogenous) to 
2 (ideologically heterogeneous).  Across congressional districts, the mean level of district 
heterogeneity is 1.00 and this ranges from the most ideologically homogenous districts with a 
score of .76 to the most ideologically diverse districts with a score of 1.54.  I categorize all 
congressional districts that are below the mean level of district heterogeneity as homogenous and 
all congressional districts that are at or above the mean level as heterogeneous. 
As Table 5.5 shows, a larger number of legislators are from homogenous congressional 
districts than heterogeneous congressional districts (1317 vs. 1019).  As expected, there are also 
more instances of MCs with primaries and high quality challengers in homogenous districts.  
Table 5.6 presents the mean levels of change in the content of legislators’ activity (∆ party-
owned, ∆ party-trespassed, and ∆ non-owned) separated by the district ideological composition.  
Regardless of the ideological composition of congressional districts, changes in activity for MCs 
with and without primaries largely do not vary.  But there appear to be differences in changes in 
the content of incumbents’ legislative issue agendas for those with high quality primary 
challengers.  MCs with such challenges from ideologically uniform districts increase their 
activity on party-owned issues by 4.10 percent between the pre-primary and primary campaign 
season while their colleagues from ideologically diverse districts with such challenges decrease 
their activity on these types of issues during the primary season by .78 percent (t = -2.33, p < 
.05).  These differences in primary activity changes continue when looking at differences in ∆ 
party-trespassed and ∆ non-owned.  Although not statistically significant, MCs with high quality 
primary challengers from homogenous decrease their attention to trespassed issues to a larger 
degree than MCs from heterogeneous districts.  There are also differences in changes in non-
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owned issues between those with high quality challengers in homogenous and heterogeneous 
districts, but, again, there is not a statistically significant difference in the changes in activity.  In 
short, this preliminary account suggests that perhaps there are different patterns of change in 
activity for those with primaries in homogenous and heterogeneous districts. 
To see if the impact of primaries and district ideological composition on changes in 
activity hold after controlling for the variables outlined in the previous analysis, Table 5.7 
presents the results of the models predicting changes in incumbents’ content of legislative 
activity disaggregated by the composition of legislators’ congressional districts.   As in the 
analysis above, the presence of a primary challenge does not prompt MCs to change the content 
of their legislative activity.  However, there is a clear distinction between the impact of high 
quality challengers on MCs’ change in the content of activity for those in homogenous and 
heterogeneous districts.  Legislators with high quality primary challengers in homogeneous 
districts increase their percent of bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships on party-
owned issues by 6.15 percent while they are campaigning in their primaries.  At the same time, 
these MCs also decrease their activity on both trespassed issues and non-owned issues (2.62 
percent and 3.07 percent respectively).  These changes in behavior are quite substantial and are 
considerably larger than those found in the previous models where changes in the content of 
legislators’ activity is aggregated across the ideological make-up of congressional districts.  
Incumbents with high quality challengers in ideologically diverse districts, however, do not 
engage in any changes between the pre-primary period and primary campaign season.  This 
suggests that the lack of changes in activity during the primary campaign season for MCs from 
heterogeneous districts dampens the effects of primaries on changes in activity in the aggregate 
models. 
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In addition, once the sample is separated many of the campaign effects in the previous 
models disappear.  Both the presence of a primary in the previous election cycle and the presence 
of the general election challenge in the present election cycle appear to not lead to any changes 
in the content of legislators’ issues agendas during the primary campaign season.   Of the 
legislator characteristics, Democrats only change their behavior between the pre-primary period 
and primary campaign season on party-owned and non-owned issues if they are from 
ideologically homogenous districts.  These effects are present in the previous models and suggest 
that the effects of party found in the aggregate sample are driven by MCs from ideologically 
homogenous districts.  Ideologically extreme MCs, though, shift the content of their legislative 
issues agendas during the primary campaign season regardless of the composition of their 
congressional districts.  Yet, these changes in activity are larger for ideologically extreme 
incumbents from ideologically diverse congressional districts.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter point to important ways that primaries impact incumbents’ 
legislative issues agendas in Congress, and also highlight the moderating effects of the 
ideological composition of congressional districts.  During the primary campaign season, MCs 
from ideologically homogenous districts become more active on the policy priorities of the party 
base while also decreasing their activity on the issues that are important to the other party’s base.  
In contrast, incumbents from ideologically heterogeneous districts do not shift their behavior in 
accordance with the policy wishes of their party’s base.  Instead, these MCs engage in no 
movement or change in activity during their primary campaign seasons.  
These findings shed light on the role of elections in promoting representation.  
Competitive primaries, as measured by the presence of a high quality challenger, lead MCs from 
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homogenous districts to become more responsive to the policy priorities of the party base and 
less so to that of the other party’s base.  This is good for constituents in these districts because 
the preferences of the district align closely with the party base.  This means primaries lead MCs 
to better represent their districts in Congress.  At the same time, we also see that incumbents 
from heterogeneous districts in even the most competitive primaries do not change the content of 
their legislative activity in response to their primary experiences.  This, too, is good for their 
districts.  Because the policy priorities of constituents in these districts are diverse, not adhering 
to the policy wishes of the small group of the party base means that MCs are representing the 
district as a whole.  In short, competition appears to be exerting the effects on legislative 
responsiveness in the ways that it ought to.  In the next chapter I further my investigation of 
primaries and legislative responsiveness by examining if primaries cause MCs to become more 
partisan in Congress.    
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Tables 
 
Table 5.1: Party Owned Issues by Campaign Period 
 Pre- 
Owned 
Primary  
Owned  
          ∆ 
 Party-Owned 
    
   No Primary Challenge 33.40 31.69     - 1.70 
   Primary Challenge 34.06 32.65     - 1.41 
   High Quality Challenge 33.68 35.06       1.37 
   All MCs 33.53 31.89     - 1.64 
Note: Data represent the mean levels of legislators’ bill and resolution introductions and  
cosponsorships that are party-owned issues in the pre-primary period, primary campaign season,  
and the change in this activity (primary percent – pre-primary percent) for MCs with and  
without primaries, those with high quality primary challengers, and across all legislators. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Trespassed Issues by Campaign Period 
  
Pre- 
Trespassed 
 
Primary 
Trespassed 
∆ 
Party-
Trespassed 
    
   No Primary Challenge 24.74 24.96          .22 
   Primary Challenge 24.23 24.16          .07 
   High Quality Challenge 24.99 23.01      - 1.98 
   All MCs 24.63 24.79          .16 
Note: Data represent the mean levels of legislators’ bill and resolution introductions and  
cosponsorships that are party-trespassed issues in the pre-primary period, primary campaign  
season, and the change in this activity (primary percent – pre-primary percent) for MCs with and  
without primaries, those with high quality primary challengers, and across all legislators. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Attention to Non-Owned Issues by Campaign Period 
 Pre-Primary 
Non-Owned 
Primary  
Non-Owned 
       ∆ 
Non-Owned 
    
   No Primary Challenge 42.01 43.51     1.50 
   Primary Challenge 41.87 43.31     1.44 
   High Quality Challenge 41.48 42.30       .82 
   All MCs 41.98 43.47     1.49 
Note: Data represent the mean levels of legislators’ bill and resolution introductions and  
cosponsorships that are non-owned issues in the pre-primary period, primary campaign  
season, and the change in this activity (primary percent – pre-primary percent) for MCs with and  
without primaries, those with high quality primary challengers, and across all legislators. 
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Table 5.4: Change in Content of Activity from Pre-Primary to Primary Period 
     ∆ 
 Own 
       ∆ 
 Trespass 
        ∆ 
 Non-Own 
Election Characteristics    
   Primary Challenge -.30 
(.49) 
.24 
(.44) 
-.05 
(.53) 
   High Quality Primary Opponent 2.75
**
 
(1.07) 
-2.03
**
 
(.82) 
-.45 
(1.08) 
   Months From General .06 
(.10) 
-.22
***
 
(.08) 
.16* 
(.09) 
   Primary Last .34 
(.47) 
-.77
*
 
(.42) 
.52 
(.48) 
   Challenge in General 1.41
**
 
(.70) 
.07 
(.63) 
-1.20
*
 
(.67) 
Legislator & District 
Characteristics 
   
   Number of Committees  -.29 
(.27) 
.11 
(.23) 
.22 
(.29) 
   Freshman -.39 
(.66) 
.04 
(.56) 
.26 
(.65) 
   Seniority -.02 
(.03) 
-.04 
(.02) 
.06** 
(.03) 
   Democrat 1.54
***
 
(.50) 
.04 
(.39) 
-1.60
**
 
(.43) 
   Ideological Extremity 7.44
***
 
(1.76) 
-5.66
***
 
(1.51) 
-.57 
(1.71) 
   District Heterogeneity 1.58 
(2.35) 
1.45 
(2.27) 
-3.30 
(2.58) 
Pre-Primary Issue Content -.48
***
 
(.04) 
-.45
***
 
(.03) 
-.55
***
 
(.04) 
Constant  9.28
***
 
(3.05) 
12.89
***
 
(2.84) 
26.80 
(3.30) 
 
R
2
 
N 
 
.17 
2336 
 
.16 
2336 
 
.21 
2336 
***
 p < .01; 
** 
p < .05; 
* 
p < .10 
Note: Data are from the 105
th
-110
th
 Congress/1998-2008 election cycles.  Each model predicts the  
percent change in the content of legislator’s issue agendas—bill and resolution introductions  
and cosponsorships—between the pre-primary and primary campaign period on party owned,  
trespassed, and non-owned issues.  The standard errors are clustered by legislator and fixed effects for  
Congress and legislator are included in each model.  
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Table 5.5: District Ideological Composition Categorization 
 Homogenous  
Districts 
Heterogeneous 
Districts 
Total MCs      1317         1019 
   Number with Primaries        255           235 
   Number with High Quality Challengers          41             52 
   Number without Primaries      1062           784 
Note: Data represent the number of legislators that fit into the homogenous and heterogeneous  
district categorization for all MCs, MCs with at least a primary challenge present, MCs with a high quality 
challenger, and MCs without a primary challenger present. 
 
 
 
Table 5.6: Change in Content of Activity from Pre-Primary to Primary Period by District 
Ideological Composition 
 ∆ 
Party-Own 
∆ 
Party-Trespass 
∆ 
Non-Own 
 Uniform Diverse Uniform Diverse Uniform Diverse 
No Primary Challenge -1.42 -2.07    .35    .05  1.16 1.96 
Primary Challenge -1.12 -1.73    .03 -  .18  1.08 1.84 
High Quality Challenge  4.10 -0.78 -2.82 -1.32 - . 82 2.12 
All MCs -1.37 -1.99    .28 -  .01 1.15 1.93 
Note: Data represent the percent change in party-owned, party-trespassed, and non-owned issues between the pre-
primary period and the primary campaign season (primary campaign season percent – pre-primary period percent) 
for MCs without primaries, MCs with at least a primary challenger present, MCs with a high quality challenge, and 
across all MCs in the sample. 
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Table 5.7: Models Predicting Change in Content of Activity from Pre-Primary to Primary Period 
by District Ideological Diversity 
 ∆ 
Own 
∆ 
Trespass 
∆ 
Non-Own 
 Uniform Diverse Uniform Diverse Uniform Diverse 
Election Characteristics       
   Primary Challenge -.88 
(.67) 
.37 
(.73) 
.18 
(.60) 
.35 
(.68) 
.53 
(.71) 
-.73 
(.73) 
   High Quality 
Challenge 
6.15
***
 
(1.48) 
.00 
(1.45) 
-2.62
**
 
(1.21) 
-1.71 
(1.17) 
-3.07
*
 
(1.58) 
1.78 
(1.50) 
   Months From General -.07 
(.12) 
.28
*
 
(.15) 
-.19
*
 
(.10) 
-.27
** 
(.13) 
.23
*
 
(.12) 
.05 
(.14) 
   Primary Last .44 
(.64) 
.16 
(.69) 
-.79 
(.54) 
-.62 
(.66) 
.51 
(.65) 
.54 
(.72) 
   Challenge in General 1.15 
(.85) 
1.64 
(1.15) 
.16 
(.73) 
-.04 
(1.14) 
-.98 
(.83) 
-1.39 
(1.10) 
Legislator 
Characteristics 
      
   Number of Committees  -.37 
(.37) 
-.16 
(.38) 
.31 
(31) 
-.17 
(.33) 
.14 
(.40) 
.32 
(.37) 
   Freshman .26 
(.85) 
-1.11 
(1.06) 
-.67 
(.78) 
.84 
(.82) 
-.06 
(.90) 
.49 
(1.01) 
   Seniority -.03 
(.04) 
.00 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.05 
(.04) 
.08
*
 
(.04) 
.05 
(.04) 
   Democrat 2.53
***
 
(.65) 
.71 
(.74) 
-.41 
(.51) 
.35 
(.58) 
-2.46
***
 
(.53) 
-.71 
(.66) 
   Ideological Extremity 4.81
**
 
(2.07) 
12.62
***
 
(3.01) 
-3.71
**
 
(1.80) 
-9.56
***
 
(2.59) 
-.74 
(2.12) 
-.16 
(2.81) 
Pre-Primary Issue 
Content 
-.49
***
 
(.05) 
-.49
***
 
(.05) 
-.51
***
 
(.04) 
-.39
***
 
(.05) 
-.54
***
 
(.06) 
-.56
***
 
(.06) 
Constant  9.62
***
 
(2.41) 
8.89
***
 
(2.45) 
14.34
***
 
(2.22) 
15.04
***
 
(2.42) 
27.08
***
 
(2.62) 
22.90
***
 
(2.72) 
 
R
2
 
N 
 
.19 
1317 
 
.19 
1019 
 
.20 
1317 
 
.12 
1019 
 
.21 
1317 
 
.22 
1019 
***
 p < .01; 
** 
p < .05; 
* 
p < .10 
Note: Data are from the 105
th
-110
th
 Congress/1998-2008 election cycles.  Each model predicts the  
percent change in the content of legislator’s issue agendas—bill and resolution introductions  
and cosponsorships—between the pre-primary and primary campaign period on party owned,  
trespassed, and non-owned issues.  The standard errors are clustered by legislator and fixed effects for  
Congress and legislator are included in each model.  
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Chapter 6: Partisanship and Congressional Primaries 
In the 2008 primary election/110
th
 Congress, Representative Mary Bono Mack (R-CA) 
faced her first primary challenge in two election cycles.  Her opponent, George Pearne, was little 
known and did not pose a serious threat to Bono Mack’s bid for renomination.  However, despite 
her clear path to victory, Bono Mack’s roll call voting behavior in Congress noticeably changed.  
Specifically, she became more partisan in her roll call votes during the primary campaign.  From 
the beginning of the term until the start of her primary campaign season, she voted with her party 
on party votes (i.e., roll calls where 75 percent of each party vote together against the other 
party) at a rate of 88 percent.  But, once the primary season began, she became considerably 
more in line with her party.  In particular, she voted in step with Republicans on 95 percent of 
roll call votes during this time—a 7 percent increase.   
This change in party voting suggests that the presence of a primary challenger may have 
induced Bono Mack to become more aligned with her fellow House Republicans.  A central 
argument of this project is that because incumbents must campaign for reelection while they are 
still legislating in Washington, DC, the context of the campaign might affect incumbents’ 
behavior in Congress.  In the case of Bono Mack, the presence of even a token primary 
challenger may have led her to vote more in line with House Republicans while she was 
campaigning in the primary in order to both appeal to her primary constituency, the party base, 
and perhaps to maintain the support of her party’s leadership in Congress. 
In this chapter I explore the effects of primaries on legislators’ roll call voting behavior.  I 
contend that when challenged in the primary, legislators will become more loyal or partisan in 
their roll calls.  But, following their primaries when incumbents are campaigning in the general 
election, they will become less partisan in their roll call voting behavior because they need to 
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appeal to their broader general election constituency.  Further, I argue that the timing of 
legislators’ primaries impacts the extent to which legislators respond to primary challengers in 
partisan roll call voting behavior.  My evidence points to a clear impact of primaries on 
legislators’ partisan activity in Congress both cross-sectionally and over time. 
Elections and Party Support 
The election-party support linkage has long been of interest to legislative studies 
scholars.  Most research has centered on the effects of electoral vulnerability on party loyalty.  
As detailed in Chapter 1, many studies have investigated party loyalty by testing the marginality 
hypothesis—that vulnerable legislators should be more responsive to their districts.  The 
evidence supporting this assertion is mixed, with some research confirming this hypothesis 
(MacRae 1952; Patterson 1961), some finding the opposite of the expected relationship 
(Huntington 1950), and still other studies finding little to no relationship between vulnerability 
and party loyalty (Cohen and Burnk 1983; Deckard 1976; Froman 1963; Shannon 1968). 
More recently, scholars have assessed the electoral costs of party loyalty.  Here, too, the 
logic underlying this research is that adhering to the party line does not represent the interests of 
the district as a whole.  Thus, the expectation is that legislators should be punished on Election 
Day for supporting the party in their roll call votes.  At the aggregate level, Lebo, McGlynn and 
Koger (2007) develop the “strategic party government” model and test the effects of aggregate 
congressional party unity on election outcomes from 1789 to 2000.  They find that heightened 
partisan voting by a party leads to decreased House seats for that party in the subsequent 
election.  At the individual level, research indicates that voters punish incumbents for partisan 
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legislative behavior (Carson et al. 2010).
17
  And, high quality challengers are more likely to 
emerge when incumbents are supportive of the party line (Carson 2005).   
But, in primaries we can imagine that party loyalty might actually work for incumbents, 
rather than against them.  The primary constituency is the party base who tend to support 
partisan behavior (Harbridge and Malhotra
 
2011).  Primary competition, then, should prompt 
legislators to become more responsive to the party base.  As discussed throughout this 
dissertation, incumbents are sensitive to their electoral prospects, and their patterns of roll calls 
reflect this (Arnold 1990; Mayhew 1974).  Even if voters are not paying attention to their elected 
representatives’ roll call voting behavior, incumbents still fear that their votes may be used 
against them during elections (Arnold 1990; Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974).  Although voters in 
general elections penalize incumbents for partisan legislative behavior (Carson 2005; Carson et 
al. 2010; Lebo et al. 2007), voters with strong party attachments (i.e., the party base) are 
supportive of such behavior in Congress (Harbridge and Malhotra
 
2011).  Thus, voting more in 
line with the party is one way for legislators to increase their responsiveness to their primary 
constituency.  Given that legislators use their offices as vehicles for reelection (Fenno 1978; 
Mayhew 1974), primaries should induce legislators to demonstrate to the party base that they are 
good party soldiers by increasing their support of the party in their roll call votes.  This should be 
particularly evident during the period of time when legislators are actively running for reelection. 
But, in the wake of primary challenges, there is another reason for legislators to grow 
more supportive of the party in their roll call voting behavior.  In addition to wanting to 
                                                 
17
 Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan (2002) find similar effects related to ideology.  Incumbents 
whose roll call behavior is out of step ideologically with their districts are more likely to be 
punished on Election Day. 
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communicate partisanship to party base, primaries should also lead legislators to be interested in 
expressing their loyalty to party leaders.  This in large part arises from what the party 
organization and its leaders can do for candidates in elections.  Parties play a significant role in 
helping incumbents win reelection by providing both direct and indirect forms of assistance.  
Although direct contributions in the form of campaign contributions are limited, parties can 
provide an abundance of resources by way of professional campaign staff and fundraising 
assistance.  During the 2010 election cycle, for instance, the Democratic Congressional 
Campaign Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee, the official 
campaign arms of House Democrats and Republicans, spent a combined total of over $200 
million dollars on congressional races (Peoples 2010).  For both parties, the bulk of the 
disbursements—over 90 percent—was spent not on direct contributions, but on other activities 
such as providing candidates with staff and research teams to aid the party and congressional 
candidates.  As congressional campaigns become more advanced and the costs of running 
congressional campaigns increase, this assistance is essential in modern campaigning, especially 
for vulnerable candidates (Frantzich 1989; Herrnson 1988; 2004; Leyden and Borrelli 1990). 
In addition, party leaders can also come back to the district and help candidates campaign 
for reelection, and this sends further signals to the party base about partisanship.  As an 
illustration, in the most recent 2012 election cycle, incumbent Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-IL) was 
challenged in the primary by former congresswoman Debbie Halvorson.  In the weeks before the 
primary, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), the highest ranking Democrat and former Speaker of the House, 
campaigned for Jackson in his district just after she publicly endorsed him.  The visit was 
featured in both major Chicago newspapers and on the local news.  During her visit, she stressed 
not only how hard Jackson works in Congress, but also his contributions to the party (Pearson 
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2012
18
).  In turn, the visit provided important cues to primary voters.  Although this might hurt in 
general elections, we should expect that these are critical signals in primary elections, 
particularly in hard-fought races.  Thus, when legislators have primaries they should want their 
party and its leaders on their side, and supporting the party in their roll call voting may be a very 
good way to achieve this.  And, at the very least, MCs who are unsupportive of the party may 
find party leaders throwing their support behind their opponents.  
However, the ultimate goal for incumbents is to remain in office.  General elections pose 
threats to both incumbents and party leaders.  Legislators who are running for reelection want to 
return to their offices following their general elections.  Party leaders also have the same goal.  
Taken together, this has implications for legislative behavior.  If legislators have challenges in 
their general elections, as most do, then following the primary season they should become more 
responsive to their general election constituency.  Research suggests that legislators become less 
ideological in their roll call voting behavior following primaries (Burden 2001), and we should 
expect this same post-primary moderation in terms of partisan roll call voting behavior.  Party 
leaders also realize the electoral costs of party loyalty, especially for vulnerable incumbents.  
Leaders should be more apt to extend leeway to incumbents while they are campaigning in the 
general election because what might be more important than party unity in Congress is keeping 
the House seats currently held.   
Primary Timing and Partisan Voting 
One of the threads throughout this dissertation is that the timing of incumbents’ primaries 
moderates the effects of primaries and legislators’ activity in Congress.  In terms of partisan 
                                                 
18
 Jackson resigned from the House in 2012 and pleaded guilty to misusing campaign funds.  He 
was sentenced to 30 months in prison. 
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voting, this might be particularly evident as those with spring, summer, and fall primaries should 
exhibit different patterns of changes in partisan voting during and after the primary campaign 
season. 
First, I expect that incumbents with primaries that are further from the general election 
(i.e., spring and summer primaries) will be more likely to increase their partisan voting during 
the primary campaign season.  These MCs have time to focus on the primary constituency before 
their general election campaigns come into full swing, and the party base should reward 
incumbents for partisan legislative behavior on primary Election Day.  Thus, MCs with primaries 
in spring and summer primary states have incentives to refocus their legislative activity to fall in 
line with the party base.  But, following the primary election, these incumbents should attend to 
the larger district constituency in the general election, and should thus moderate their levels of 
partisan behavior in Congress by returning to their pre-primary levels of party support. The 
prediction, then, is that shifting away from partisan roll call voting will occur following the 
primary election date for incumbents with spring and summer primaries. 
But, these expectations should not necessarily extend to those with fall primaries. I 
anticipate that legislators with primaries in the fall will not become more partisan in their 
legislative behavior, but that their levels of partisan voting behavior will be instead largely 
unaffected by their primary election experiences.  This stems from the fact that incumbents with 
primaries in the fall (i.e., September – November) are typically battling challengers in both the 
primary and the general election at the same time.  Thus, these MCs must simultaneously 
campaign for both renomination in the primary and also compete to win the general election.  
Because of this, these MCs must attempt to appeal to both the primary and general election 
constituency.  Both during the primary campaign season and in the following post-primary 
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period, then, we should expect fall primary MCs will adhere to the interests of their larger district 
constituency, the general electorate, instead of that of the primary constituency.   
However, this is not to suggest that MCs with late primaries are not anticipating their 
upcoming primary contests before the start of their primary campaigns.  Indeed, the optimal 
strategy might be for these legislators to enhance their partisan behavior before the primary 
campaign season commences.  Given this, these MCs might demonstrate high levels of partisan 
activity before their primary campaign seasons (and by extension the general election campaign 
season) even begin.   
Of course it is not the case that all votes are created equal.  Indeed, some votes are 
controversial and others not as much so.  Further, the timing in which majority party leaders call 
these votes might also be a function of the electoral considerations.  For example, in the 109
th
 
Congress/ 2006 election cycle, Senate Republicans were accused of scheduling floor votes in 
June that coincided with the policy priorities of the Republican party base, such as constitutional 
amendments to prohibit flag burning and ban same-sex marriage (Congress Daily 2006).  This, it 
was argued, was a move by Republicans to mobilize its party base for the upcoming November 
election cycle.  Similarly, the legislative agenda in the House is undoubtedly influenced by 
elections.  Majority party leaders likely schedule floor votes to coincide with upcoming 
elections, or schedule votes to avoid any conflicts resulting in the hindering of party members’ 
electoral fortunes.  Like previous studies of congressional roll call voting, in my study of partisan 
activity in Congress there is no way around the selection mechanisms that drive the leadership’s 
timing of floor votes.  Nevertheless, I am still able test the relationship between primaries, 
timing, and partisan roll call activity.   
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In sum, competitive primaries should lead incumbents with spring and summer primary 
dates to grow more partisan in their roll call votes during their primary campaigns.  To be sure, 
those who are concerned with their primary reelection prospects should fall in step with their 
parties in Congress in their efforts to woo the party base.  But, following their primaries, these 
legislators should grow less responsive to the party base and become more attentive to their 
larger general election constituency, hence becoming less partisan in their roll call votes 
following the primary season.  Those with fall primaries, however, should not exhibit any 
changes in partisan activity either during or after the primary election season as their primary 
election dates’ proximity to the general election does not permit these incumbents to center their 
attention on the primary constituency. 
Primary Campaign Season and Changes in Partisan Voting 
 As outlined in Chapter 2, I measure partisan voting using indicators of party 
unity/loyalty.  In particular, I focus on “party votes” where 75 percent of one party voted 
together against 75 percent of the other party (Cox and McCubbins 1991).  These votes are 
measures of collective agreement within the party and disagreement between the parties, and 
therefore represent partisan roll call voting behavior.  The central thesis of this chapter is that 
primaries prompt MCs to change their level of partisan voting throughout their terms.  Thus, the 
dependent variables are measures of change in party support between the pre-primary period and 
the primary campaign season, and also the change in support between the primary campaign 
season and following the primary election (the post-primary period). 
Figure 6.1 presents the mean level of pre-primary party support and primary campaign 
season party support for all MCs, those with and without primaries, and MCs with high quality 
challengers.  Across legislators the average party support score is 93.52 percent in the pre-
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primary period and 93.54 in the primary campaign season.  When we consider changes in 
activity between the pre-primary period and the primary campaign season, differences across 
legislators emerge.  MCs with at least a token primary challenger present increase their support 
of the party by .50 percent while their colleagues without primaries decrease their support by .10 
percent during this time (t = -2.48, p <.05).  Incumbents with high quality challengers further 
increase their support of the party by 1 percent (t = -2.08, p < .05).  In the 110
th
 Congress, for 
example, this one percent increase equates to about 4 additional roll call votes in support of the 
party. 
Figure 6.2 shows the pre-primary and primary campaign season party support by the 
presence and quality of primary challenges separated out by the MCs with spring, summer, and 
fall primaries.  The timing of the primary appears to factor into whether MCs change their 
behavior.  Those with primaries in spring and summer primary states have a distinct pattern from 
incumbents with primaries in fall primary states.  Specifically, incumbents with spring and 
summer primaries—particularly those with high quality challengers—become more aligned with 
their parties during the primary season while their colleagues with primaries in the fall decrease 
their partisan roll call behavior—even when a high quality challenger is present (t = 2.46, p < 
.05).  But, MCs with high quality challengers in fall primary states are the most supportive of all 
legislators in their pre-primary period, voting in line with their party on 94.99 percent of party 
vote roll calls during this time.  The lends support to the notion that perhaps these incumbents 
anticipate their primary challenges and enhance their partisan voting behavior before the primary 
campaign officially begins.  The lowest mean party support score is for MCs with high quality 
challengers in spring primary states.  These incumbents, on average, vote with their party 88.90 
142 
 
percent of the time in the pre-primary period and 90.93 percent during the primary campaign 
season.   
Modeling Changes in Partisan Voting 
I next turn to the multivariate models that predict the dependent variable, primary ∆ party 
support.  This variable is measured as a difference in party support between the pre-primary 
period and primary campaign season (primary campaign season support – pre-primary support).  
In order to isolate the effects of primaries on changes in legislative behavior, a number of control 
variables are included in the models.   
 The first set of control variables are election characteristics.
19
  Not only do I expect that 
legislators’ primary election experiences will shape their level of partisan behavior in Congress, 
but the presence of a general election challenge should lead MCs to moderate their behavior.   I 
include the variable challenge in the general election in the models.  In addition, we should 
expect incumbents’ past primary experiences might also impact their patterns of partisan 
behavior in Congress.  Primary last is controlled for in the models. 
 A number of features of legislators and their districts are included in the models.  I expect 
that freshman members of Congress might be more consistent in their support of their parties as, 
compared to their colleagues with more seniority they are not as experienced at integrating their 
legislative activity with their election experiences compared to their colleagues with more 
seniority.  Further, MCs with more seniority tend to vote the party line less than their junior 
colleagues (Stratmann 2000).  Senior members might therefore be less constrained and change 
their levels of party support between the pre-primary period and primary campaign season.  
Thus, freshman legislators and years of seniority are both controlled for in each model.  It might 
                                                 
19
 Coding for the control variables are outlined in the previous chapters unless otherwise noted. 
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also be that MCs who are in the majority have less leeway when it comes to supporting their 
parties.  The majority party requires support of its members to pass measures in Congress.  In 
return for support, the majority party can provide legislative opportunities in Congress for its 
members.  This provides incentives for majority party members to be loyal party soldiers.  Given 
this, we should typically expect majority party members to be more loyal to their parties than 
minority party members.  But, the election season presents a bit of a conundrum for incumbents 
as voting with the party may not be in line with the wishes of the district constituency.  Thus, a 
majority party member should be more apt to change his or her behavior during the general 
election season by turning away from his party and falling in step with his district.  Minority 
party members, on the other hand, may be less likely to change their behavior because their 
levels of party support are lower.  In addition, a control for party leader is incorporated into the 
models because party leaders are likely the most partisan of all members and thus should 
consistently remain partisan throughout their terms.  Party leaders also typically vote less often 
than the average MC. 
We should also expect that ideologically extreme legislators will become more partisan in 
their legislative behavior during the campaign season as they are likely elected out of highly 
partisan districts.  Such an effect was found in the previous chapter on the impacts of primaries 
on legislators’ issue agendas, and the same logic should map onto changes in legislators’ partisan 
activity.   A measure of MCs’ ideological extremity is included in the model.  Along the same 
lines, incumbents from ideologically homogenous districts might adjust their behavior more so 
than their colleagues from heterogeneous districts.  Regardless of their primary contexts, MCs 
from ideologically homogenous districts may seek to align more closely with the party base 
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during the primary campaign season than MCs from ideologically diverse districts.  District 
heterogeneity is accounted for in each model.  
Finally, two other variables are included.  A variable that controls for changes in 
legislators’ roll call voting participation is measured as a change in the percent of missed votes 
between the pre-primary period and the primary campaign season.  This variable is important to 
include because, as presented in Chapter 4, legislators tend to miss more votes as their terms 
progress (i.e., they miss more votes in the primary campaign season compared to the pre-primary 
period).  If legislators’ roll call participation is not constant over the course of their terms, this 
might impact their percentage change in partisan roll calls as MCs might want to avoid taking 
positions on roll calls that are contentious as the general election approaches (i.e., 75-75 party 
votes).  Also included in each model is a measure of legislators’ pre-primary party support.  This 
is integrated into the models as an anchor for the dependent variable (change in party support 
between the pre-primary and primary campaign season). 
Changes in Partisan Voting in the Primary Campaign Season 
My expectation is that MCs with spring and summer primaries will become more partisan 
in their roll call votes during the primary campaign, while those with primary challenges in fall 
primary states will not change their level of partisan support in response to their primary election 
experiences.  Again, the dependent variable is the change in partisan voting between the pre-
primary and primary campaign season.   
Table 6.1 presents the results of the models predicting change in party support during the 
primary campaign season.  A positive coefficient indicates an increase in alignment with the 
party in legislators’ roll call votes during the primary campaign season while a negative 
coefficient indicates a decrease in support for the party in roll call votes.   The results of the 
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models largely conform to expectations.  Those with spring primaries who have at least a token 
primary challenger present increase their level of partisan voting by .68 percent.  Having a high 
quality challenger appears to lead to a larger shift in support for the party as MCs with these 
types of challengers further increase their partisan behavior by an additional 1.68 percent.  In 
addition, incumbents with at least a token primary challenge present in summer primary states 
also become more partisan in their roll call voting behavior.  These MCs increase their levels of 
party support in their roll call voting behavior by .95 percent during the primary campaign 
season. 
Although the expectation is that legislators with fall primaries would be largely 
unaffected by their primary election experiences during their primary campaigns, the results 
suggest otherwise.  Incumbents with high quality primary challengers in fall primary states 
decrease their level of partisan voting in Congress by 1.61 percent during their primary campaign 
seasons.  This unexpected result may be because vulnerable MCs’ with later primary dates 
increase their partisan activity before the onset of the primary campaign season and then 
decrease their support of the party during the primary campaign season because of their general 
election contests.  Although I conceptualize the primary season as the six months before the 
primary election, it is reasonable to assume that vulnerable incumbents might be anticipating a 
primary challenge well before this time, particularly for those in fall primary states.  According 
to my coding scheme, the primary campaign season for MCs with October primaries, for 
example, begins in April.  But news of a challenger in both the primary and the general likely 
begins well before this time period.  In addition, many states have early primaries, in February 
and March.  The primary campaign season for these MCs begins during the first legislative 
session in August and September.  MCs with fall primaries might look at their spring primary 
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colleagues’ campaign experiences and be planning for their own contests before April, the 
beginning of their six month campaign season window.  Given this, these MCs might anticipate 
their primaries well before the primary campaign season even begins.   
Descriptively, we see evidence of such behavior as MCs with high quality challengers in 
fall primary states are the most partisan of all legislators in the pre-primary period.  These 
incumbents vote the party line at a rate of 95 percent in the pre-primary period compared to the 
average MC, whose party support score is 93.5 percent during this time. Yet, during the actual 
primary campaign season when fall primary MCs are campaigning for renomination in the 
primary and also likely seeking to appeal to the general election constituency, they might step 
away from such high levels of partisan behavior by becoming less partisan in their roll calls.  It is 
important to point out that even though MCs with high quality challengers in fall primary states 
decrease their activity during the primary campaign season, their levels of party support in the 
primary season is higher than, though not statistically distinct from, their colleagues with high 
quality challengers in spring primary states (93 percent and 91 percent respectively). 
Other campaign effects also emerge in the models.  The presence of a general election 
challenge leads MCs to decrease their alignment with the party in the primary campaign season 
for incumbents in spring and summer primary states but not for those in fall primary states.  I 
suspect that this is tied to the alignment of the primary and general election campaign seasons.  
As discussed earlier, MCs in states with later primary dates where the primary and general 
election season overlap are likely gearing up for their general election challenges before the six 
month primary season window, and as such they should not necessarily exhibit any changes in 
behavior during their states’ primary campaign season.  In addition, incumbents in fall primary 
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states who had a primary challenge in the previous election cycle decrease their level of partisan 
voting in the primary campaign season.   
Further, legislators in spring and summer primary states that are in the majority party 
grow less partisan in their roll call votes as their term progress—that is, between the pre-primary 
and primary campaign season.  There also appears to be a relationship between ideological 
extremity and changes in party support, but this varies depending on the timing of the primary.  
Ideologically extreme incumbents from summer and fall primary states become more partisan in 
their roll call voting behavior, particularly when the primary aligns closely to the general 
election.  This is not surprising given that MCs who are ideologically extreme are likely elected 
from ideologically extreme districts, and hence they should be rewarded for partisan behavior.  
Becoming more partisan over the course of their terms might be an optimal strategy for these 
legislators.   
The results thus far suggest that there is a pattern of primaries influencing legislators’ 
levels of partisan behavior.  MCs with spring and summer primaries become more partisan in 
their roll call voting behavior during their primary campaign season, especially those with high 
quality challengers in spring primary states.  At the same time, MCs with fall primaries move 
away from the party line during their primary campaign season.  Although the effects may seem 
small, we should not necessarily expect MCs to engage in too much movement during their 
terms.  Legislators already have high levels of partisan voting, so there is a ceiling effect as to 
how much more partisan they can become.  In addition, savvy incumbents with an eye towards 
reelection will want to avoid too much movement as to avoid the appearance of being a flip-
flopper.   
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Moderation Following the Primary  
After their states’ primary election dates, I expect that all MCs, regardless of their 
primary election contexts, will decrease their party support going into the general election.  
However, this change in activity should be especially pronounced for those with primaries in 
spring and summer primary states.  Following their primaries, I expect that legislators with 
spring and summer primaries will become less partisan in their roll call voting behavior in 
Congress, as they head into the general election as they will be returning to their pre-primary 
levels of party support.  But, the presence of a primary challenge should not exert any additional 
impact on fall primary legislators’ partisan voting behavior in the post-primary period.   
Figure 6.3 shows the mean levels of party support in the primary season and the post-
primary period.  Legislators in spring primary states, regardless of their primary election 
contexts, decrease their support of the party following their states’ primary campaign season.  
There is no substantive difference in these changes in activity for those with and without 
primaries or high quality challengers.  Differences in changes in activity do emerge in summer 
primary states.  Incumbents from these states, on average, decrease their activity, but it is 
particularly high for those with primaries.  MCs without high quality challengers decrease their 
activity by .45 percent following their states’ primary election dates.  However, MCs in summer 
primary states with high quality primary challengers decrease their levels of partisan roll call 
voting behavior from 90.93 percent to 88.19 percent following their primaries  (t = 2.46, p < .05).  
In short, it appears that following their states’ primary election dates, legislators in the spring and 
summer primary states return to their pre-primary levels of party support as they head into the 
general election.   
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MCs in fall primary states, however, have different patterns of party support.  Those 
without primaries become more supportive of the party following their states’ primary election 
dates.  This result holds for the legislators with at least a token primary challenger present.  
Although the differences in the primary season and post-primary party support are small, MCs 
from fall primary states have a different pattern of partisan behavior compared to their spring and 
summer primary colleagues.  Where, on average, legislators with and without primaries in spring 
and summer primary states decrease their partisan activity following their states’ primary 
election dates, this does not necessarily hold in fall primary states. MCs with high quality 
challengers in fall primary states, though, appear to decrease their party support following the 
primary season, but this change in activity is small and not statistically different than changes in 
activity of other fall primary state MCs. 
To test the hypothesis that legislators with primaries moderate their partisan behavior 
after the primary campaign season, I model the change in party support using a change score 
similar to the previous measure.  Specifically, the dependent variable is the post-primary ∆ party 
support on 75-75 party votes between the primary campaign season and the post-primary period 
(post-primary support – primary campaign season).  The independent variables in the previous 
analysis are included in each of the models.  However, a control for whether legislators lost their 
primaries is also incorporated into the models.  This variable is particularly important given that 
MCs who lost their primaries find themselves free of both electoral pressures and any constraints 
from the party leadership once their primaries are over and their House careers are coming to a 
close.  In addition, a control variable for the change in missed roll call votes measures the change 
in missed votes between the primary campaign season and the post-primary period.  The anchor 
for pre-primary party support is replaced with the primary season party support score because 
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the dependent variable is a difference in the activity between primary campaign season and the 
post-primary activity. 
Table 6.2 shows the models predicting post-primary ∆ party support in partisan roll call 
activity following legislators’ primary election dates.  For incumbents in spring and summer 
primary states, the only campaign effect that emerges in these models is for incumbents with 
high quality challengers in spring primary states.  These MCs decrease their levels of partisan 
roll call activity by 4.51 percent following the primary campaign season.  This is not necessarily 
surprising given that legislators with high quality challengers in spring primary states exhibit the 
lowest levels of party support in the pre-primary period and then increase their party support in 
the primary campaign season.  These results suggest that these MCs seek to return to their typical 
levels of partisan activity following their primaries as they focus on their larger district 
constituency.   
The expectation that MCs with primaries in the summer would also moderate their 
partisan behavior following their primary dates does not hold.  This may be a result of a couple 
of factors.  First, it could be that changes in behavior after the primary season only occur for 
those who have the time to engage in it—that is, those who have early spring primaries.  MCs 
with summer primaries might avoid shifting their behavior too much between the primary and 
general election as they do not want to rapidly change their behavior.  Incumbents with spring 
primaries have more time to gradually change their behavior following their primary election 
dates.  For example, MCs with March primaries have eight months until the general election to 
decrease their partisan roll call voting behavior.  However, incumbents with, say July primaries, 
have less time before the general election is upon them.  Thus, these MCs might need to be more 
careful in shifting their behavior. 
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This null finding may also be a result of their activity levels in the pre-primary and 
primary campaign season.  Unlike their colleagues in spring primary states who have high 
quality challengers and increase their support of the party by 2.36 percent in the primary 
campaign season, MCs in summer primary states with primary challenges do not shift their 
behavior at such a high level (.98 percent).  Given this, these summer primary MCs might 
therefore not need to change their behavior back to their pre-primary levels in the post-primary 
period as much as spring primary MCs. 
As expected, MCs with primaries in the fall are not as influenced by their primary 
election contexts.  These incumbents do not engage in any post-primary moderation.  In addition, 
none of the other election characteristics appear to influence changes in legislators’ partisan roll 
call voting behavior (including for those who lost their primary).
20
  The legislator characteristics 
that are significant conform to expectations except for the impact of majority party member on 
changes in partisan legislative behavior.  Majority party incumbents in summer primary states 
increase their support of the party during the post-primary period while majority party legislators 
in fall primary states decrease their support of the party.  I expected that majority party members, 
regardless of the timing of their primaries, would all become less aligned with the majority party 
leaders as they seek to appeal to the district as a whole in the general election.  Minority party 
members, on the other hand, are less constrained by their party leaders in their legislative 
behavior, so they should not necessarily change their behavior to such a large extent.  However, 
this difference in impact of majority party status on changes in legislators’ party support does not 
                                                 
20
 The coefficient for Lost Primary in the fall primary model is omitted as no MCs with fall 
primaries lost their primary contests. 
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necessarily have an explanation and may simply be a feature of the legislators who have summer 
and fall primaries. 
Between-Congress Changes in Party Support 
  The findings from the preceding cross-sectional analysis suggest that primaries prompt 
legislators with spring and, to a lesser extent, summer primaries to become more partisan in their 
roll call votes during the primary campaign season.  Following their primary elections, MCs with 
high quality challengers in spring primary states return to their more moderate pre-primary 
activity.  This cross-sectional approach compares all instances where MCs have primaries to 
those instances where MCs do not have primaries.  What the hypotheses tests do not fully tell us, 
however, is whether it is the presence of primary challengers that is doing the work in driving 
MCs to become more partisan.  A more stringent approach to investigating the primary-partisan 
behavior linkage is to compare the changes in activity for incumbents to themselves when they 
do and do not have primaries.  Here, we can examine if the changes in activity between the pre-
primary and primary campaign season are a function of primaries, or are simply behavioral 
patterns of those who tend to get primaries.   
 To examine the impacts of primaries on incumbents’ partisan legislative behavior, I use 
the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses/ 2006 and 2008 election cycles for the comparison.  I selected this 
time period because it represents the two most recent Congresses in my sample.  Included in the 
comparison are those MCs who are present in both the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses and who 
sought reelection in both 2006 and 2008.  Omitted are those who are only in one Congress, did 
not have two full terms, or those not running for reelection in either election cycle. 
 I created a primary context categorization that identifies whether incumbents did not have 
a primary in either election cycle (no primary – no primary), did not have a primary in the 109th  
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Congress/2006 election cycle but had a primary challenge in the 110
th
 Congress/2008 election 
cycle (no primary – primary), had a primary in the 109th Congress/2006 election cycle but not the 
110
th
 Congress/2008 election cycle (primary – no primary), or had a primary in both election 
cycles (primary – primary).  I expect that no primary – primary legislators will engage in the 
largest shifts in party support between Congresses—that is, during the Congress for which they 
have a primary.  Primary – no primary MCs, on the other hand, should continue to be concerned 
about potential challenges and thus should not engage in any more or less changes in party 
support in the Congress following the election year where they had a primary.  For this same 
reason, primary – primary MCs should also not shift their levels of party support between 
Congresses. 
Table 6.3 presents the counts of legislators that fit into each of the categories.  As shown, 
most (219) MCs in the 109
th
-110
th
 Congresses did not have primaries in either election cycle.  
However, nearly a quarter of incumbents (80) had a primary in one election cycle (44 legislators 
had primaries in the 109
th
 Congress, but not the 110
th
 Congress, while others 36 legislators had 
primaries in the 110
th
 Congress, but not the 109
th
 Congress).  In addition, 9 percent (30) had 
primaries in both election cycles.   
 The central question at hand is whether the change in partisan activity is larger when 
MCs have primaries compared to when they do not.  The key dependent variables are the 
between-Congress difference in primary change in party support, between-Congress primary ∆ 
party support, and the between-Congress difference in post-primary change in party support, 
between-Congress post-primary ∆ party support.  For all legislators, I subtracted each 
incumbent’s 109th Congress primary ∆ party support from their 110th Congress primary ∆ party 
support.  I followed this same procedure for the between-Congress post-primary ∆ party support.   
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As an illustration, we can look at the party support record for Representative Jim 
Marshall (D – GA).  Marshall did not have a primary challenge in the 109th Congress, but he did 
have one in the 110
th
 Congress.  In the 109
th
 Congress, Marshall became less supportive of the 
party line in the primary campaign season as he decreased his support from 74.62 percent in the 
pre-primary period to 74.07 percent in the primary campaign season—a .57 percent decrease.  In 
the following Congress when Marshall had a primary, he became more partisan in his roll call 
voting behavior during the primary season voting with the party at a rate of 75.51 percent in the 
pre-primary period and 77.27 percent during the primary campaign season—a 1.76 percent 
increase.  Thus, between the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses, Marshall increased his support of the 
party line when he had a primary challenge.  The between-Congress primary ∆ party support 
score, then, is 2.33.  Measuring the change in activity between Congresses in this way allows me 
to test whether MCs engage in larger shifts when they have primaries as compared to when they 
do not.  For Marshall, this variable captures the difference between his drop in party support in 
the 109
th
 Congress and the increase in his support in the 110
th
 Congress. 
Table 6.4 presents the legislators’ mean between-Congress primary ∆ party support and 
between-Congress post-primary ∆ party support for each primary categorization.  A positive 
score indicates that MCs become more supportive of the party line in their roll call voting during 
the primary season in the 110
th
 Congress than that of the 109
th
 Congress, while a negative score 
indicates that incumbents become less supportive during the primary season in the 110
th
 
Congress.  Legislators who do not have primaries in either Congress appear to, on average, 
increase their levels of party support between Congresses by .63 percent.  This is not necessarily 
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surprising given that, as shown in Chapter 3, party loyalty has increased over time.
21
  Thus, the 
between-Congress primary ∆ party support suggests that, on average, even those without 
primaries engage in larger shifts towards their parties during the primary campaign season in the 
110
th
 Congress compared to the 109
th
 Congress.  Following the primary, these MCs decrease 
their support of the party by 1.06 percent more in the 110
th
 Congress.  
Incumbents with primaries in both the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses, on average, also 
become more supportive of the party.  Shifts toward the party line are 1.02 percent larger during 
the primary campaign season in the 110
th
 Congress as compared to that of the 109
th
 Congress.  
These MCs also decrease their levels of party support in the post-primary period by .77 percent 
more in the 110
th
 Congress than the 109
th
 Congress.
22
  
When we look at the differences in changes in party support when legislators do and do 
not have primaries, we see that these MCs who had a primary in the 110
th
 Congress but not the 
109
th
 Congress (no primary – primary) exhibit the largest shifts in behavior between Congresses 
during the primary campaign season.  On average, these incumbents become more partisan 
during the primary campaign season when they have primaries compared to when they do not— 
                                                 
21
 In the 110
th
 Congress Democrats also gained majority control in the House and this might 
affect between-Congress changes in partisan activity.  I control for this in the forthcoming 
models. 
22
 Of course, this may be an artifact of the change in party control in the House as members of 
the Democrat party may have higher levels of party support as they seek to obtain the rewards 
that majority party status affords.  Yet, I suspect that MCs who did not have primaries in the 
109
th
 Congress but did so in the 110
th
 to engage in larger changes in party support that those who 
did not have these election experiences.  
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a 3.66 percent increase.  This increase is considerably larger than the average no primary – no 
primary legislators (t = -2.85, p < .01). When it comes to post-primary moderation, their 
between-Congress post-primary ∆ party support is .32 percent. 
Turning to primary – no primary legislators, the negative between-Congress change score 
indicates that the changes in activity between the pre-primary period and the primary campaign 
season for these MCs are larger in the Congress that they have a primary compared to the 
Congress when they do not.  It might be that following their primaries these MCs are still 
concerned about the potential for a challenge and are thus engaging in more responsive behavior 
to the party base in the next Congress. As suggested, these MCs might be more supportive of the 
party line in the Congress following their primaries and thus exhibit little change in activity 
between the pre-primary period and the primary campaign season in the 110
th
 Congress. 
This descriptive account suggests that primaries cause MCs to exhibit different patterns 
of party support when they do and do not have primaries.  To test this more fully, I model 
between-Congress primary ∆ party support and between-Congress post-primary ∆ party support 
as a function of primary contexts and structural control variables.  The key independent variable, 
no primary –primary, is a dichotomous variable that indicates if the legislator did not have a 
primary in the 109
th
 Congress but did in the 110
th
 Congress.  Primary – no primary is a dummy 
variable designating MCs who had a primary in the 109
th
 Congress but not the 110
th
 Congress.   
Also included in the model is the primary – primary variable that identifies legislators that had 
primary challengers in both the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses.  The omitted category from the 
models, then, is a variable that identifies no primary – no primary legislators who do not have a 
primary in either Congress.   We can treat this category of legislators as the baseline for the 
average between-Congress change in partisan behavior.  As the descriptive analysis indicates, the 
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average legislator without a primary becomes more partisan during the primary campaign season 
in the 110
th
 Congress as compared to the 109
th
 Congress which corresponds to growing trends in 
party support over time.  If no primary – primary MCs, primary – primary MCs, and primary – 
primary MCs exhibit different patterns in changes in behavior between Congresses than the 
average incumbent without any primaries, then the coefficients for these variables will be 
significant.  
Included in the models are three control variables that account for factors that are not 
necessarily constant between Congresses and that may influence the extent to which legislators’ 
behavior changes between Congresses.  These variables are included because of important 
effects found in the earlier cross-sectional analysis.  As suggested, freshman appear to have 
different patterns of partisan support during their terms as compared to their more senior 
colleagues, so MCs whose first terms was the 109
th
 Congress may have different behavioral 
patterns in the 110
th
 Congress.  Freshman 109
th
 identifies those incumbents who were freshman 
in the 109
th
 Congress.  The models in the previous analysis also suggest that MCs in the majority 
party behave differently than MCs in the minority party.  Adding to this, the 110
th
 Congress saw 
a change in party control in the House from the Republican party to the Democrat party.  Given 
this, I expect that Democrats who returned to the 110
th
 Congress to be more loyal to their parties 
in this Congress than they were as minority party members in the 109
th
 Congress.  Further, this 
heightened level of loyalty should be constant throughout their terms in the 110
th
 Congress.  The 
reason for this is two-fold.  First, the Democrats came into the 110
th
 Congress victorious and we 
should expect the new majority party members to be highly unified.  In addition, the majority 
party and its leaders have a great deal of power in Congress ranging from setting the legislative 
agenda to committee chair assignments.  We should expect Democrats will want to adhere to the 
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party line throughout their legislative terms to a greater deal when there is more at stake (i.e., 
when they are in the majority party).  Change in majority party status is an indicator variable for 
Democrats MCs. 
Finally, the timing of legislators’ primaries has a moderating effect on the extent to which 
primaries prompt MCs to change their partisan roll call voting behavior during their 
congressional terms.  As discussed in Chapter 3, primary dates are not constant across elections 
as states tend to move their primaries up during presidential election cycles.  For example, in the 
109
th
 Congress/2006 election cycle Florida, Maryland, Washington, and Wisconsin had fall 
primary dates.  But, during the 110
th
 Congress/ 2008 election cycles, these states moved their 
primary dates up to the spring or summer.  Most states, however, have primaries in the same time 
period in both the 109
th
 Congress/2006 election cycle and the 110
th
 Congress/2008 election 
cycle.  But, it is important to control for whether MCs’ primary election dates were moved 
further away from the general election as this might explain why legislators change their 
behavior more in one Congress than another.  Primary timing ∆ indicates if the timing of 
legislators’ states’ primary election (i.e., spring, summer, and fall) moved up in the calendar year 
between the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses.   
Results 
Table 6.5 presents the results of the OLS models predicting between-Congress primary ∆ 
party support and between-Congress post-primary ∆ party support.  Again, the reference 
category for the primary election variables is the between-Congress changes in party support for 
MCs who do not have primaries in either Congress/election cycle, and the coefficients for the 
variables no primary – primary, primary – no primary, and primary – primary indicate whether 
the between Congress change in activity is substantively different for MCs with these primary 
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contexts as compared to the average legislator who does not have a primary in either Congress.  
Not surprisingly, MCs exhibit larger changes in support for the party line in their roll call voting 
behavior in the Congress when they have primaries.  The coefficient for no primary – primary is 
positive and significant and indicates that incumbents’ primary ∆ party support is 2.98 percent 
larger when they have primaries compared to when they do not.  The between-Congress 
difference in primary party support score changes for primary – no primary and primary-primary 
MCs is no different than no primary – no primary MCs.  This suggests that MCs who had a 
primary in the previous election continue to run scared and do not change their activity to a 
greater degree in the subsequent Congress when they do not have a primary.  Also, incumbents 
who have primaries in multiple Congresses tend to, on average, exhibit no substantive difference 
in their patterns of party support during their primary campaigns between Congresses.  
Following the primary campaign season, however, there appears to be no variation in 
between-Congress differences in post-primary moderation across legislators as neither the 
primary campaign context variables are significant.  What this indicates is that legislators’ 
partisan activity is influenced by their primary election experiences only while they are 
campaigning, but not after their primary election dates. 
The control variables conform to expectations.  Legislators who were freshman in the 
109
th
 Congress engage in larger shifts in partisan activity in the 110
th
 Congress suggesting that in 
the first term MCs remain constant in their partisan levels of support throughout their term.  This 
effect is present in both the primary season and post-primary models.  In addition, Democrats 
who became majority party members in the 110
th
 Congress shifted away from the party in their 
roll call voting in that Congress.  This is surprising given that I expected these MCs to be more 
supportive of their party and remain consistently so during the Congress for which they are in the 
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majority.  Perhaps one explanation is that these MCs engaged in heightened levels of party 
support in the 110
th
 Congress pre-period period as they sought to obtain the rewards of majority 
party status, but this support subsides once the campaign season commences.  The change in 
majority party status does not affect party support following the primary election date.   
Finally, the coefficient for primary timing ∆ is significant in both models. As expected, 
MCs whose states’ primary dates move up, say summer to spring, engage in larger shifts in party 
support during their states’ primary campaign season when the primary dates are earlier in the 
calendar year.  Following their states’ primary election dates, these MCs moderate their behavior 
as they move into the general election season.  This effect is linked to front-loading in the 110
th
 
Congress/2008 presidential election cycle.   
Conclusion 
 Taken as a whole, the findings in this chapter highlight the meaningful impacts that 
primaries have on partisanship in Congress.  Legislators become more partisan while they are 
campaigning in their primaries. This effect is evident both cross-sectionally (comparing changes 
in partisan roll call voting behavior for those who do and do not have primaries) and 
longitudinally (comparing legislators to themselves when they do and do not have primaries).  
Although the degree of impact may rest on the timing of legislators’ primaries, the effects of 
primaries on legislators partisan roll call voting behavior is nevertheless present in any way that 
we study it.  This points to a number of questions about the relative “goodness” of primaries and, 
by extension, competition more broadly.  If primaries make incumbents more partisan, is this 
fundamentally bad for democracy?  Do primary elections ultimately hurt representation?  These 
questions are explored in the next chapter.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 6.1: What Explains Primary Campaign Season Change in Partisan Voting?   
 Spring  
Primaries 
Summer 
Primaries 
Fall  
Primaries 
 
Election Characteristics 
 
 
  
   Primary Challenge .68
#
 
(.45) 
.95
***
 
(.31) 
.71 
(.61) 
   High Quality Primary Opponent 1.68
#
 
(1.07) 
.67 
(.71) 
-1.61
**
 
(.90) 
   Challenge in General -1.46
*
 
(.84) 
-1.24
***
 
(.39) 
-.15 
(.40) 
   Primary Last .53 
(.37) 
-.24 
(.30) 
-.73
***
 
(.49) 
Legislator & District Characteristics    
   Freshman -.78 
(.56) 
-.38 
(.40) 
-.14 
(.55) 
   Seniority .00 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.02) 
.00 
(.02) 
   Majority Party Member -.91
***
 
(.33) 
-.82
***
 
(.24) 
-.15 
(.30) 
   Party Leader -.96 
(1.27) 
.23 
(.47) 
.92 
(1.42) 
   Ideological Extremity -2.97 
(2.03) 
5.18
***
 
(1.14) 
5.86
***
 
(1.44) 
   District Heterogeneity -.71 
(2.17) 
1.46 
(1.30) 
-1.86 
(1.79) 
Δ Missed Votes -.52 
(.05) 
-.45
***
 
(.04) 
-.35
***
 
(.04) 
Pre-Primary Party Support -17.01
***
 
(6.05) 
-14.31
***
 
(3.53) 
9.08
**
 
(4.33) 
Constant  21.80
***
 
(5.28) 
12.70
***
 
(3.67) 
9.37
**
 
(4.29) 
 
R
2
 
N 
 
.43 
568 
 
.28 
1183 
 
.19 
585 
*** 
p < .01; 
** 
p < .05; 
*
 p < .10;  
#
 p < .15 
Note: Data are from the 105
th
-110
th
 Congress/1998-2008 election cycles.  Each OLS model predicts the percent  
change in the party support scores on 75-75 party votes between the pre-primary and primary campaign period 
(primary party support – pre-primary party support).  The standard errors are clustered by legislator and fixed  
effects for Congress are included in the model. 
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Table 6.2: What Explains Post-Primary Changes in Party Support? 
 Spring  
Primaries 
Summer 
Primaries 
Fall  
Primaries 
 
Election Characteristics 
   
   Primary Challenge .11 
(.56) 
-.04 
(.33) 
-.07 
(.71) 
   High Quality Primary Opponent -4.51
*
 
(2.27) 
-1.17 
(.85) 
-.84 
(1.51) 
   Lost Primary 
 
2.02 
(1.92) 
2.52 
(2.14) 
-- 
 
   Challenge in General .91 
(.79) 
.65 
(.55) 
-.96 
(.55) 
   Primary Last -.48 
(.40) 
.05 
(.30) 
.19 
(.60) 
Legislator & District Characteristics    
   Freshman 1.19
* 
(.60) 
-.20 
(.46) 
-.96 
(.96) 
   Seniority -.02 
(.03) 
-.00 
(.02) 
.01 
(.03) 
   Majority Party Member .28 
(.34) 
.75
*
 
(.30) 
-1.06
*
 
(.54) 
   Party Leader -2.31 
(1.40) 
.65 
(.62) 
4.61
**
 
(.83) 
   Ideological Extremity 9.45
**
 
(1.98) 
6.86
**
 
(1.39) 
7.89
**
 
(2.49) 
   District Heterogeneity -.57 
(2.14) 
.40 
(1.52) 
.35 
(2.21) 
Δ Missed Votes -.55** 
(.09) 
-.38
**
 
(.04) 
-.41
**
 
(.07) 
Primary Party Support -12.15
*
 
(5.72) 
-22.21
**
 
(2.51) 
-40.84
**
 
(7.01) 
Constant  6.99 
(5.11) 
17.12
**
 
(2.85) 
36.42
**
 
(6.97) 
 
R
2
 
N 
 
.38 
568 
 
.29 
1183 
 
.38 
585 
***
 p < .01; 
** 
p < .05; 
*
 p < .10 
Note: Data are from the 105
th
-110
th
 Congress/1998-2008 election cycles.  Each OLS model predicts the  
percent change in the party support scores on 75-75 party votes between the primary campaign period and the  
post-primary period following the primary election date through the November general election date   
(post-primary party support – primary season party support).  The standard errors are clustered by legislator  
and fixed effects for Congress are included in the model. 
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Table 6.3: MCs by Primary Status in the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses 
Congress to Congress Primary Context Number of MCs 
No Primary – No Primary 219 
Primary – Primary 30 
No Primary –  Primary 44 
Primary – No Primary 36 
Total 329 
Note:  Numbers represent the total number of legislators used in the comparison analysis  
of the changes in behavior for MCs between the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Between Congress Difference Primary Δ Party Support & Post-Primary Δ Party 
Support 
Congress to Congress Primary Context Primary Δ  
Party Support 
Post-Primary  
Δ Party Support 
No Primary – No Primary .63 1.06 
Primary – Primary 1.02 -.77 
No Primary – Primary  3.66 .32 
Primary – No Primary -.04 -.50 
Mean 1.01 .73 
Note: Data are from the 109
h
-110
th
 Congress/2006-2008 election cycles.  The second column presents the mean 
between-Congress (109
th
 and 110
th
 Congress) difference in the percent change in the party support scores on 75-75 
party votes between the pre-primary period and the primary campaign season by primary categorization.  The third 
column presents the mean between-Congress (109th and 110th Congress) difference in the percent change in the 
party support scores on 75-75 party votes between the primary campaign season and the post- primary period by 
primary categorization.   
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Table 6.5: What Explains Between-Congress Difference in Primary ∆ Party Support? 
  
Primary Δ  
Party Support 
 
Post-Primary  
Δ Party Support 
 
No Primary – Primary 2.98*** 
(1.00) 
-.78 
(1.41) 
Primary – No Primary -.18 
(1.10) 
-.77 
(1.57) 
Primary – Primary  .53 
(1.18) 
-1.50 
(1.67) 
Freshman 109
th
  2.09
*
 
(1.07) 
2.41 
(1.52) 
∆ Majority Party  -2.82** 
(.67) 
-.53 
(.95) 
Primary Timing ∆ 1.20 
(.9) 
-2.15
*
 
(1.29) 
Constant 1.65
*** 
(.58) 
1.43
* 
(.83) 
 
R
2
 
N 
 
.10 
329  
 
.02 
329 
*** 
p < .01
; ** 
p < .05; 
*
 p < .10 
Note: Data are from the 109
h
-110
th
 Congress/2006-2008 election cycles.  The OLS model in the second  
column predicts the between-Congress (109
th
 and 110
th
 Congress) difference in the percent change in  
the party support scores on 75-75 party votes between the pre-primary period and the primary campaign  
season. The OLS model in the third column predicts the between-Congress (109
th
 and 110
th
 Congress)  
difference in the percent change in the party support scores on 75-75party votes between the primary  
campaign season and the post-primary period. 
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Figure 6.1: Pre-Primary and Primary Campaign Season Partisan Voting Rates 
 
Note: The figure presents the mean levels of pre-primary party support and primary campaign  
season party support on rolls where 75 percent of each party votes against each other for all  
MCs, those without primaries, and MCs with at least a primary challenger present and those  
with high quality primary challengers.   
  
91
92
93
94
95
All MCs No Primary Primary Challenger
Present
High Quality
Challenger
Pre-Primary Support Primary Support
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Figure 6.2: Pre-Primary and Primary Campaign Season Partisan Voting by Timing of Primary 
 
 
Note: The figure presents the mean levels of pre-primary party support and primary campaign season party  
support on rolls where 75 percent of each party votes against each other for MCs with and without primaries and 
with high quality primary challengers by the timing of their states’ primary election dates.   
 
 
 
  
84 86 88 90 92 94 96
fall
summer
spring
fall
summer
spring
fall
summer
spring
Pre-Primary Support Primary Support
W/ 
Primary 
W/ Quality 
Challenger 
W/O 
Primary 
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Figure 6.3: Primary Campaign Season and Post-Primary Period Partisan Voting 
 
Note: The figure presents the mean levels of primary season party support and post-primary party 
support on rolls where 75 percent of each party votes against each other for MCs with and  
without primaries and with high quality primary challengers by the timing of their states’ primary  
election dates.   
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summer
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Chapter 7: Primaries and Representation  
  
This dissertation began with the simple question of whether primaries are good for 
democracy.  Competitive elections are argued to be a necessary component of the democratic 
process (Dahl 1956).  Competition should, at the very least, prompt incumbents to become more 
responsive to their constituents.  I rigorously assessed this claim by empirically testing a number 
of hypotheses about how primary competition in particular influences legislative behavior.  
Importantly though, my findings also shed light onto whether competition improves the quality 
of representation in Congress.  In this chapter, I provide a summary of my key findings and 
discuss the implications about the relative “goodness” of primary elections in representative 
democracy.  I also address the role of the 2010 Tea Party movement in the contemporary 
Congress.  Specifically, I contend that the primaries might have more influence in Congress 
following the Tea Party movement. 
Overview of Findings  
 The empirical analyses point to a number of ways that primaries influence legislative 
behavior.  First, they confirm that we cannot ignore the two-stage nature of the election process 
in our study of legislative behavior.  As my findings show, primaries impact the volume and 
content of legislators’ activity as well as their partisan roll call voting records.  Indeed, in many 
cases incumbents with primaries are more active in introducing and cosponsoring legislation than 
those who do not have such challenges.  Primaries also affect legislators’ responsiveness to the 
party base in both their legislative issue agendas and their roll call votes.  Many incumbents 
adjust their policy priorities in Congress while they are campaigning for reelection in the primary 
by focusing more on the issues that are important to the party base.  In a number of cases, MCs 
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with primaries also become more partisan during their primary campaign seasons.  In short, 
primaries influence a wide range of legislators’ activities in Congress. 
Second, legislators’ election contexts influence their activity in Congress while they are 
campaigning.  What MCs do in Congress is a function of their campaign experiences (see Arnold 
1990; Sulkin 2005; 2011).  This is not new to the study of the election-legislative behavior 
linkage.  What is unique to my approach is that I investigate how competition influences 
incumbents’ activity while they are simultaneously campaigning and legislating.  For instance, 
many MCs who are actively campaigning in the primary are also less present in Washington, 
DC.   
Third, the rules that guide the election process matter.  In particular, the decisions states 
make about when to hold their primaries have consequences that extend beyond the usual 
considerations.  In presidential election cycles there is a good deal of discussion about the effects 
of frontloading on the presidential election process.  As states seek to move their primaries 
earlier and earlier, presidential elections are more often sewed up before most of the summer and 
fall primaries.  This leaves a large number of states with no real impact in the selection of the 
presidential party nominees (Ridout and Rottinghaus 2008). 
 But what my findings show is that the decisions that states make about when their 
primaries are held also shape the influence of congressional primaries.  In particular, the timing 
of legislators’ primary election dates moderates the effects of primaries on both their volume of 
activity and appeals to the party base.  As MCs’ election dates converge onto the general election 
dates, legislators in these late primary states respond to their primary election contexts differently 
than their early primary colleagues.  For instance, legislators with early primaries become more 
active in introducing and cosponsoring legislation while they are campaigning, while those with 
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later primaries amend less and miss more votes as a result of their primary election experiences.  
In this way, then, competitive primaries prompt MCs in early primary states to become more 
active in Congress while MCs with later primary dates decrease their activity levels.  Further, the 
effects of primaries on legislators’ appeals to the party base also vary by the timing of the 
primary date.  Incumbents with spring and summer primaries become more partisan in their roll 
call voting behavior in Congress while they are campaigning.  Incumbents with fall primaries, on 
the other hand, become less partisan during their primary campaign seasons.  Early primary 
legislators only have to battle one challenger at time and can thus focus on the party base and the 
district constituency at separate times.  Later primary MCs, however, are campaigning in both 
the primary and the general election at the same time and have less time to spend in Congress 
and also eschew the interests of the party base as they seek to appeal to the larger district 
constituency.  In short, if every state held its primaries in the spring, there would likely be more 
bills introduced in Congress and also higher levels of party loyalty in each party.  However, if 
every state held its primaries in the fall, there would likely be a larger number of roll calls that 
legislators miss and a decrease in party loyalty in Congress.  Taken as a whole, then, the 
decisions that states make about the timing of their primary elections greatly influence 
legislators’ activity in Congress. 
Finally, my results underscore that when studying the election-legislative behavior 
linkage, it is important to consider the ideological composition of legislators’ districts.  MCs 
respond to their election experiences in different ways depending on the ideological composition 
of their constituencies.  When looking at the effects of primaries on legislators’ issue priorities, I 
find that the extent to which incumbents refocus their agendas on issues that are important to the 
party base is driven by district ideology, with much larger effects for those from homogenous 
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districts.  This is because the issue priorities of the party base and that of the larger district more 
closely align in such districts.  Because of this, MCs with primaries in homogenous districts 
become more active on the policy priorities of the party base during the primary campaign 
season.  In heterogeneous districts where the policy priorities of the party base and that of the 
larger district are not as aligned, legislators with primaries in these districts do not have the same 
incentives to become more responsive to the party base in the content of their issue agendas. 
Elections as the Democratic Ideal? 
Given my findings, we can now return to the question that I set forth at the beginning of 
this dissertation about whether competitive elections are inherently good for democracy.  
Competition, it has been long argued, gives citizens choices about who will represent them in 
government.  If an incumbent is not fulfilling the wishes of his or her constituents, voters can 
elect someone else.  Knowing this, the threat of defeat drives incumbents to represent and 
respond to the interests of their constituents (Fiorina 1972; Froman 1963; Griffin 2006; MacRae 
1952; Schumpeter 1972).  Elections, then, are the mechanism that citizens have to hold their 
elected representatives accountable.  Without competition, many argue, representative 
government cannot be achieved. 
As Dahl (1956) notes, elections “are crucial processes for insuring that political leaders 
with be somewhat responsive to the preferences of some ordinary citizens” (131).  The results in 
my empirical analyses indicate that primary competition enhances responsiveness.  But, the 
findings are like a double-edged sword—in some ways competition has good effects on 
representation, and in other ways competition has bad effects on representation.  What this 
means is that although competition leads MCs to become more responsive to their constituents, 
and in the case of primaries this means the party base, responsiveness does not always make for 
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good representation.  In short, responsiveness to a few may lead to less representation for the 
whole. 
First, during the primary campaign season, those with primaries tend to return to their 
districts to campaign.  It is important for MCs to be connected to their districts, and constituents 
expect MCs to be in the communities for which they serve at regular intervals (Fenno 1978).  
However, legislators with primaries tend to be less present in Washington, DC during their 
primary campaigns.  This means that MCs are representing their districts less in Congress than 
they would if they were not challenged in the primary.  Thus, primaries, and competition more 
broadly, may sometimes hurt the quality of representation. 
In addition, my findings also point to primaries as contributing to enhanced partisanship 
in Congress.  Primaries have longed been associated with increased polarization in Congress 
(Burden 2001; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope; Fiorina and Levendusky 2006; King 2003).  Over 
time, both parties have become more internally homogenous (see Jacobson 2000; 2005).  Given 
this, the primary constituencies of both parties tend to nominate ideologically extreme candidates 
who then go on to Washington, DC and act as ideologues in Congress (Fiorina and Levendusky 
2006).   
Polarization in Congress is often criticized for producing increased tension between the 
parties and gridlock.  My findings indicate primaries may feed into this growing divide.  MCs 
with primaries become more partisan in their legislative behavior during their primary campaign 
seasons.  Of course, not all MCs have primaries, but in the average Congress 21 percent of 
incumbents have at least a token primary challenger.  In most cases, MCs with primaries become 
more aligned with their parties during their primary campaigns.  As a result, primaries have can 
have a meaningful impact on partisan behavior in Congress.  
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This is not to say that primary competition always has negative outcomes. When looking 
at legislative responsiveness in terms of legislators’ policy priorities, only MCs in ideologically 
homogenous districts responded to the issue concerns of the party base in their activity in 
Congress.  Incumbents with primaries in ideological diverse districts, on the other hand, did not 
shift their attention to the policy priorities of the party base.  As discussed in Chapter 5, these 
results point to positive conclusions about the primary-legislative behavior linkage.  Because the 
general electorate and the party base closely align in homogenous districts, when incumbents 
from these districts become more active on the issues important to the party base they are better 
representing their districts.  For MCs from ideologically diverse districts, not responding to the 
policy priorities of the party base is equally as good for constituents in these districts because 
these issues are only important to a subset of the larger district constituency.  
In addition, the findings indicate that many MCs with primaries become more active in 
Congress in introducing and cosponsoring legislation, and this is also good for representation.  
Constituents want their elected representatives to be actively representing their interests in 
government (Arnold 1990), and my evidence indicates that primaries often further drive 
incumbents to become more active in Congress. 
The Tea Party Movement and Congressional Primaries 
 The Tea Party movement and the 2010 election brought with it a renewed discussion 
about the role of primaries in congressional elections.  Not only were Tea Party candidates 
winning open seats, but they were also defeating incumbents.  Indiana’s six-term moderate 
incumbent Senator Richard Lugar, for example, was defeated in the primary by Tea Party-
backed Richard Mourdock.  Although Mourdock would go on to lose in the general election to 
Representative Joe Donnelly, Lugar’s defeat was heralded as a definitive win for the Tea Party.  
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What this example highlights is that no one is immune from losing in the primary, and that this 
movement, although likely short-lived, exemplifies the ways in which primaries have become an 
important part of congressional elections.
23
 
My results indicate that movements like the Tea Party’s not only impact election 
outcomes, but likely also influence legislators’ responsiveness to the party base in Congress.  As 
an illustration, we can look at the legislative record of moderate incumbent Senator Olympia 
Snowe (R-ME).  After being threatened with a Tea Party challenge, Snowe changed her position 
in the 111
th
 Congress to support a moratorium on earmarks, a core policy concern of the Tea 
Party movement, as she attempted to inoculate herself against a potential primary challenger 
(Mercimer 2010).
24
  It is likely that this change in behavior was pervasive across Republicans in 
both the House and Senate.  As suggested, the threat of what Boatright (2013) refers to as 
“getting primaried” likely prompted incumbents to become more responsive to the party base in 
their legislative activity. 
 Given this, it may be that primaries mean more today than they did in the recent past.  In 
short, the Tea Party movement may have made incumbents in both parties respond to their 
primaries differently now than before.  The fact that such a high profile incumbent as Senator 
                                                 
23
 Support for the Tea Party Movement has declined in the 2012 and 2013 elections.  For 
example, many of those House members who rode the Tea Party wave in 2010 were defeated in 
their 2012 reelection efforts (Gray 2012).  In addition, public support for the Tea Party has 
shifted from a high of 32 percent support in 2010 to a low of 22 percent in a September 2013 poll 
(Blake 2013). 
24
 Feeling the heat of the Tea Party, Snowe would eventually go on to retire from the Senate to 
avoid a battle in the primary.  
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Lugar was defeated in the primary might have been a wakeup call to all incumbents of both 
parties—if MCs do not adhere to the interests of the party base, then they, too, may get defeated 
in the primary.  Given this, legislators with even a token challenge in primary might shift their 
behavior during the primary campaign season to a greater degree towards to policy interests of 
the party base in today’s Congress.  Even more, they may become overall more aligned with the 
issue priorities on their party base. 
Conclusion  
  The study of primaries bears on the larger question about the role of competition in 
promoting representation and responsiveness.  Competition is supposed to lead elected 
representatives to be responsive to their constituents and better represent them in Congress.  The 
two-stage nature of the election process complicates this a bit as legislators often have two 
different reelection constituencies—the primary and the general.  In my exploration of the effects 
of primaries on legislative behavior, the evidence indicates that in some ways competition works 
in the way it is supposed to.  For example, primaries induce many incumbents to become more 
active in Congress.  At the same time, there are also instances where competitive primaries lead 
MCs to be less present in Congress and also to become more partisan in their roll call voting 
behavior.  Taken as a whole, my findings show that competitive elections produce both positive 
and negative outcomes on the quality of representation in Congress.  
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